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1. A day to remember
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Wednesday February 25th, 2009. It was around 9.30AM on a gloomy morning when we 
arrived at the train station of Haarlem. I was travelling together with fellow researchers 
Kees Boersma and Pieter Wagenaar to an interview appointment around 10AM with a 
field commander at the fire station in Haarlem, safety region Kennemerland. We were 
in the data collection phase for our research project on use of information technology in 
emergency management (see: Boersma, Wagenaar and Wolbers 2012). The fire station 
was quite a walk from the train station, so we decided to take a cab. We enjoyed the 
opportunity of going to the field once more, to hear the experiences of a field commander 
in a lively region that had recently gained the responsibility for emergency response to 
Schiphol Airport. 
It was around 30 minutes into the interview –we were discussing the role of the 
up-scaling procedures with the field commander– when he abruptly stopped talking. His 
pager alarm triggered. 
10:31:33 25-02-09 PRIO 1 UGS A PELIKAANWEG LUCHTHAVEN SCHIPHOL LUCHTVAART 
INCIDENT SCHIPHOL (VOS: 6) (INC: 09) [ 344 171 349 346 342 748 198 563 574 590 584 195 594 
194 193 ]
"So… a VOS6, he stated remarkably calm. "A VOS6 is something serious…" He remained 
silent for about half a minute, after which he continued his explanation: "VOS6 stands for 
aviation accident at Schiphol Airport. Category 6 means the plane has actually crashed 
and has between 50-250 persons on board. If you don’t mind, it’s probably best to end 
the interview". He excused himself and promptly left the room, heading towards the 
crash site in the role of field commander. 
We just witnessed the start of the response to, what would later be regarded as, 
one of the largest aviation disasters the Netherlands has known. Turkish Airlines Boeing 
737-800, flight 1951, stalled on the final approach to runway 18R of Schiphol Airport. The 
pilots failed to respond adequately after losing too much airspeed caused by a defect 
radio altimeter. The aircraft crashed into a ploughed field just before the runway, near 
highway A9. Unfortunately, nine people (including the three pilots) lost their lives and 86 
were wounded, of which 25 serious and 55 sustained minor injuries. 
10:36:05 25-02-09 PRIO 1 UGS A PELIKAANWEG LUCHTHAVEN SCHIPHOL LUCHTVAART 
INCIDENT SCHIPHOL (VOS: 6) (INC: 09) (GRIP: 3 schiphol)
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Back at the fire station people were rapidly walking down the hallway. The GRIP3 level of 
the Dutch upscaling protocol had been activated, calling Tactical- (Incident Commanders) 
and Strategic Commanders (Mayor and Regional Commanding Officers) to various 
incident command rooms. We could hear bits and pieces of anxious conversations in 
the hallway, "Shall I come along?" and "Do you have any information yet?" Blue light 
flashes and the sound of sirens filled the surroundings, while we witnessed the largest 
deployment of emergency vehicles I had ever seen. Fire engines, ambulances, and other 
special geared trucks pulled out from the fire station. 
While we witnessed the start of a massive emergency response operation from 
the main fire station in Haarlem, the calmness of the field commander had struck me. 
I wondered: how are that many different emergency response units able to coordinate 
in such a challenging environment? This question triggered my creative leap and would 
remain the central focus of my PhD research. At a later stage, when I was better informed 
by the theoretical debate, I transformed my initial question into the following main 
research question: how do emergency responders coordinate the response operation 
across the boundaries of their organizations in fast paced environments?
Several months later the first evaluation reports appeared, applauding the 
professionalism of the response operation. The public opinion about the emergency 
response operation to the Turkish Airlines crash was generally positive. The headline on 
the national newspaper ‘NRC-Next’ of February 27th, 2009 is illustrative of this opinion: 
"No disaster after the disaster". Although the media applauded the professionalism and 
promptness of the emergency response operation, the public investigation reports of the 
Inspectorate of Justice and Safety (IoJS) and the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) also noted 
some hard to solve challenges. As it turned out, these challenges where not unique to this 
response operation, but were similar to the organizing challenges that were identified in 
emergency responses worldwide. 
In the following paragraphs I will explore the organizing challenges that emerge 
during coordination processes in emergency response operations. A key characteristic 
of these challenges is that they are based upon opposing coordination approaches that 
exist simultaneously, but are in apparent contradiction with each other. I will explore these 
contradictions by using a paradox perspective. With a paradox perspective it becomes 
possible to explore how organizations can attend to competing demands simultaneously 
(Smith and Lewis 2011), which, as we will see, is a key characteristic of emergency 
management. Following Smith and Lewis (2011) I regard a paradox as: "contradictory yet 
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interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time; such elements seem 
logical when considered in isolation, but irrational and inconsistent when juxtaposed" 
(Smith and Lewis 2011, p. 387). A paradox is different from a dichotomy in the sense 
that: "taken singly, each proposition is incontestable, but taken together they seem to be 
inconsistent incompatible" (Poole and Van de Ven 1989, p. 563). 
My analysis of the public investigation reports indicated that three paradoxes 
emerged during the response operation to the Turkish Airlines crash. Using these 
paradoxes will enable me to show the layeredness of the coordination challenges, that 
include the coordination of on-scene action, information sharing, expertise, and network 
relations. I will use the paradoxes to illustrate the main coordination challenges in this 
particular response operation, and subsequently link them with the central theoretical 
phenomena discussed in the upcoming chapters of this dissertation: 
1. designed and emergent coordination;
2. administrative and expertise coordination; 
3. centralized and networked coordination.
1.1 Designed and Emergent Coordination 
The first challenge in the report of the Dutch Safety Board (2010) identified that the first 
fire engines responding from both Schiphol Airport and the regional fire stations had 
trouble locating the crash site. Crash tenders drove down the runway and did not see 
the aircraft, because it crashed behind a dike that obscured the view from the runway. 
Accidentally, around the same time, an ambulance passing by on the A9 highway from 
the adjacent safety region ‘Noord-Holland-Noord’ spotted the aircraft. The driver 
passed the information to his Emergency Response Center (ERC) in Alkmaar. However, 
the location of the crash site was not communicated to the ERC in Haarlem, which was 
responsible for the dispatch to the crash site. In the ERC in Haarlem several calls came in 
from citizens that had seen the crash site, but this information was not shared between 
the dispatchers in the ERC working in the same room, in the first chaotic moments of the 
response operation (often symbolically characterized as the ‘fog of war’). Consequently, 
as the first official call came from the Schiphol tower that had lost the aircraft on the radar, 
the ERC dispatchers (incorrectly) activated the VOS6 procedure meant for a plane crash 
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on the Schiphol Airport grounds. However, the actual crash occurred in a ploughed field 
just outside the Schiphol airport perimeter. The consequence was that all incoming units 
were directed to UGS A (a designated staging area at Schiphol), as the VOS6 procedure 
prescribes, instead of directly to the crash site. 
Figure 1. Location of the crash site in the path of runway 18R
The logic behind the VOS procedure is that emergency services cannot freely drive on the 
airport grounds, but must be marshaled by airport police to avoid collision with aircrafts 
and other airport traffic. The activation of the VOS6 procedure thus let first responders 
believe that they were responding to a crash on the airport grounds. When they could 
not locate the crash site on the airport grounds, a new search had to be initiated in 
the surrounding areas. Valuable time was lost due to this confusion. The Dutch Safety 
Board concluded that "the consequence of activating a VOS6 was that the regional fire 
department reached the crash site only after approximately half an hour" (DSB 2012, p. 6). 
The trouble with locating the crash site and the discussion around activating the (in)
correct procedures illustrates that emergency responders have to make quick decisions, 
often based on incomplete information. These decisions, in the first moments of the 
response operation, are often hard to revise once they have been made. As such, we 
have to question the effectiveness of coordinating based on predefined plans and 
procedures in fast paced environments. Still, the activation of the VOS6 procedure also 
had a positive side to it. When we interviewed the field commander several months after 
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the response operation, he explained that for him and other units it was a blessing that 
the VOS6 procedure had been activated. Once the crash site was located, it meant that 
the Schiphol military police units were positioned at strategic points on the airport to 
guide the emergency units from the UGS to the crash site. This allowed a faster guidance 
of units and resources, once the crash site was located. 
Standard operating procedures, like the VOS procedure, are designed coordination 
mechanisms that function by structuring the response operation in advance, and allow 
professionals to fall back upon well thought out plans of action, known to everybody 
in the organization (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). In this way, in stressful and dynamic 
environments less time is needed to structure the organizational response itself. This 
allows commanders to focus on other priorities in the first moments of the response 
operation. Like the actual use of the VOS6 procedure shows, contingencies in the 
response operation often turn out to be more complex than anticipated in the original 
procedures. Once emergency responders arrive at the disaster scene predetermined 
plans need to be adapted to the dynamically unfolding situation at hand. Therefore, to 
explain the actual coordination processes at the incident scene, the emphasis must not 
only lie on studying designed coordination mechanisms, but also on understanding the 
nature of emergent coordination (Bechky and Okhuysen 2011, Bigley and Roberts 2001). 
Recent studies have shown that in addition to standard operating procedures, mutual 
adaptation, improvisation, and ad-hoc networking are important elements of emergent 
coordination that enable first responders to adapt to changing circumstances at the 
disaster site (Kapucu 2006, Comfort 2007, Moynihan 2009). Therefore, it is important to 
consider in what way the tension between designed and emergent coordination manifests 
in the on-scene coordination processes.
Shifting the perspective towards organizational theories opens the door for more 
extensive theorizing on how the tension between designed and emergent coordination 
manifests. Traditionally, in the ‘design school’, coordination is explained from an 
information processing logic (March and Simon 1958, Lawrence et al. 1967, Van de 
Ven et al. 1976, Argote 1982). This logic supposes that each coordination mechanism 
has certain information processing capabilities that can be utilized in different kinds of 
environments. In stable environments, coordination can be achieved by using procedures 
that have a low information processing capability. That is, procedures prescribe a specific 
way of working, but do not provide a means to transfer additional information. In contrast, 
more dynamic environments require coordination mechanisms with higher information 
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processing capabilities. These are for instance group meetings that allow a more elaborate 
processing of information. Following this logic, optimum coordination takes place when a 
mechanism is selected that closely matches the dynamics of the situation. 
However, one of the key features of coordinating in dynamic environments is that 
circumstances change more rapidly and unexpectedly than anticipated. Recent studies 
illustrate that ongoing adaptation is required as fast paced environments are often too 
unstable for aligning coordination mechanisms with predefined contingencies (Bigley and 
Roberts 2001, Faraj and Xiao 2006, Kellogg et al. 2008). This shows the limits of the 
information processing logic, as this logic supposes that contingencies can be assessed 
beforehand, and that predefined coordination mechanisms actually fit the situation 
at hand (Faraj and Xiao 2006). This is not possible in dynamic environments as the 
environment is prone to change and predefined interdependencies emerge differently in 
practice. Hence, classic coordination theories based on an information processing logic 
do not sufficiently incorporate the organizing dynamics we recognize in fast response 
organizations (Klein et al. 2006, Bigley and Roberts 2001). Therefore, the information 
processing logic does not offer a holistic approach for explaining how coordination 
processes actually occur in dynamic environments. 
Studies that explore how coordination processes occur in dynamic environments 
show that on the one hand, unambiguous command is needed for the timely direction of 
the involved units, while on the other hand flexibility, and on-the-spot decision making 
is required to adapt to the continuously changing situation (Bigley and Roberts 2001, 
Moynihan 2009, Comfort 2007, Majchrzak et al. 2007). When professionals need to 
combine the best of these two worlds simultaneously, it results in paradoxical demands 
between following the designed coordination mechanisms or opting for an emergent 
solution (Poole and Van de Ven 1989, Smith and Lewis 2011, Bigley and Roberts 2001). 
This is the paradoxical relation between designed and emergent coordination that is 
present in emergency management. This paradox illustrates that coordination is not so 
straightforward as matching predesigned mechanisms with emerging contingencies. 
As the contingencies become more complex, local on-scene adaptations are necessary 
to continue the operation. While these adaptations create flexibility, they also increase 
ambiguity and diminish the predictability of the outcome of designed procedures that 
partly restricts coordination based on anticipation (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). In other 
words, designed and emergent coordination cannot be seen separate from each other. To 
understand how their paradoxical relation develops in action, it is helpful to zoom in on 
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how crisis managers manage between following procedures and adapting on-scene. This 
requires zooming in (Nicolini 2009) on how crisis managers actually deal with adapting 
to a continuously changing, or emergent environment, while departing from a designed 
coordination structure. 
Practice based studies offer a tradition that facilitates this by zooming in on what 
people actually do in organizing (Nicolini 2006, Schatzki et al. 2001). Like Orr (1998, p.439) 
describes: it focuses on "what is actually done in the doing of work and how those doing it 
make sense of their practice" (Orr 1998, p. 439). As practice based studies zoom in on the 
performance of ongoing work, organizing processes are central in this approach (Tsoukas 
and Chia 2002). Organizing processes are interlinked, on-going, and contextualized 
streams of activities that are enacted by individuals (Orlikowski 2000, Faraj and Xiao 2006). 
As such, people’s work practices constitute the process of organizing by them. Bourdieu 
(1990, p. 12) defines practices as "generative formulas reflecting the modus operandi", 
or simpler said, the manner of working. He characterizes practices as constantly in flux, 
because they are not based upon conscious, constant rules. Instead, practices are based 
upon practical schemes that are embodied by individuals, and vary according to the logic 
of the situation. Consequently, the manner in which individuals experience, or make sense 
of, the environment shapes what kind of activities they undertake (Brown and Duguid 
2001). This corresponds with the idea that crisis managers have to constantly make sense 
of, and adapt to, a changing environment. Therefore, a practice view helps understand 
how the process of coordination is executed or neglected, and how crisis managers deal 
with and make sense of the paradoxes they are confronted with.
In this dissertation will I use a practice based perspective to study cross-boundary 
coordination in action. Practice based studies of coordination have focused mostly on 
practices occurring within a single organization (e.g. Orlikowski 2002, Bechky 2003, 
Carlile 2004, Faraj and Xiao 2006, Bechky and Okhuysen 2011, Hsiao et al. 2012). What 
has been underexposed in the practice debate is that not only do organizations face 
more and more volatile and specialized environments that require collaboration between 
professionals, the collaboration also increasingly takes places across the boundaries of 
different organizations (Brusoni and Prencipe 2001). That is why there is a necessity to 
study coordination across the boundaries of organizations. There is limited knowledge 
on what constitutes coordination through work practices that cross the boundaries of 
organizations operating in dynamic environments, and how actors deal with and make 
sense of these organizational boundaries. It’s my objective to explain more precisely how 
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crisis managers practice cross-boundary coordination, while dealing with the paradoxical 
demand between operating based on designed coordination and incorporating the need 
for emergent coordination.
1.2 Administrative and Expertise Coordination 
How challenging dealing with the paradoxical demand of designed and emergent 
coordination may seem, unfortunately this was not the only concern the emergency 
responders faced in their response to the Turkish Airlines crash. The second challenge 
described in the public investigation reports was that common understanding between 
different organizational actors was compromised at several moments during the response 
operation. During the response operation a deviating understanding existed about the 
number of victims that are transported to different hospitals (IoJS 2009a, p.13). “At a 
certain point no-one knows who is doing what. That the victims are transported to hospitals 
rather quickly, is because of the professionals in the field who just transported the patients 
to a hospital, despite of a missing command structure”. (IoJS 2009a, p.97). This is a rather 
bold statement in the incident report, but indeed tactical and strategic command units 
had trouble getting validated information from the field. Improvised action at the crash 
site by medics triggered new, and obstructed existing information flows in the network of 
collaborating actors. The following example shows clearly how this occurred.
At the moment the first ambulance arrives at the crash site 18 minutes after the 
crash at 10:44AM, its crew starts a triage of the amount and severity of wounded victims. 
The incident report describes that this is immediately problematic, as several victims have 
already left the crash site by themselves and are transported to a temporary shelter, a 
nearby barn, with help from bystanders, fire department, and police units (IoJS 2009a). 
Sometime later, two trauma doctors arrive at the temporary shelter, observe the situation, 
and decide to intervene. They believe it is necessary to perform a second triage. The 
trauma doctors assess that 19 victims are incorrectly identified as slightly wounded (Triage 
Category 3); 17 are seriously injured (Triage Category 2) and two of them are severely 
injured (Triage Category 1). In addition, the doctors judge that all of these victims need to 
be transported to the hospital to check for a ‘high energetic trauma’, due to the severity of 
the crash speed of 180 km/h (IoJS 2009a, p.91). As a result the 19 victims are transported 
to the hospital immediately, and all other passengers in a later stage. 
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The information about the second triage and the new triage status of the victims never 
reached the other crisis management teams (IoJS 2009a, p.66). Due to the different 
locations at which the triage has taken place, different numbers of victims with different 
triage statuses spread throughout the continuously evolving and expanding response 
network. For a long time it is unclear to the public authorities how many wounded there 
are and what their status is. In the end it took four days to validate the incomplete lists 
gathered from various on-site medical teams with lists in the 13 involved hospitals (IoJS 
2009a, pp. 93-94). The final count shows that 57 victims were transported with ambulances 
from the crash site, 42 victims were transported from the mobile field hospital and 25 
victims were transported with own means of transportation. These numbers illustrate the 
diffuse situation the crisis teams had to deal with.
Triage is a medical decision making process meant for prioritizing transport of injured 
to the hospital, and for assessing the medical capacity required for the transport (Koenig 
and Schultz 1994). Yet, the previous situation shows that triage information is also used 
for interpreting the number and severity of wounded by other (non-medical) response 
organizations. It is a well-known concern in emergency response operations that crisis 
managers with different backgrounds, specialized operational expertise, and different 
professional languages need to coordinate across their jurisdictional and organizational 
boundaries (Comfort and Kapucu 2006). This offers a multilayered coordination challenge, 
as the gathering of victim information requires the crossing of jurisdictional boundaries, 
which includes the regulation of authority, legitimization, and the application of expertise. 
This is especially the case for communicating information about the number and severity 
of wounded. Providing the correct number of victims is an important aspect for different 
response organizations in their (public) crisis communication. When multiple response 
organizations use and interpret triage information, misunderstandings about the status 
and number of victims will likely reverberate throughout the entire emergency response 
network, causing extensive coordination problems. 
I will characterize this coordination problem in terms of administrative and expertise 
coordination. Administrative coordination is based on tangible resources, such as 
documents, checklists, and standard operating procedures, which are employed for routine 
tasks. For more complex, non-routine tasks, administrative coordination is insufficient. 
Managing complex tasks requires expertise coordination, the management of knowledge 
and skills. Expertise coordination is much harder to grasp because professional judgment 
and skills remain embodied in the craftsmanship and proficiency of professionals (Faraj 
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and Sproull 2000). As such, expertise coordination often occurs implicitly between groups 
that have a similar proficiency, through anticipation and dynamic adjustment (Rico et al. 
2008). For instance, when firefighters estimate the hose length for frontline teammates, 
they do not explicitly discuss so, but will continuously adjust in course of the operation. 
In the aftermath of the Turkish Airlines crash expertise coordination is visible through the 
‘expert’ on-scene reassessment for another triage by the trauma doctors. Paradoxically, 
this expertise coordination directly influenced the validity of the ongoing administrative 
coordination of triage numbers between the involved command centers. As a second 
triage was performed based on the expert assessment of the trauma doctors, it conflicted 
with the ongoing administration of triage classifications, as new triage statuses were given. 
The expert assessment that all passengers need to be checked for a high energetic trauma 
in a hospital poses a formidable logistical task for the medical agencies. Hence, similar 
to designed and emergent coordination, administrative and expertise coordination also 
have a paradoxical relation since expertise judgment often coincides with administrative 
procedures.
When expertise is coordinated across the boundaries of organizations it is likely 
that professionals have different backgrounds and knowledge. As a result common 
understanding is often limited, as each actor relies on his own training and expertise 
for assessing the situation. Once different actors interpret the situation from their own 
background, differences in judgement of interdependencies and subsequent coordination 
requirements appear. This is regarded as problematic in the coordination debate since 
common understanding is a key integrative condition for coordination (Okhuysen and 
Bechky 2009). Common understanding is required to oversee the whole, assess what 
interdependencies arise and how they should be managed. Therefore, in the coordination 
debate a considerable amount of attention has been paid to how boundaries can be 
bridged to develop common understanding (Carlile 2004). 
The debate on cross-boundary coordination of knowledge centers around 
three boundary-spanning models: trading, sharing and knowing (Hsiao et al. 2012). 
These different boundary spanning models focus on different kinds of cross-boundary 
coordination processes. In the ‘trading model’ coordination is achieved through 
negotiation of interests, while in the ‘sharing model’ the exchange of knowledge is 
central, and in the ‘knowing model’ the process of learning is emphasized. Each model 
identifies a different boundary spanning process that has a different logic and duration. 
The ‘knowing model’ emphasizes long term learning processes by studying how members 
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of different communities can gradually acquire knowledge through participating in each 
other’s craft (Hsiao et al. 2012, Brown and Duguid 2001, Lave and Wenger 1990). Learning 
how the other party operates, what language they use, and how they solve problems, 
helps to cross similar boundaries in the future (Hsiao et al. 2012). In the ‘sharing model’ 
transferring, translating and transforming knowledge is put central (Carlile 2004, Bechky 
2003). It’s argued that experts need to communicate ambiguous meanings across the 
boundary of their organizations so simply transferring knowledge is often not enough. 
Instead, in the process of boundary spanning, knowledge needs to be ‘translated’ to 
establish common meaning, or ‘transformed’ to support the negotiation of contested 
meanings. 
Yet, as the triage process in the aftermath of the Turkish Airlines crash shows, the 
problem that fast response organizations face, develops too fast for learning and entails 
more than merely translating knowledge. Experts need to coordinate in an environment 
that is unknown, difficult to oversee, and that is characterized by unexpected and 
continuous change. This dynamic environment makes it very difficult to develop and 
sustain common understanding. Moreover, action and expertise are often distributed 
and need to be employed immediately, to prevent the situation from escalating or 
deteriorating. Studies about organizations operating in fast paced environments stress 
the limitations of developing common understanding for coordination (Kellogg et al. 
2008). This is reflected in the ‘trading model’, in which members of different communities 
coordinate their actions temporarily and locally, navigating their differences in norms 
and interests only as needed (Kellogg et al. 2008). During the trading process experts 
make information visible through representations of the situation, which function as a 
shared medium to support the coordination process (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). 
I will conceptualize these representations as boundary objects (Star and Griesemer 
1989). Boundary objects are representations that help to cross boundaries between two 
intersecting social worlds. They are generally treated as means of translation based on 
their interpretive flexibility, as different groups develop different interpretations of the 
same object (Star 2010, Pickering 2003). A boundary object facilitates the cross-boundary 
coordination process as actors with different backgrounds try to find enough common 
ground to understand their interdependencies, while retaining their differences. 
In emergency management a boundary object often takes the shape of a ‘Common 
Operational Picture’ (COP). A Common Operational Picture represents a map of the 
disaster area that is used for coordination by pinpointing important objects, as well as 
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the progress of the response operation (Wolbers and Boersma 2013). Using the Common 
Operational Picture to represent the disaster site helps crisis managers to quickly display 
the state of affairs, while they can negotiate their different interpretations of the situation. 
Maps are general enough to provide quick overview, while different users can still interpret 
them in different ways. Therefore, it is commonly claimed that boundary objects have a 
capability of being malleable enough to adapt to different local needs and routines, while 
at the same time being robust enough to foster common understanding (Trompette and 
Vinck 2009, Star and Griesemer 1989, Star 2010). In the boundary objects literature a lot 
of attention has been paid to the different manifestations of the boundary object itself 
(Zeiss and Groenewegen 2009). Relatively little, however, is known about the process 
of how the boundary object is configured in-use. Especially in emergency management 
crisis managers from multiple disciplines have to continuously update the Common 
Operational Picture to match changing contingencies. Therefore, the boundary object 
is continuously changed in course of the response operation. To study this process of 
change I will zoom in on the coordination processes through which boundary objects are 
constructed and configured in use throughout the response operation. This perspective 
moves the attention away from the object itself, to the process of its construction and 
use. It helps to understand in more detail how boundary objects develop and change 
during the coordination process, which generates a more complete understanding of the 
processes that support or inhibit cross-boundary coordination. 
In crisis management the Common Operational Picture is receiving progressively 
more attention, as it’s recognized that representations of the disaster scene are an important 
coordination mechanism for supporting the development of situational awareness (Endsley 
1995, Comfort 2004, Wolbers and Boersma 2013). Finding the appropriate technological 
infrastructure for the Common Operational Picture has been considered a key challenge. 
However, this technological solution is rooted in an ‘information warehousing logic’, 
which implies information can be collected, sorted and exchanged in an accessible and 
univocal form. Yet, the focus on the technological aspect of information management is 
decreasing the concern for social and organizational processes, as for instance, in practice 
professionals interpret similar information differently. Therefore, it is valuable to focus on 
how emergency responders try to develop common understanding by making sense of 
information (Weick et al. 2005, Maitlis and Sonenshein 2010). To capture these aspects 
of coordinating with help of a Common Operational Picture, I will use a sensemaking 
perspective to show how crisis managers attribute different meanings to information 
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that can help or distort information sharing. A sensemaking perspective is appropriate 
since it focuses on how actors interpret information, and how they try to develop a 
shared understanding of the same information. This provides a more holistic, embodied 
perspective on the process of information sharing during cross-boundary coordination. 
1.3 Centralized and Networked Coordination 
The third challenge described in the public investigation reports was the information 
management between different crisis management teams, operational in the GRIP3 
emergency state. Several agencies and teams were active quite rapidly, but were deprived 
of information for several hours (IoJS 2009a, p.66). This led to coordination problems 
between the medical organizations in the now rapidly expanding emergency response 
network. Providing emergency care for 86 wounded overwhelmed the local medical 
response capacity, but fortunately the VOS6 protocol didn’t only designate staging 
areas; it also activated the procedures to call 3 Mobile Medical Trauma teams (MMT) and 
64 ambulances to the crash site (IoJS 2009a). Furthermore, it notified dispatchers that 
between 7 and 13 hospitals had to be warned to create emergency trauma room capacity. 
Emergency response centers throughout the Netherlands received the call and rerouted 
their ambulances to the crash site. 
While the initial dispatch of 64 ambulances was fast, the quick capacity buildup 
created additional problems. In the heat of the moment dispatchers only warned 6 
hospitals and failed to call in the MMTs in first instance (DSB 2012). As the focus was 
on building ambulance response capacity, limited attention was paid to the information 
needs of other partners in the medical response network. This led to several problems in 
the periphery of the network. As no calls came in several hospitals anticipated on a large 
amount of wounded at own initiative, kept trauma rooms at bay, and called in additional 
surgical capacity. This forced several hospitals to cancel their planned surgeries to keep 
trauma care available, but they were not notified when the number of severely wounded 
was far less than expected (IoJS 2009a). 
It’s a well-known phenomenon in emergency medical care that organizing 
a coherent triage, transportation, and registration during mass casualty situations 
leads to coordination issues (Tierney 1985, Koenig and Schultz 1994). Monitoring the 
status and location of casualties requires consistent communication between a wide 
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spectrum of medical actors: the medical officer, casualty transport coordinator, mobile 
field hospital commander, ambulances crews, emergency response centers, national 
ambulance dispatch center, and hospitals. To make matters more complicated, police 
and municipalities share responsibility for casualty registration and communicating 
information to victims’ relatives.
The common solution for structuring communication and enabling fast decision-
making is by employing a centralized command and control structure, in which 
communication lines and authority are formalized. Command and control structures 
are known for their hierarchical decision capacities and clear role structures, and are a 
powerful instrument for accomplishing tasks characterized by repetition and uniformity 
(Quarantelli and Dynes 1977). Its underlying premises is that when the organizations 
involved in the response operation match the existing command structures, centralized 
coordination forms a quick and effective solution. Yet, such a system is difficult to maintain 
in a dynamic environment in which a large number of organizations become involved and 
membership fluctuates over time. Like I have argued in the previous paragraphs, in these 
situations command and control structures insufficiently account for the decentralization 
and flexibility that is required during the response operation. 
Similarly, the coordination process in the aftermath of the Turkish airlines crash 
shows that the dynamics occurring around medical logistics cannot be understood 
completely in terms of centralized coordination. The problems response organizations 
are confronted with outgrow the span of control of the existing command and control 
structure, as organizational and jurisdictional boundaries need to be crossed. This 
calls for a coordination structure that is able to account for the distributed nature of 
this coordination problem: networked coordination. Due to its enhanced capacity for 
adaptation to fluctuations in the environment, networked coordination is found to be 
more effective to deal with the distributed nature of information and decisional challenges 
under pressure (Moynihan 2008a, 2009). Therefore, centralized command structures are 
gradually extended with or transformed into inter-organizational networks to provide a 
structure through which distributed crisis response activities can be coordinated (Topper 
and Carley 1999, Moynihan 2008a). 
An important coordination challenge of networked coordination is that as new 
organizations are included in the network, information sharing becomes increasingly 
complex, as information flows through the network from various positions at different 
times. This occurs because response organizations have operational field units at different 
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levels, different functional command structures, and separate back-offices for information 
and resource management (Comfort and Kapucu 2006). Therefore, a rapidly evolving 
network triggers an information flow that is in flux. The research challenge is that, as 
Topper and Carley (1999) argue, much remains unclear about how information flows 
through the network and what networked coordination looks like in terms of structural 
evolution. In other words, how does information sharing in response networks develop, 
and how does this affect cross-boundary coordination?
To depict these network dynamics I will focus on how to capture the time critical 
nature of the communication and coordination during a response operation. While a 
lot of network studies try to depict and conceptualize the characteristics of networked 
coordination, they fail to take into account its processual nature. Hence, it is important to 
explore the time critical processes that constitute the network, to develop a better idea 
of the dynamics underlying networked coordination.
1.4 Defining cross-boundary coordination
Where does the previous analysis of the coordination issues during the Turkish Airlines 
crash leave us? The set of three paradoxes -designed and emergent coordination, 
administrative and expertise coordination, and centralized and networked coordination- 
all have their own specific way of conceptualizing cross-boundary coordination. Still, if 
one important aspect of coordination stands out from the case of the Turkish airlines 
crash, it is that the processes are interrupted when the officers experience and create 
different sorts of boundaries, while they need to coordinate simultaneously with multiple 
sets of actors in a very limited time frame. The manifestation of boundaries makes it 
difficult for organizations to foresee the consequences of their actions in relation to the 
whole in a turbulent environment, where there is an immediate need to act.
This features in the incident reports when information that is required for coordination 
tends to be shared only in a specific functional or organizational setting, and it is likely 
to stay only in that ‘silo’ or ‘stovepipe’ (Roberts 2011). For example, the combination of 
a geographical and a jurisdictional boundary is encountered when the location of the 
crash site was known almost instantly by the ERC in Alkmaar, but this information was 
not communicated on time with the ERC in Haarlem. A different type of boundary is 
encountered during the triage of victims. What seems as a logical intervention for the 
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trauma doctors is not immediately recognized and communicated due to a knowledge 
boundary between the emergency management officials. Ultimately, what stands out 
from these examples is that different boundaries emerge, at different locations and at 
different times, that hamper coordination. To understand the different coordination issues 
during the Turkish Airlines crash it is necessary to unpack the concept of boundaries. 
I consider a boundary as a demarcation that marks the limits of a common set of 
practices, which may include functional and hierarchical boundaries, as well as, knowledge, 
cultural, temporal, and spatial boundaries (Hsiao et al. 2012, Carlile 2002, Beckhy 2004, 
Levina and Vaast 2005, Orlikowski 2002). Boundaries are not fixed entities or obstructions 
waiting out there to impede coordination between different parties. Instead, boundaries 
as social objects are shaped by spatial locations, temporality, personal interpretations, 
patterns of interactions, and formal and perceived accountabilities (Barley and Kunda, 
2001). As such, boundaries are created and perceived by individuals; they are socially 
constructed. Regarding boundaries as social constructions allows me to reflect upon 
whether boundaries themselves are problematic during coordination, or whether cross-
boundary coordination actually depends more on how people socially reconstruct a 
boundary. 
Treated in this way, boundaries form a discontinuity, and therefore require actors to 
negotiate the way in which the boundary shapes the collaboration beyond the discontinuity 
(Watson-Manheim et al. 2012). When a boundary is encountered during coordination it 
momentarily inhibits actors from grasping the nature of the interdependencies between 
them. Difficulties to grasp interdependencies can emerge due to knowledge differences, 
different expectations, or unexpected changes during the coordination process. To be 
able to coordinate based on a new situated understanding of how interdependencies can 
be managed, actors have put effort in crossing the perceived boundary between them. 
This activity is commonly addressed as boundary spanning, which occurs, for instance, 
through redefining roles (Okhuysen and Beckhy 2009), crafting boundary objects (Star and 
Griesemer 1989, Carlile 2002), negotiating interests (Vaughan 1999, Kellogg et al. 2006), 
sharing knowledge (Carlile 2004), engaging in epistemic contestation (Faraj and Xiao 
2006), or creating shared understanding (Hsiao et al. 2012, Bechky 2004). My definition 
of cross-boundary coordination can be derived from this conceptualization of boundaries. 
I define cross-boundary coordination as a temporally unfolding and contextualized 
process of managing interdependencies in response to the discontinuity of a boundary, in 
order to realize a collective performance (Malone and Crowston 1994, Faraj and Xiao 2006, 
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Okhuysen and Bechky 2009, Watson-Manheim et al. 2012). In this definition coordination 
is treated as a process (Jarzabkowski et al. 2012, Gkeredakis 2014) that temporarily 
unfolds on the basis of the perceived contextualization of the interdependencies by 
different actors. During this coordination process actors may encounter different sorts 
of boundaries that offer discontinuities, which need to be overcome in order to align 
their interests (Watson-Manheim et al. 2012). This definition leaves us to question how 
the process of managing interdependencies occurs in the challenging and dynamic 
environment of emergency response. 
1.5 Research Methodology
Emergency management provides a dynamic empirical field to study cross-boundary 
coordination. As we have witnessed in the analysis of the Turkish Airlines crash, cross-
boundary coordination is a multi-layered phenomenon, as it occurs at the level of task 
execution, regulation of authority, information sharing, and during the application of 
expertise. The locus of these different coordination processes can be traced back to 
the incident site when emergency officers from different organizations and their field 
commander need to understand each other and synchronize their interdependent actions 
in a very limited time frame. Giving attention to these actors helps to gain understanding 
of how cross-boundary coordination unfolds in these fast-paced environments. 
Intriguing about the operations at the disaster site is that officers in command 
face paradoxical demands in their work practices, that entail working in predefined 
structural designs based on protocols and procedures, while the situation calls for rapid 
adaptations based on their expert judgment. As these adaptations take place in changing 
configurations, different types of boundaries are encountered that need to be bridged. 
This occurs in a ‘pressure cooker’ in which time pressure pushes the officers to make 
rapid decisions in a context that is very difficult for them to oversee. These fast-paced 
dynamics provide a major challenge for cross-boundary coordination and allow me, 
as an organizational scientist, to challenge existing and develop new conceptual and 
theoretical inferences about the nature of cross-boundary coordination practices in fast-
paced environments. 
To capture the complexity of how these multilayered coordination processes 
unfold, I will use a mixed methods research approach. This is necessary because the 
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interactions that constitute cross-boundary coordination occur at different levels, and 
boundaries emerge at different places. Consequently, different types of interactions and 
processes need to be studied at these different levels. In the different empirical studies I 
will move from the locus of practice at the field command level, towards information flows 
in the network of collaborating organizations. As the different chapters focus on different 
kinds of coordination processes, each empirical chapter employs its own appropriate 
methodological toolset, based on a different combination of methods which is justified 
accordingly. In the different chapters I will focus on four different coordination processes: 
cross-boundary coordination practices, the tailoring and configuration of boundary 
objects, processes of sensemaking and narratives, and sequences of information flows 
through the response network.
The qualitative data is collected from the winter of 2010 into the winter of 2014, 
and focuses on both field exercises and real-life incident response operations. To get 
access to the cross-boundary coordination processes in situ I observed and recorded 
40 emergency management field exercises and in a later stage interviewed the involved 
officers in command, field commanders and other experts at the operational and tactical 
level. This resulted in total in 64 formal interviews, and numerous site visits to 19 different 
safety regions in the Netherlands. The interviews with the officers that participated in the 
exercises allowed me to reflect on their actions during the exercises and to explore if and 
how they experienced similar tensions during real-life emergency response operations. 
Later I interviewed another set of 13 officers at the operational and tactical level that were 
involved in the response to a large traffic accident on a Dutch highway on June 28th 2011. 
As this incident was similar to one of the training scenario’s it allowed me to compare 
the analysis of the exercise with a real operational event. Finally, the network analysis is 
based on a document analysis and formalization of interactions described in the incident 
report about the response operation to the Schiphol Tunnel fire that occurred on July 2nd 
2009. In addition to the analysis of the Schiphol Tunnel fire report, multiple other incident 
reports are analyzed to check for descriptions of cross-boundary coordination dynamics.
As the different studies all have their own methodological approach, they are 
supported by an overall coherent approach, in which ontological assumptions and 
methodological choices are aligned (Nicolini 2012). The common ontology behind my 
methodological approach is a process ontology. A process ontology is based on the 
premise that the world is in constant movement, and consists of flows, in which things 
are reifications of the continuous process that constitute it (Tsoukas and Chia 2002). As 
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the world is considered to be in constant movement, process studies focuses on evolving 
phenomena, how and why things emerge, develop and end over time (Langley et al. 
2013). Therefore, it draws on theorizing that explicitly incorporates temporal progression 
of activities. By adopting a process approach I’m able to connect the different studies of 
cross-boundary coordination in the upcoming chapters.
To study the coordination practices I employed inductive, qualitative field studies 
during field exercises using the grounded theory approach outlined by Corbin and Strauss 
(2008). Studying a practice in general requires two basic movements: zooming in on the 
accomplishments of practice, and zooming out towards the relationships in space and 
time (Nicolini 2012). As practices are inherently contingent they cannot be understood 
without reference to a specific place and time. Therefore it is necessary to capture the 
full richness of the stream of activities and investigate how they are connected to the 
interdependencies in the environment (Barley and Kunda 2001, Langley 1999). Zooming 
in on the contingent actions of the officers in command makes the interactional order, 
temporal adaptations and artefacts they work with visible. This approach is characterized 
by an iterative process of continuously moving back and forth between the empircal 
phenomena and its theoretical reading (Alvesson and Kärreman 2007). In the end, I 
systematically abstracted this grounded data into more general patterns, and used these 
for theorizing that result in a process model (Gioia et al. 2012). 
For the study on the use of boundary objects I required more insight into the 
sequential nature of these process dynamics. To capture cross-boundary patterns of action 
over time that center around boundary objects I performed a Markov chain analysis on 
the codes of the coordination modes from the transcriptions of the field exercises. Markov 
analysis gives an indication of whether there are regularities in local sequential structure 
whereby acts are predictable from immediately preceding acts (Poole et al. 2000). By 
identifying common recurrent sequences, Markov analysis points to features of interaction 
that can then be explored in further discourse analysis when returning to the transcripts 
themselves. To visualize this structure, I utilized a visual mapping strategy (Langley 1999) 
by creating a timeline that visualized the transitions between the coordination modes. This 
timeline depicts the sequence of coordination modes as it unfolds during the episodes 
and affords a more detailed understanding of the temporal sequencing of coordination.
To capture sensemaking processes and underlying narratives I analyzed the field 
exercise transcriptions by adopting an interactional narrative analysis (Riessman 2005). 
This type of narrative analysis zooms in on the dialogue between teller and listener to 
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analyze the dialogue as a process of co-construction, where teller and listener create 
meaning collaboratively (Riessman 2005). Analyzing narratives enabled me to zoom 
into the underlying cues, roles, scripts, and recurrent action that arise from the different 
institutional context of the emergency responders, as well as their organizational values 
(Gabriel 2000). 
By using these previous methods I have zoomed in on the dilemmas of the officers in 
command on the disaster site. Yet, this does not provide the full picture of the distributed 
cross-boundary coordination challenges described earlier in the analysis of the Turkish 
Airlines crash. As the analysis of that response operation showed, it is necessary to 
zoom out because cross-boundary coordination is a multifaceted process that occurs at 
different places, and at different times. This networked coordination process is based 
on distributed information streams that evolve throughout the response network. I used 
social network analysis to study the temporal flows of information sharing processes. To 
be able to capture the temporal information sharing processes I used network analysis 
based on a process ontology that focuses on the flows of information inside the network. 
This approach does not regard the network structure of relationships as a fixed entity, 
but, instead is treated as being permanently in a state of becoming. While the network is 
continuously evolving as information is send and received by different actors at different 
times it creates an information sharing process that is in flux. By taking different snapshots 
of this network moments of temporal stability can be detected, in which the relations can 
be assessed as temporal social network structures.
1.6 Chapter overview: ‘drawing the line’ as the central metaphor 
In the upcoming chapters of my dissertation I will be unpacking the processes of cross-
boundary coordination along the lines previously articulated. I will explore, analyze, and 
theorize in what ways emergency response officials deal with the challenges they encounter 
during the coordination process. As a reader, you might recognize that the paradoxes 
between designed & emergent coordination, administrative & expertise coordination, and 
between centralized & networked coordination, offer a recurring perspective in all four 
chapters, either explicitly stated or implicitly implied. This also features in the title of this 
dissertation ‘drawing the line’, which serves as the central metaphor to connect the different 
theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches in each of the chapters.
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Chapter 2.  Picking up the Pieces: A fragmentation perspective  
on cross-boundary coordination
‘Drawing the line’ means to treat one thing different from another. In chapter two I will show 
that fragmentation is central to coordination in crisis management. Fragmentation emerges 
because ambiguous demands lead to a complexity of relationships and multiplicity of 
interpretations. In this chapter I will zoom in on how officers in command deal with such 
ambiguity by negotiating the relevance of their experienced boundaries. By showing how 
coordination is also about constructing boundaries, or metaphorically drawing different 
lines, I will illustrate that negotiation is a key aspect of cross-boundary coordination.
Chapter 3.  Drawing the Line: Tailoring boundary objects for cross-boundary 
coordination
‘Drawing the line’ is also literally done by officers in command to develop situational 
awareness by using the Common Operational Picture. Maps and drawings of the disaster 
site function as boundary objects that are used to acquire overview on the response 
operation, and to negotiate the value of different perspectives. In this chapter I will 
analyze a case where a red line is drawn on the COP in a field command meeting to 
demarcate a hazardous no-go area. Moments after a red line is drawn on the map in the 
field command meeting, a medical officer wanders off into the toxic area. This situation 
is analyzed in-depth, compared with other cases, and used to show that it’s important 
to study the configuration of boundary objects from a processual view. The inductive 
process analysis results in the distinction of four coordination modes, which show how 
boundary objects are tailored in action by moving between modes that stress integration 
or segmentation, and modes that stress an open or closed configuration. In this chapter a 
relational perspective on boundary objects-in use is developed by showing how boundary 
objects can support different coordination modes simultaneously. This generates a more 
complete understanding of the process by which the configuration of a boundary object 
is constituted in-use and why this supports or inhibits cross-boundary coordination.
Chapter 4. You Didn’t Know This Was Relevant For Us? Excuse me!
‘Drawing the line’ also means to define when the limit has been reached. In this chapter 
I will illustrate how officers at the disaster site contest and negotiate their actions by 
using a Common Operational Picture. During the negotiation process it becomes clear 
that information is often expressed only in a particular way, benefiting the actions of 
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one response organization, but diminishing the importance of the actions of others. 
This offers a new ‘trading zone’ perspective in contrast to the dominant ‘information 
warehouse’ logic many information systems scholars use in crisis management studies. By 
using sensemaking theory I will show that the officers experience different cues and enact 
coordination differently, when dissimilar lines are drawn and limits are negotiated, which 
impedes cross-boundary coordination of the response operation.
Chapter 5.  Incorporating Time Dynamics in the Analysis of Social Networks  
in Emergency Management
Finally, ‘drawing the line’ resembles the emerging connections between actors in a 
network picture. In this final chapter I zoom out towards the network level to depict the 
tension between centralized and networked coordination. The analysis of the response 
to the Schiphol tunnel fire is used to introduce a process perspective to social network 
analysis. I argue that the role of temporality and timeliness is not properly dealt with in 
network studies of emergency response networks, thus limiting our knowledge of how 
these structures evolve, enable, or constrain different coordination possibilities over time.
1.7 Chapter background
The chapters in this dissertation are based on a number of international, peer-reviewed 
publications, conference proceedings, professional publications, and presentations. 
An overview of this output is presented below, organized by empirical chapter. As our 
research group has a tradition of cooperative research, the empirical chapters of my 
dissertation are co-authored. Therefore, in these chapters the we-form is used. As a first 
author on all these manuscripts I took the lead in both the research and writing process.
Chapter 2 
Wolbers, J., F. K. Boersma, P. Groenewegen. 2014. ‘Picking up the Pieces. Towards a 
Fragmentation Perspective of Cross-boundary Coordination’. Manuscript under 
review at Organization Studies
Accepted for: the 2015 Academy of Management Meeting: Opening Governance, 
August 7-11 2015, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
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Presented at: 30th EGOS Colloquium:  Reimagining, Rethinking, Reshaping: Organiza-
tional Scholarship in Unsettled Times, July 3-5 2014, Rotterdam, Netherlands.
Presented at: 8th Annual Liverpool Symposium on Current Developments in Ethno-
graphic Research in the Social and Management Sciences: The politics of meaning 
making and meaning breaking, August 28-30 2013, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Presented at: Conference on Coordination within and among Organizations, Administra-
tive Science Quarterly (ASQ), Academy of Management OMT Division, June 2011, 
HEC, Paris, France. 
Chapter 3 
Wolbers, J., F. K Boersma, P. Groenewegen, M. S. Poole. 2015. ‘Drawing the Line. Tailoring 
boundary objects for cross-boundary coordination’. To be submitted.
Presented at: 30th EGOS Colloquium Pre-Colloquium Paper Development Workshop 
Understanding organization as process, July 2nd 2014, Rotterdam, Netherlands. 
Presented at: 29th EGOS Colloquium:  Bridging Continents, Cultures and Worldviews, 
July 4-6 2013, Montreal, Canada. 
Presented at: 3rd International Process Symposium: How Matter Matters: Objects, 
Artifacts and Materiality in Organization Studies, 16-18 June 2011, Corfu, Greece. 
Chapter 4 
Wolbers, J., K. Boersma. 2013. The Common Operational Picture as Collective 
Sensemaking, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 21(4): 186-199.
Presented as Keynote: ‘The Common Operational Picture as Collective Sensemaking’, 
Situational Awareness & Incident Management (SAIM) Symposium, 17-18 June 
2014, Joint Research Center, European Commission, Ispra, Italy.
Presented in Expert Panel: ‘Creating the Common Operational Picture with the Crowd’: 
11th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and 
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Management, (ISCRAM), 19-21 May 2014, University Park, State College, 
Pennsylvania, USA.
Wolbers, J., K. Boersma, J. de Heer. 2012. Netcentrisch Werken in Ontwikkeling. Een 
cultuuronderzoek naar multidisciplinaire samenwerking en gezamenlijke operatio-
nele beelden in de Veiligheidsregio’s. De Swart, Den Haag. 
Chapter 5 
Wolbers, J., P. Groenewegen, J. Molle, J. Bim. 2013. Incorporating Time Dynamics in 
the analysis of Social Networks in Emergency Management, Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management, 10(2): 1-31.
Passenier, D., J. Mollee, J. Wolbers, K. Boersma, P. Groenewegen. 2012. Formalization of 
crisis response coordination from a public inquiry report. In: L. Rothkrantz, J Ristvei 
& Z. Franco (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Information 
Systems for Crisis Response and Management ISCRAM 2012. Vancouver, April 
2012: 1-5
1.8 Drawing another line: beyond the focus of this dissertation
In my years as a PhD candidate I have also studied other phenomena in emergency 
management, in addition to the four empirical articles that are focused on cross-boundary 
coordination. This resulted in 10 additional publications that are not directly included 
in this dissertation. These studies articulate my earlier work as a bachelor and master 
student and functioned to sharpen and articulate my ideas. I will briefly list these to show 
the full spectrum of my work during my PhD trajectory.
The original study towards the implementation of Netcentric Work that led to the 
interview on the day of the Turkish Airlines crash is published in the Journal of Homeland 
Security & Emergency Management. 
Boersma, F. K., F. P. Wagenaar, J. J. Wolbers. 2013. Negotiating the ‘Trading Zone’. 
Creating a shared Information Infrastructure in the Dutch Public Safety Sector. 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 9(2) 1-25. 
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An ethnographic study of multi-organizational collaboration an Emergency Response 
Center (112 calls) from my bachelor thesis –by which I set my first steps into the field 
of emergency management– is published in the IGI handbook of research on electronic 
collaboration. 
Wolbers, J., P. Groenewegen, P. Wagenaar. 2009. ‘ICT to Facilitate Emergency Response 
in the Netherlands’ In: J. Salmons and L. Wilson, Handbook of Research on Elec-
tronic Collaboration and Organizational Synergy, Hershey: IGI Global: 626-636 
A research report focused to give advice to improve the role of Netcentric Work for 
information management is published in a Dutch report: ‘Netcentric Work in Development’ 
Wolbers, J., K. Boersma, J. de Heer. 2012. Netcentrisch Werken in Ontwikkeling. 
Een cultuuronderzoek naar multidisciplinaire samenwerking en gezamenlijke 
operationele beelden in de Veiligheidsregio’s. De Swart, Den Haag. 
Together with Willem Treurniet, master thesis student Manne Messemaker and Kees 
Boersma, I published a comparison of crisis communication styles and command doctrines 
during the Moerdijk Chemical Fire and Alphen mall shooting.
Treurniet, W., M. Messemaker, J. Wolbers, K. Boersma. 2015. Shaping the societal 
impact of emergencies: striking a balance between Control and Cooperation, 
International Journal of Emergency Services, 4(1).
During the PhD trajectory I regularly visited the ‘International Conference on Information 
Systems for Crisis Response and Management’ (ISCRAM) to present new ideas and 
findings in Work in Progress papers. This resulted in 5 publications in the ISCRAM 
conference proceedings.
Boersma K., J. Ferguson, P. Groenewegen, J. Wolbers. 2014. Beyond the Myth of 
Control: toward network switching in disaster management. In: S.R. Hiltz, M.S. 
Pfaff, L. Plotnick, and A.C. Robinson (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th International 
Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management 
ISCRAM 2014. University Park, Pennsylvania, USA, May 2014: 125-129
Messemaker, M., J. Wolbers, W. Treurniet, K. Boersma. 2013. Shaping Societal 
Impact: between control and cooperation. In: T. Comes, F. Fiedrich, S. Fortier, 
J. Geldermann and T. Muller (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International 
Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management 
ISCRAM 2013. Baden-Baden, May 2013: 901-905
38  |  Chapter 1
Passenier, D., J. Mollee, J. Wolbers, K. Boersma, P. Groenewegen. 2012. Formalization 
of crisis response coordination from a public inquiry report. In: L. Rothkrantz, 
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2. Picking up the Pieces 1
Summary
Already for several decades empirical studies in disaster management show that fragmentation 
is a prevailing phenomenon. Still, coordination theories are primarily characterized by a focus on 
integration, aimed at achieving a coherent and unified set of actions. A tautology is concealed in 
this approach: coordination is simultaneously the diagnosis of the problem and the way forward to 
resolve it. We will show that dealing with fragmentation is not only inevitable; it is a key characteristic 
of coordinating across the boundaries of response organizations in turbulent environments. 
Fragmentation emerges because ambiguous demands lead to a complexity of relationships and 
a multiplicity of interpretations. We zoom in on how officers in command from fire department, 
medical services, and police coordinate through boundary work on the basis of negotiation. Our 
analysis indicates that cross-boundary coordination is not based on integration, but can be better 
interpreted through a fragmentation perspective to unveil the cross-boundary coordination dynamics 
of negotiation. By showing how fragmentation is not a deficiency of integration, but has features in 
itself that are necessary for coordination in fast-paced environments, our work generates a more 
complete understanding of the process of coordinating, in both the practice of crisis management, 
and for organizational theory in a broader sense.
1 This chapter under review at Organization Studies and is co-authored with Kees Boersma and 
Peter Groenewegen.
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2.1 Picking up the Pieces
Emergencies offer a unique challenge for coordination between emergency response 
organizations. During an emergency situation circumstances change rapidly over time, 
which makes it difficult for emergency management organizations to oversee the full 
complexity of their interdependencies (Rimstad and Sollid 2015). Emergency response 
units need to coordinate across their organizational boundaries in these turbulent 
environments, often with partners they have not worked with before (Comfort 2007). 
This offers two challenges for coordination. First, a multitude of organizations engage 
in emergent collaborations to tackle unforeseen problems that no single organization 
can address singlehandedly, which leads to the emergence of ad-hoc interdependencies 
(Roberts 2011). Second, expertise is suddenly needed on emerging coordination issues 
responders are confronted with that exceed their own knowledge (Weick and Sutcliffe 
2011). Combined, these issues challenge emergency responders to coordinate ad-
hoc with experts from different response organizations who have different skills and 
professional jargons, in an environment that is characterized by continuous time pressure, 
as it is prone to escalate.
As emergency responses to disasters have shown, this often results in fragmentation: 
the separation of the organizational responses into segments, leading to disjunction. 
For example, Dearstyne (2007) describes the fragmentation in the mobilization of the 
response operation in New York on 9/11. Organizing a coordinated response after the 
attacks proved to be a daunting task, as: “commanders in the towers had very little 
reliable information on what was happening outside the towers. They had no external 
information about the overall status of the incident area. This lack of information 
hindered their ability to evaluate the overall situation. Command posts were set up 
and then moved before they accomplished substantive work” (Dearstyne 2007, p.40). 
Fragmentation is not exclusive to large-scale catastrophic events, it is also visible during 
much smaller incidents. In response to the collapse of the I-95 highway in Mississippi, for 
example, police and fire departments set up command posts in different locations and 
struggled with combining rescue and crime scene investigation (Cook 2009). Also, during 
a chemical spill in Helsingborg, Sweden commanders struggled to deal with the ad-hoc 
response operations that "did not follow fixed plans or procedures" (Uhr et al. 2008, 
p. 83). Fragmentation emerges during these response operations because emergency 
responders have to deal with unexpected turns of events, attend to a variety of demands 
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simultaneously, and manage opposing interests in situations that are difficult to oversee 
and are characterized by high time pressure.
These observations should give reason to pause. While in organization and 
management theory coordination is considered to be about “the integration of 
organizational work under conditions of task interdependence and uncertainty” (Okhuysen 
and Bechky 2009, p. 469), already for several decades empirical studies in emergency 
management showed that reaching integration is problematic (Dynes and Aguirre 1979, 
Drabek 1985). Instead, fragmentation is a prevailing phenomenon during smaller and 
larger incidents (Drabek 1985, Quarantelli 1997). At the same time, fragmentation has 
a negative connotation in the coordination debate and is often treated synonymously 
with a notion of uncontrollability, disorder and failure. This relation between integration 
and fragmentation points us to a tautology that is concealed in the coordination debate: 
a lack of integration is the diagnosis of the coordination problem and more or better 
integration is the way forward to resolve it (Kettle 2003). Likewise, Roberts (2011, p. 
677) notes that “despite constant calls for better coordination, the path to get us there 
keeps circling back on itself”. We claim that the tautology originates in the treatment of 
integration and fragmentation as a dichotomy, in which integration leads to coordination 
and fragmentation should be avoided. The consequence of theorizing coordination only 
in terms of integration is that the significance of fragmentation has been overlooked.
However, we believe that fragmentation has something to offer for our understanding 
of coordination. To see the possibilities of fragmentation, the term requires amelioration: 
the transformation of a negative connotation to a positive one. Fragmentation is too 
often simply portrayed as a lack of coordination, while it might better characterize the 
reality of operating in fast-paced environments like emergency management, in which 
interdependencies arise under high time pressure, are difficult to oversee, and offer 
equivocal demands due to ambiguity and unexpected changes. Ambiguity and ad-hoc 
adaptations stand at contrast with an integration logic, since they prevent from managing 
based on a cohesive whole. Nevertheless, in the fast-paced dynamics of emergency 
situations integration is often the least viable option, or simply cannot be achieved. This 
leaves open research ground, because how is cross-boundary coordination practiced in 
fast-paced environments like emergency management, when achieving integration is 
challenged? 
To explore how coordination is performed in situ, we will zoom in on the contextualized 
coordination practices of officers in command that are responsible for cross-boundary 
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coordination. Our insights are drawn from a 4 year multi-sited ethnographic study of 40 
emergency management exercises in the Netherlands, combined with 56 retrospective 
interviews with emergency response officials about their coordination practices during 
both real life response operations and exercises. The contribution we make in this paper 
is to develop grounded theory on how coordination is accomplished in fast-paced 
environments that are characterized by fragmentation. To frame our contribution we will 
first explore the current literature on coordination and show how this body of knowledge 
has left the fragmentation perspective underexposed. 
2.2 From integration, differentiation, and modularization  
towards fragmentation
The traditional idea of coordination is based on the relation between integration and 
differentiation (Lawrence et al. 1967), which consists of the decomposition of subtasks, 
and the need to bring these together into one cohesive whole (Heath and Staudenmayer 
2000). As such, coordination is meant to achieve “the integration or linking together of 
different parts of an organization to accomplish a collective set of tasks” (Van de Ven 
et al. 1976, p.322), which is based on “the interdependent nature of the activities that 
organization members perform” (Argote 1982, p. 423). The notion of integration finds its 
roots in the designability of coordination mechanisms. For several decades coordination 
theories have focused on designability, in which scholars supposed that organizational 
systems could be articulated with enough precision to allow individuals to complete their 
work in a coordinated fashion (Malone and Crowston 1994, Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). 
Coordination studies have since then moved from the design of work processes (Taylor 
1914), to the design of management systems (Fayol 1949), but as organizations turned 
from manufacturing systems towards service oriented forms the limitations of designability 
became evident. Coordination theorists realized that coordination in these organizations 
relied less on predefined hierarchy and more on interpersonal communication and 
feedback (Argote 1982, Van de Ven et al. 1976). This broadened our understanding of 
coordination, and led to the emergence of coordination dichotomies. Most well-known 
conceptualizations of coordination are based upon such dichotomies, such as formal 
versus informal coordination, programmed versus non-programmed (March and Simon 
1958), and personal versus impersonal coordination (Van de Ven et al. 1976).
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As in the following decades collaboration increasingly took place across the boundaries 
of organizations in different geographical locations (Srikanth and Puranam 2011) a 
new way of decomposing subtasks emerged next to differentiation: modularization. 
Modularization is based on the decomposition of a system of activities into modules, 
such that activities within a module are highly interdependent with one another, but there 
are few dependencies between activities that are part of different modules (Sanchez and 
Mahoney 1996). Modular coordination centers around the problem of the division of work 
and specification of the nature of responsibilities between organizational units from one 
or more firms that provide the components and modules of a work system (Sinha and Van 
de Ven 2005). Because coordination mechanisms are designed in advance, coordination 
based on modularization takes place in relatively stable environments. 
What has kept the coordination debate from advancing in a new direction is 
that integration, differentiation, and modularization are still based upon the notion of 
designability, which has difficulty incorporating coordination in ambiguous and fast-paced 
settings (Faraj and Xiao 2006). As organizations face more and more volatile environments, 
time pressure hampers the achievement of designed coordination (Kellogg et al. 2006). This 
notion is picked up in a comprehensive review of the coordination literature by Okhuysen 
and Bechky (2009), who identified that coordination is a combination of design and 
emergence, based upon three different integrative conditions: accountability, predictability 
and common understanding. First, accountability is conditional for coordination because 
it aligns responsibilities. This occurs through either designed coordination that is based 
on the enactment of formal authority and organizational standards, or through emergent 
coordination in which other parties become accountable for their own contribution, when 
others make their responsibilities visible (Reagans et al. 2005, Bechky 2003, Bechky 
and Okhuysen 2011). Second, predictability enables actors to anticipate subsequent 
task related activity based on familiarity with the elements and timing of task execution 
(Espinosa et al. 2004, Rico et al. 2008). Predictability based on designed coordination 
occurs through scheduling of formal workflows that are depicted in protocols and 
procedures (Reagans et al. 2005). Predictability during emergent coordination functions 
though anticipation that is based on perceived fit with each other’s roles during task 
execution (Rico et al. 2008, Okhuysen and Elsbach 2005). Third, common understanding 
is considered necessary for coordination because a shared perspective on the objectives 
of actions is required to perform a task (Bechky 2003). Common understanding can be 
based on designed coordination when it is embodied in plans and schedules that are 
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created in advance (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). In addition, common understanding 
can also develop in an emergent fashion during the iterative process of discussing how 
interdependencies can be managed while an operation unfolds (Bechky and Okhuysen 
2009). It’s important to notice that by showing how these three integrative conditions 
contribute to coordination Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) voiced a new dichotomy in the 
coordination debate between designed and emergent coordination.
Contemporary studies of coordination can be positioned in this dichotomy, as 
these explore the performance of emergent coordination. In these studies coordination 
is treated as an emergent process, which is always ‘in the making’ (Bechky 2003, Bechky 
2006, Faraj and Xiao 2006, Kellogg et al. 2006, Majchrzak et al. 2007, Majchrzak et al. 
2012). Consequently, coordination in these studies is generally defined as a: “temporally 
unfolding and contextualized process of input regulation and interaction articulation 
to realize a collective performance” (Faraj and Xiao 2006, p. 1157). As coordination 
is performed through a dynamic and adaptive activity in which local trajectories of 
interdependent action are synchronized (Jarzabkowski et al. 2012, Gkeredakis 2014), 
interdependencies among activities continuously shift and are negotiated and reframed 
in the context of work (Kellogg et al. 2006). While recent attention for emergent 
coordination is opening the window for theorizing more dynamic coordination processes, 
in general, these studies are still based upon the notion of integration. Like Okhuysen and 
Bechky’s (2009) review also coalesces into three integrative conditions of coordination. 
This shows that the underlying rationale is that local trajectories of interdependent action 
are considered to be coordinated when they result in a set of integrated actions. 
However, as novelty arises in turbulent environments it becomes increasingly difficult 
to reach cohesive action, because it increases uncertainty of how interdependencies 
influence collective action (Carlile 2004). The challenge of coordination in turbulent 
environments that prevents integration is that organizing processes tend to be distributed, 
because expertise is dispersed among team members, and answers or solutions are not 
predefined but are generated through interactions (Faraj and Sproull 2000). The result 
is that during emergent coordination processes incongruent perspectives are likely to 
emerge (Bechky 2003, Bechky 2006). For instance, in a study of trauma teams, Faraj and 
Xiao (2006) show that coordination practices are based upon dialogue in which epistemic 
contestation occurs. Experts challenge each other’s assumptions to develop sufficient 
shared understanding to solve the complex problems at hand. Other studies of emergent 
coordination also show signs of divergence, such as misunderstandings due to different 
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interpretations (Bechky 2003), and the emergence of knowledge boundaries (Carlile 2004, 
Levina and Vaast 2005). Current studies of coordination treat divergent perspectives as 
something to be solved, as it does not contribute to common understanding, which is 
considered to be essential for coordination (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). The conversion 
of disorder to order is seen as fundamental to the process of coordinating, since 
organizational structures are primarily directed to processing information and removing 
its equivocality (Weick 1993). However, in fast-paced environments divergence and 
disconnections are key characteristic of cross-boundary coordination that cannot be 
converted to an integrated order (Kellogg et al. 2008). Therefore, it’s essential to look for 
a different perspective on coordination that incorporates ambiguity and unpredictability.
In her work on organizational culture, Martin (1992) describes such a perspective in 
addition to integration and differentiation: fragmentation. This fragmentation perspective 
is helpful to explain how incongruent perspectives contribute to coordination, since 
it is rooted in the appreciation of ambiguity, rather than excluding it or channeling it 
into a realm of order and clarity (Martin 1992). Ambiguity is paramount in turbulent 
environments and is perceived when "a lack of clarity, high complexity, or a paradox 
makes multiple, rather than single or dichotomous explanations plausible" (Martin 1992, 
p. 134). A fragmentation approach focuses on multiplicity of interpretations, which 
emerges when, due to ambiguity, meanings are hard to decipher and necessarily open 
to multiple explanations. As possible interpretations multiply a flux emerges, in which 
temporary issue specific coalitions form around certain interpretations. Thus coordination 
is not based upon a single solution that results in coordinated action, but consists of a 
changing configuration, a contested order, that needs to be negotiated and augmented 
time and again. 
A fragmentation perspective takes ambiguity that is also consistently described in 
crisis management (Dynes and Aguirre 1979, Bigley and Roberts 2001, Suparamaniam 
and Dekker 2003) as an inescapable reality rather than complications to be resolved, or 
reduced into a cohesive whole. This has several consequences for studying coordination. 
While from an integration perspective an ambiguous, environment in flux might be 
regarded as unwanted or required to be resolved, from a fragmentation perspective 
ambiguity is an inescapable reality. Our understanding of coordination in fast-paced 
environments might be expanded in a direction that values ambiguity, rather than a 
stance that is aimed at producing clarity. This leaves us to explore how coordination is 
performed if the environment is in constant flux and multiple perspectives prevail.
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2.3 Methodology
Data collection
In this study we set out to learn how emergency management officers practice cross-
boundary coordination in a fast-paced environment. Based on our interest to elaborate 
theory on cross-boundary coordination processes in fast-paced environments, we 
conducted an inductive, qualitative field study using grounded theory approaches 
(Corbin and Strauss 2008). This approach is valuable for developing theories about 
dynamic processes, because it captures the full richness of the stream of activities that 
is intimately connected to the interdependencies in the environment (Barley and Kunda 
2001, Langley 1999). This grounded data is then systematically abstracted into more 
general patterns that can be used for theorizing (Gioia et al. 2012). This approach is 
characterized by an iterative process of continuously moving back and forth between the 
empircal phenomena and its theoretical reading (Alvesson and Kärreman 2007). 
The qualitative data presented in this article is collected from the winter of 2010 
into the winter of 2014, and focuses on cross-boundary coordination processes in both 
emergency response field exercises and real-life incident response operations. In this period 
40 exercises are observed, and 56 interviews were held with emergency officials in which they 
reflected on their coordination experiences during these exercises and actual operations. 
The data collection is divided into three phases: a pilot phase, main data collection phase 
and a validation phase. This allowed us to develop a gradual understanding of the core 
puzzle of cross-boundary coordination processes, to later zoom in on these processes in 
detail, and finally to zoom out again to validate our now detailed understanding of cross-
boundary coordination processes during response operations (Nicolini 2009).
Observations Interviews 
Pilot Phase 3 Command Exercises 12 experts interviews
Main Data 
Collection 
16 Field Exercises in disaster area
21 Command and table-top exercises
10 interviews with officers that 
participated in exercises
Validation 
Phase
10 interviews exercise participants
13 officers on highway accident case
11 experts interviews
Total 40 exercises 56 interviews
Table 1. Data Collection
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In the pilot phase we advanced our intuition about the research question on how coor-
dination is practiced in fast-paced environments. We conducted exploratory interviews 
to better understand how coordination is accomplished and institutionally organized in 
emergency response. We interviewed 12 experts in the field and observed 3 exercises. 
We learned that during the response operation officers in command and the field 
commander should be the key actors in our research, since they are responsible for 
managing the coordination on scene. Their role is to oversee the response operation, 
coordinate the employment of resources, and protect the emergency responders from 
taking unnecessary risks. In addition, we learned about the difficulties of observing the 
work practices of officers in command during emergency response operations. Therefore, 
we explored the possibility to study field exercises that allowed us to engage freely with 
the officers and to study their behavior and interactions, without the risk of jeopardizing 
the safety and quality of an actual response operation. Exercises are good analytical tools 
to study coordination, because the emergency management organization is similar to real 
events, and actors are obliged to act and forced to make decisions (Latiers and Jacques 
2009). Despite these benefits exercises may lack the same emotional aspects, decision 
impact and in some cases recruitment delay (Latiers and Jacques 2009). 
The main data collection focuses on observations of a set of 16 field exercises 
staged in a disaster area on an old air force base in the winter of 2010. We selected these 
exercises for our main analysis, because the respondents described that the staging of 
these exercises gave a more tense dynamic that represented more closely the realism 
and feel for the situation they had experienced during actual emergency operations. 
Furthermore, we had the possibility to walk around freely during the exercises and record 
conversations between the officers in detail. The exercise scenarios included: a fire in 
a youth hostel, fire in an adult club, collision on a highway, hostage situation, carbon 
monoxide poisoning in an elderly home, fire in a tire factory, explosion after a failed 
SWAT raid, and a Cessna plane crash on a gas station. The staging of the exercises in 
different locations on the training grounds enhanced the realism and feel for the situation, 
as for example an exercise that involved a highway traffic accident was located at a 
fully reconstructed highway with crashed vehicles and trucks on the training grounds. 
In addition to the observations, respondents who participated in the exercises were 
interviewed during 1 or 2 hours in the spring of 2011 to induce their view on coordination 
challenges during the response exercises. 
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In the validation phase we wanted to compare our analysis of the exercises with the real life 
experience of the officers. First we felt that we needed a member check (Schwartz-Shea 
and Yanow 2009) to see whether our ideas were in line with the operational experiences 
of the officers that participated in the exercises. We conducted these interviews in the 
summers of 2011 and 2012, two years after the initial observations. In this stage, our 
acquaintance with the officers allowed us to reflect on their actions during the exercises 
in comparison with their real-life operational experience in the two-year period. This 
enabled us to confront and build on one of the challenges in our material, the fact that 
the observations are based on exercises instead of real incident response operations. By 
taking this final step and checking the analysis and results with the officers, we feel much 
more confident that the results represent the actual practices of emergency response 
operations. In addition, we also wanted to broaden our validation of the analysis in the 
exercises with the analysis of a single case from an actual response operation. To do so 
we interviewed a set of 13 officers that responded to a large highway traffic accident. As 
this incident was similar to one of the scenarios of the field exercises, we were able to 
compare the responses. Finally, we interviewed 11 experts to validate coordination issues 
in situations with hazardous materials as these became central in our analysis. 
Data analysis
By combining the wide array of materials, the analysis was characterized by an iterative 
process that gradually deepened and interconnected our insights, which developed 
alongside the three phases of our data collection. In the first phase we identified the 
main themes in cross-boundary coordination, while reading through our field notes and 
discussing our preliminary ideas from the field. Consequently, the notion of boundaries 
and ambiguity emerged. In the second phase we analyzed the transcribed recordings of 
the set of 16 exercises and the transcribed interviews with its participants in detail. This 
was a significant step in unraveling the nature of coordination practices, since "most work 
practices are so contextualized that people often cannot articulate how they do what 
they do unless they are in the process of doing it" (Barley and Kunda 2001, p. 85). The 
analysis was based on theoretical sampling (Corbin and Strauss 2008) during which codes 
were assigned, with the help of the analysis tool MaxQDA, to what we considered to be 
important events, aspects, and interactions during the coordination process. We started 
with open coding to break down the data to understand the underlying dynamics, and 
continued with axial coding to reveal the thematic relationships and contrasts between the 
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codes (Strauss and Corbin 1990). This allowed us to develop an in-depth understanding 
of the pace and sequence of events, through which we were able to unravel how the 
interplay between integration and fragmentation occurred, which became central to our 
understanding of coordination. In the third phase our analysis gradually arrived at three 
practices distancing from the incident, demarcating expertise and switching tactics with 
an underlying data structure (Gioia et al. 2012). This final phase allowed us to zoom in 
and out on the data to critically assess, compare and broaden our understanding of the 
dynamic phenomena we observed in the training exercises (Nicolini 2009). Based on the 
data structure we were able to develop the dynamic relationships among the emergent 
concepts. Next to the analysis of the interview data we consulted materials stemming from 
other sources, such as evaluation reports, after-action reviews, and video excerpts from 
other exercises to validate our model. We used this material to strengthen our analysis by 
comparing the results of our analysis to a broader set of video’s and documents.
2.4 Findings
Our analysis of cross-boundary coordination processes during emergency response 
operations revealed that officers-in-command coordinated their actions across the 
boundaries of their organizations by using a set of three interrelated practices: distancing 
from the incident, demarcating expertise and switching tactics. By employing these 
practices the officers strived at keeping sufficient overview on the operation, recognize and 
assess potential dangerous situations, and retain flexibility to adapt to unexpected events. 
In the following sections, we discuss each practice in turn and describe how the boundary 
work that is part of these practices shows the relevance of a fragmentation perspective.
2.4.1 The practice of ‘distancing from the incident’
One of the first actions the officers engaged in when they arrived on scene during the 
exercises was trying to find out what is going on, as the response operation itself was 
already underway. The situation the officers found themselves in was prone to escalate, 
and events quickly followed up under increasing time pressure. The officers experienced 
that it’s difficult to oversee this fast-paced environment, which is necessary for developing 
an emergent task distribution. First they had to catch up with the situation on scene, 
assess priorities, identify interdependencies to other response organizations, and get an 
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overview of the overall progress of the response operation. Like one of our respondents 
mentioned, to be able to coordinate in such an environment, one needs to acquire room 
to maneuver as soon as possible.
Police Officer: “the sooner you are free, the more overview you get, because if you lack 
overview, you’re in trouble. Situational awareness is important when you arrive at the 
incident scene and you need to retain it. That’s the feeling, right? The feeling that you 
are in control. To get there you have to let go. If you don’t delegate, it starts to grow 
over your head. You will lose situational awareness pretty quickly. If you think this will be 
taken care of, that will be taken care of, you start to relax and acquire overview. That is 
the art I think, putting your hands in your pockets halfway through, and thinking, well, 
what’s next? That is when you’ve got it”.
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
 
• Don’t let the situation grow over your head 
• Require overview 
• Develop situational awareness 
Trigger:  
Difficulty to oversee situation 
Distancing from 
the incident 
• Don’t let the situation overwhelm you 
• Delegate tasks to get hands free 
• Putting tasks aside 
• ‘It’s my process, my responsibility’ 
• ‘I make the final call’ 
Need:  
Develop a rapid task distribution 
Boundary Work:  
Claiming control by reinstating a 
functional boundary   
• Safety first 
• Safe and unsafe areas 
• Hazardous materials 
Trigger:  
Unknown threat 
Demarcating 
Expertise 
• What are the consequences 
• Not having sufficient knowledge 
• What is the danger 
• Draw conclusions only from your own field 
• Clear boundaries for who knows what 
• Location of safe and unsafe area 
 
Need:  
Risk assessment 
Boundary work:  
Emphasizing expertise by 
reinstating a knowledge boundary  
• A disaster requires a customized response 
• Unforeseen events occur regularly 
• It requires continuous adaptation 
Trigger:  
Unexpected situation 
Switching 
Tactics 
• Ad-hoc collaborations 
• Finding creative solutions 
• Change tactics 
• Actionable temporal solutions 
• Take professional space 
• Improvise within prof. margin 
Need:  
Creative ad-hoc solutions 
Boundary work:  
Constraining improvisation by 
reinstating a normative boundary  
Figure 2. Data Structure
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Like this Police Officer mentions, for the officers ‘letting go’ is a prerequisite to assess the 
situation and acquire situational awareness. To prevent the situation from overwhelming 
them, the officers explained that their first actions are aimed at putting tasks aside 
immediately. We will refer to this coordination practice as ‘distancing from the incident’. 
Distancing is aimed at detaching one from the task complexities of the incident to acquire 
overview. The officers delegate tasks to their subordinates to organize enough time for 
them to reflect and assess the situation before coordinating with others. While the officers 
regard distancing as way to get overview on the unfolding response operation, it also 
challenges them to partially give up control. Through distancing themselves from the 
operation, they lose sight on the distributed actions of their subordinates that take place 
at different locations and at different times. Our conversations with the officers indicated 
that coordination on the incident site is not about coordinating by integrating all actions 
to achieve a coherent response. In the turbulent environment of emergencies this option 
is just not feasible as it takes too much time and the interdependencies keep changing 
as new tasks emerge. 
Interviewer: “you mention putting task aside, but how do you keep overview? You seem 
to imply that you consciously lose sight?” Fire Officer: “that is the nice part of my 
function. As Fire Officer I only deal with a specific part and if you put something aside, 
somebody else will deal with it. But you’re right at the moment I put tasks aside to be 
able to deal with other problems I lose grip on everything else that is going on”.
Vignette 1. The consequence of distancing: distributed action leads to a multiplicity of 
interpretations
In order to show how the practice of distancing unfolds in action, we will analyze the 
response to a fire in a hostel from one of the field exercises. The situation is as follows: 
fire crews are responding to an automatic fire alarm in a hostel. As the first units arrive on 
scene it becomes clear that a large, yet unknown, number of persons are trapped inside 
the hostel, but it’s unclear how many persons exactly. When the officers arrive on scene 
they distribute their crews to perform rescue operations and try to develop a correct 
estimation of the amount of persons trapped inside the building. Soon discussions about 
the correct amount of victims emerge at different times and locations during the response 
operation.
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First units arrive on scene and assemble in front of the building.
Fire Engine Commander  is unknown, there was a group of 50 persons with 10 staff.
Police agent inclusive?
Fire Engine Commander 50 and 10 staff.
Police agent  50 plus 10 staff?
After about 10 minutes on the right side of the building.
Hostel manager there are still persons trapped inside!
Fire Officer do you know how many?
Hostel manager yes 50 and 10…
Fire Officer [interrupts owner] and the children, what age are they?
Hostel manager  yes, between 15 and 20, but they are mentally disabled, so you have to 
take that into consideration.
After about 20 minutes in the first Field Command Meeting.
Field Commander  All right, is everybody present? Ten minutes max for this meeting so you 
can return to your units quickly. What is the situation?
Fire Officer  Situation is fire in a youth hostel. There is a group of 40 disabled children 
with a nursing staff of 10 persons. 
Medical Officer  I have called in 26 ambulances in total and a Medical Combination 
because the women outside talked about 50 disabled children with 10 
staff, that is 60 in total. She has not included herself, so I activated 
plenty of resources.
In this vignette from the emergency response operation we witness the emergence of a 
multiplicity of interpretations. The units operating in different areas develop their own 
interpretations based on their view on the incident. This is not something that can be 
prevented, but is a direct consequence of the fast-paced action required to rescue victims 
from a blazing fire. The fire engine crews are busy with evacuating the building and have 
little time to discuss the correct number of persons inside. 
We witnessed similar problems with verifying the number of victims in nearly all 
exercises. Therefore, we wanted to find out whether this coordination issue also occurred 
during real operations. We interviewed 13 officers that responded to a large traffic 
accident on the Dutch highway A2 on 28th June 2011, where several cars collided with 
a military truck. A field commander noted similar issues with assessing the amount of 
victims:
“It’s very difficult to assess how many victims were involved. Are there 14 people 
including a fatality, or are there 15? How many of those are soldiers, and where are 
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they coming from? The information I received from the emergency response center 
indicated 7 injured of which 3 are military personnel, 3 cars involved, and 1 person 
deceased. The Fire Officer told me that these amounts were incorrect, as according 
to him there are 5 cars involved, 3 persons trapped instead of 2 and 1 was already 
rescued. The Medical Officer later told me that 2 persons were deceased instead of 1.  
There is always a tension in those numbers. At the same time the medical services are 
responsible for the victim counts, so every time there is a discrepancy I will tell the 
medical services to go back and check. If the Fire Officer says there are 14 and the 
Medical Officer says there are 16, then it’s 16”.
In both exercises and real operations, the consequence of the practice of distancing 
is that, while action gets distributed, multiple units develop different contextualized 
interpretations. As every officer focuses on a specific part of the response operation 
these different interpretations increase equivocality, as different numbers start to emerge. 
Therefore, the practice of distancing doesn’t provide the officers with a complete 
situational awareness, but a partial view on the operation, that is continuously updated 
with different perspectives from different locations. This leads a situation in flux in which 
shared accountability between the officers becomes contested. 
We found that the common response of the officers when encountering multiple, 
conflicting interpretations was seeking for control by reinstating the functional boundaries 
between them. As the boundary is reinstated during an emergent task distribution it 
results in separate pockets of control. The Medical Officer involved in the response to the 
hostel fire explained: 
“I make the final call on the number of victims. It has to go through me. At a certain 
moment you as an officer must have the guts to claim this is my responsibility, we’re not 
all going to say something about this. Of course I need input from my own colleagues 
and from the police and fire department, but in the end I decide on what we are dealing 
with in medical terms. If everybody starts to articulate the number of victims, well, I’m 
sure we’ll end up with the wrong number. I really try to take on that role, also because I 
can judge which victims are transported in ambulances”.
In sum, the practice of distancing is triggered by the difficulty to oversee the situation 
and the need to develop an emergent task distribution. As the officers gradually develop 
overview on different aspects of the response operations and reassign task to their units, 
new interdependencies between the officers emerge. To retain control on their own tasks 
the officers reinstate their functional boundaries, which results in separate pockets of 
control instead of shared accountability. Paradoxically, the practice of distancing from the 
incident thus also contributes to the very fragmentation the officers try to resolve.
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2.4.2 The practice of ‘demarcating expertise’
One of the most complicated situations the officers can encounter that literally brings 
the response operation to a halt, is when they are confronted with a threat to safety. This 
involves, for example the spill of an unknown hazardous material, a hostage situation, 
or explosion danger. In these situations safety is one of the primary concerns for the 
officers. Their adagio is: safety first. As a Field Commander explains: “safety is priority 
one for me. It means that you need to be informed adequately about what is going on, 
combined with the risk assessment from each response organization”. Also a Medical 
Officer explains: “my philosophy is if I have to safe someone in just one minute, it would 
already be too late. Safety is everything for me. Yes, we have to provide aid, but safety 
first”. In the following excerpt a Fire Officer reflects on explosion danger after a large gas 
leakage in a residential area he experienced during an actual response operation. 
“A great example is the gas leakage two weeks ago. Multiple locations were evacuated 
in a hurry. The problem was that a gas cloud is not visible, so we need to measure it. 
Now, what’s my estimation, what capacity should you call in? The only thing we knew 
was that the diameter of the pipe, which implicated a pressure of 8 bar. Our hazardous 
materials advisor calculated afterwards that a no-go area of 250m was on the safe side. 
So we were operating in a safe area with evacuating two elderly homes on the edge of 
that circle. But still, if he concluded that the safe area was 500m we would have done 
too little”.
Yet, paradoxically, the assessment of what is safe and unsafe is subject to diverse 
interpretations, because officers have different understandings about the threats to 
safety. When a dangerous situation is encountered the common response is to halt the 
response operation and designate the location of the unsafe area, so that the emergency 
responders can work safely in the surrounding area. This is a difficult assessment as the 
nature and degree of the threat can change, and often limited information is available. 
A Fire Officer explains what he experiences when he encounters such a situation: 
“Yes, safe and unsafe, you’ve heard that hundreds of times probably. The Police and 
Medical Officers are explicitly trained on that point. You have to know where you can 
work safely. It’s the first thing they ask, sometimes it drives you crazy! You have to 
explain time and again that smoke is never healthy, but they won’t immediately pass 
out if they’re standing in thin smoke. I don’t want to be busy with that. Just be clear, this 
is safe and this is unsafe. Good luck”.
The Fire Officer suggests he has no time to explain every detail, because the emergency 
situation requires quick action, so he just designates a safe and unsafe area. Putting effort 
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in developing common understanding seems not to be the most viable option in these 
fast-response circumstances. Creating common understanding requires effort and takes 
time, two resources that are often at stake during response operations. We observed 
that in contrast to building common understanding, the way to coordinate action 
during unknown situations in this fast-paced environment was to engage in the practice 
of demarcating expertise. As the officer with sufficient expertise claims responsibility 
over handling the dangerous situation, the other officers stand down and rely on the 
knowledgeability of the officer with expertise. Like a Police Officer explains: 
“When you are talking about a fire the discussion soon starts to move in the direction 
of hazardous materials, smoke clouds, etc. My actions and communication depend on 
the information I receive from the fire department. Those are topics in which I have to 
trust the fire officer for the full 100%. a) I don’t have sufficient knowledge about that. 
b) I don’t feel any need to check that person. There is a lot of pressure to act on me at 
that time”.
When ambiguity is high the officers primarily ask for the location and nature of the threat 
so they can keep their distance and let the officer with sufficient expertise handle the 
threat. Therefore, the officers in general do not strive for common understanding as this 
takes too much time, but instead rely on the expertise of others for dealing with the 
situation. A Field Commander stresses the logic behind this way of operating: 
“Now you’re getting at my point of view, you don’t have to know much about it, because 
if you do you will draw conclusions from another field of expertise. It might work out, but 
you can also get it all wrong. For example, when talking about a ‘large fire’ protocol it’s 
better to observe that there are a lot of engines on their way, rather than thinking: ‘oh, 
a large fire, that means the fire is getting out of control’. That is no definition for us [the 
fire department]. If someone else thinks it is, you can suddenly get a totally different 
situational awareness”.
 
Vignette 2. Demarcating expertise in response to explosion danger
The situation is as follows: a small Cessna plane has a mechanical failure in flight and tries 
to perform an emergency landing on a highway. The landing attempt fails and the plane 
crashes near a petrol station, where a fuel truck is just unloading its petrol. The debris 
of the plane hits one of the gas pumps and its catches fire. Emergency services respond 
and soon try to extinguish the fire and rescue the pilots, truck driver, and the people in 
the petrol station. During the rescue operation the Medical Officer feels her units are 
at risk due to the explosion threat posed by the petrol truck. She consults with the Fire 
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Officer about the safety of her units. However, the Fire Officer is under a lot of pressure to 
act. Consequently, he demarcates his expertise and starts an argument with the Medical 
officer.
 
1st Fire Officer An important question for you to ask is: how much fluid is left inside?
Medical Officer Yes, well then you must find the driver.
1st Fire Officer   No, we can see that with our heath camera… and it shows it’s half empty. 
Medical Officer  I don’t know that, so you must share that information with me!
1st Fire Officer   I’m telling you an important question for you is to ask how much is in there!
Medical Officer   How should I know you can see that, you also don’t know what needles I use? 
You’ve got your profession and I’ve got mine. You can also explain unasked 
things to us!
2nd Fire Officer  I don’t see why it’s relevant for you to know what is inside. Unless those victims 
are lying in the fluids.
Medical Officer   No, but still. My colleagues are walking around here and if it explodes my 
medical hazardous materials expert knows what it’s about. I want to move 
ahead of the facts, not behind.
2nd Fire Officer  Yes, but do you know what the problem is? I’ll share my consideration. The 
thing is that if I keep telling those issues, it might get interpreted wrong. 
Someone else might say, oh then we need to do this and that. The fluid, the 
fire, that’s Fire Department!
The contestation between the Medical and the Fire Officers shows that during the 
response operation knowledge boundaries are reinstated. Expertise becomes an 
instrument to segment the operation. During the discussion the Fire Officer uses his 
expertise to retain control over dealing with the explosion risk. The consequence for 
coordination is that knowledge boundaries are not bridged, but actively reinstated. This 
shows the importance of demarcating expertise to coordinate unknown threats in the 
fast-paced environment of emergency response. On the one hand, shared understanding 
is important for the officers to retain a safe operating environment, but on the other hand 
the officers demarcate their expert authority to be able to take quick actions. During 
our interviews the officers noted the importance of respecting the expertise of other 
emergency response officers. 
Medical Officer: “In one situation a Field Commander was thinking what I should be 
doing. When the meeting ended and we went outside I asked him, do you have a 
minute? I said: I am a blonde, but it’s not my natural color! I am perfectly able to decide 
what I can and cannot do. You don’t have to think for me!” 
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In sum, the practice of demarcating expertise enables the officers to quickly contain 
potential dangerous situations by reinstating the knowledge boundary and putting 
the other response operations on hold. This diminishes the importance of common 
understanding as other officers are kept away from the hazardous area and the officer 
with the expertise manages the threat on his own. When other officers are kept out of 
the action, it becomes very difficult for them to keep track of what is going on. By not 
directly involving others this practice triggers equivocality, as multiple interpretations 
of the situation develop. Like we have seen in the vignette, this leads to ongoing 
negotiations between the officers. Therefore, the practice of demarcating expertise is a 
way to coordinate unknown situations in a fast-paced environment, but by reinstating the 
knowledge boundary it also contributes to fragmentation.
2.4.3 The practice of ‘switching tactics’
Another important aspect of coordinating emergency response operations is switching 
tactics to respond to unexpected events. The officers are trained to recognize deviant 
situations and anticipate on them. Procedures that entail a specific sequence of action are 
often adjusted during this process. These adaptations cannot be predicted in advance, 
but occur ‘on the run’. A Police Officer describes such a situation from an actual response 
operation:
“There was a fire in an elderly home, and we decided to evacuate the residents. 
Unfortunately, it was freezing outside. So where do you leave those people? There 
was a shelter location in town, but we knew the key holder was very difficult to reach. 
So, a spark of creativity triggered, an ad-hoc collaboration between fire department 
and police on scene. I happened to be at the station and I could listen in on their 
conversations. I said guys listen up. We’ve got a gym here. I have got it operational 
within 30 minutes. All right, go for it. Another colleague stops a bus and lets it drive to 
the gym. The registration process is a bit fuzzy then, but at least we’ve got everybody 
warm inside”.
This example illustrates the officers on scene develop ad-hoc collaborations to address 
emerging problems. In general, the officers have to coordinate different aspects of the 
response operation that take place at different locations. In this case, there are existing 
procedures for arranging a temporary shelter and bus transportation by the municipality. 
However, the Police Officer knows it often takes a long time before the municipality is 
operational. Therefore, the Police Officer takes matters in his own hands and arranges 
transportation before the elderly are affected by the cold weather, which could potentially 
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worsen the situation. This situation shows that switching tactics enables the officers to 
coordinate in response to unexpected events, but has the downside of compromising 
predictability. When standard operating procedures are used in a different fashion, 
different interpretations of what is about to happen can emerge, resulting in deviating 
expectations and anticipations. 
Vignette 3. Switching tactics on-scene for a carbon-monoxide threat
In the following case of a carbon monoxide threat in a nursing home we see how a Fire 
Officer switches tactics to get more units on the scene to assist for an evacuation, which 
goes against the logic of the up-scaling procedures. The situation is as follows: ambulance 
crews arrive at a nursing home, where several residents have become nauseous. When 
the paramedics enter the elderly home their bootstrapped carbon-monoxide (CO) alarm 
triggers. There seems to be a high-level of CO concentration in the nursing home. The 
paramedics decide to back up and call in the fire crews for taking measurements. The first 
fire engine on scene contacts the Emergency Response Center (ERC): “ERC, we are taking 
measurements that confirm the presence of carbon-monoxide. We’ll start evacuating, but 
I don’t have enough crews on scene. I would like more people here, over”. The ERC 
relays this message to the Fire Officer, who is still on route, and he requests to initiate 
the procedure that alarms 4 engines: ‘very large fire’. The Fire Officer explains: “it’s the 
responsibility of the Fire Department to take care of the evacuation. I issued ‘very large 
fire’ to get more people on the scene quickly”. However, mentioning a ‘very large fire’ on 
the radio triggers a widespread misunderstanding amongst the other officers.
Response Center Medical Officer, the Fire Officer makes it a very large fire, over.
Medical Officer Oh, it’s a very large fire? Do you know if there is fire inside the building?
Fire engine commander Euhm, no, I don’t smell anything.
 …
Response Center Police Officer, there is a very large fire, over.
Police Officer   I heard that there is a very large fire on the radio too. [radio’s] Response 
Center, do we know where the fire is located in the building? 
The misunderstanding reverberates for some 40 minutes in the distributed response 
operation. In the meantime, by altering the response tactic, the Fire Officer succeeds in 
activating a large fire response capacity to evacuate the nursing home. As the Fire Officer 
explains in an interview, this procedure is normally issued when there is an actual fire that 
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requires four engines and additional water transport capacity. So, by issuing the very large 
fire procedure the Fire Officer adjusts the use of the procedure for this particular situation. 
The confusion eventually ends up back at the Fire Officer. At that time the Medical Officer 
begins to grasp the origin of the misunderstanding.
Fire Officer  I heard there is a fire. Is there a fire? Have you located a fire?
Police Officer  I have heard from the ERC that there was a fire.
Medical Officer   No, dispatch has told us that there was a very large fire. I now presume 
that you have done that to get more units on the scene faster?
Fire Officer yes.
Medical Officer right, but that has caused the confusion.
Like this vignette illustrates switching tactics on the one hand allows the officers to adjust 
to unexpected situations, but on the other hand, it increases equivocality during the 
response operation. Different interpretations develop because predictability from the 
regular procedures is compromised. The Fire Officer raises a normative boundary based 
on how he thinks the protocol can be altered for this situation. This is at odds with the 
expectations of the other officers. A ‘very large fire’ procedure in its regular use means 
that four fire engines and fire extinguishing water supply units are called to the scene. 
To arrange a large water transportation capacity on scene roads are generally blocked, 
due to large diameter fire hoses lying across them. For the Police Officer it means that he 
needs to consider that certain roads are cut, which calls for an alternative traffic circulation 
plan. For the Medical Officer it means that dealing with an unknown amount of persons 
trapped inside calls for her to increase the on-scene treatment capacities and to notify 
the hospitals specialized in burn traumas. These anticipations by the other officers during 
the response operation is not what the Fire Officer considered when he decided to switch 
tactics to get more units on the scene to perform a quick evacuation. 
In sum, the practice of switching tactics enables the officers to adapt in response 
to unexpected events, but it also compromises predictability. This in turn increases 
equivocality as the predictability from regular tactics is compromised and divergent ad-
hoc anticipations are performed. Like we see in the vignette boundary work is required to 
negotiate the deviating understanding that arises from the different anticipated sequences 
of action. In response to the equivocality that arises from unexpected adaptations the 
officers reinforce the normative boundary based in the regular procedures to retain 
operational control.
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Figure 3. A process model of cross-boundary coordination during Emergency Response Operations
Our analysis can be integrated into a process model that theorizes cross-boundary 
coordination in fast-paced environments. The analysis indicated that three characteristics 
during response operations trigger a process that leads to fragmentation: a turbulent 
environment that is difficult to oversee, the emergence of unknown threats to safety, 
and dealing with unexpected situations. In accordance, we found three coordination 
practices to be central in the way officers in command responded to these characteristics 
of a fast-paced environment: distancing, demarcating expertise, and switching tactics. 
The model shows how these coordination practices lead to boundary work in which the 
officers reinstate functional, knowledge, and normative boundaries to be able to cope 
with the fast-paced changes in the emergency situation. Paradoxically, on the one hand 
their actions of reinstating boundaries result in the very fragmentation they are trying 
to overcome. On the other hand, these coordination practices also allowed the officers 
in command to initiate fast-paced action by temporarily reinstating boundaries that 
served to momentarily hold off interdependencies with other officers. As boundaries 
are reinforced to retain control and speed, fragmentation emerges that is constituted 
by separate pockets of control, a multiplicity of interpretations, and ad-hoc adaptations. 
64  |  Chapter 2 Picking up the Pieces  |  65
2.5 Discussion
Our model of cross-boundary coordination extends theorizing on coordination by 
suggesting a different perspective on the accomplishment of coordination in situations 
when achieving integration is challenged. By considering the coordination practices of 
emergency officers in command over the course of exercises and real life operations 
we have described a process model of cross-boundary coordination that shows the 
emergence of fragmentation. This extends theorizing on coordination in three different 
domains: coordination, boundary spanning, and high reliability organizations. 
First, our analysis shows that coordination in fast-paced environments results in a 
dynamic that cannot be explained in terms of integration, as the integrative conditions 
of accountability, predictability and common understanding become contested in action 
(Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). Instead, our analysis shows a dynamic in which functional, 
normative and knowledge boundaries are reinstated to put interdependencies at bay. 
This results in a flux of issue specific coalitions that create a multiplicity of interpretations. 
Consequently, coordination takes the character of a contingent, and emergent outcome 
that cannot be planned or prescribed, but is highly dependent on the situated activities 
of the various actors. This fragmented nature of coordination has important virtues for 
operating in fast-paced environments because it allows speed, distributed action, and 
creative contextualized solutions to emerging problems, at the expense of multiplicity and 
issue specific coalitions. Segmenting the response operation by reinstating boundaries 
keeps interdependencies at bay, which enables swiftness that is required in fast-paced 
environments. It’s important to put interdependencies on hold in complex environments, 
because "it reduces the system liability to deadlock by reducing the number of actors that 
have to reach agreement" (Genschel 1997, p. 617). 
While contemporary coordination studies explore processes of emergent coor di-
nation, they are often based upon an integration logic. Studies of emergent coordination 
tend to neglect that interpretive flexibility creates contradictions and uncertainties that 
make disputes endemic to the coordination process, resulting in incongruent perspectives 
and equivocality (Bechky 2003, Martin 1992). From an integration perspective such 
ambiguity is seen as problematic, because common understanding is necessary to 
develop a shared perspective on the actions to be coordinated (Okhuysen and Bechky 
2009). Yet, from a fragmentation perspective it has value when multiple perspectives 
prevail, precisely because it allows professionals to find non-conventional solutions and 
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stimulate creativity and improvisation to adapt in unknown situations (Weick and Roberts 
1993, Harrison and Rouse 2014). Different interpretations stimulate doubt, discovery, 
and on-the-spot decision-making, which stimulate sensitivity to operations (Weick and 
Sutcliffe 2011). Also Harrison and Rouse (2014) who studied emergent coordination 
practices in dance groups, note that predictability and common understanding are 
compromised when looking at coordination processes in creative environments. Instead, 
they argue for the importance of de-integration. De-integration enables ‘mis-fitting’ 
that increases creativity and pushes the group to discover new problem domains. As 
such, de-integration disrupts a sense of predictability and common understanding, but it 
allows to accommodate the quest for new ideas. It shows that ambiguity and incongruent 
perspectives are not necessarily negative for coordination. Instead, it indicates that 
a different mode of coordination is required to explain the coordination processes in 
environments characterized by ambiguity. Our results indicate that coordination based 
on boundary work features negotiation as coordination mode to deal with a multiplicity 
of interpretations. This is in line with several studies that show negotiation is helpful 
in dynamic environments, as it allows members of different issue specific coalitions to 
coordinate their actions temporarily and locally, navigating their differences in norms, 
meanings, and interests only as needed (Kellogg et al. 2006, Vaughan 1999). When 
negotiation functions as coordination mode, coordination “doesn’t have to depend on 
shared idea’s, interest, or norms, which are difficult to accomplish when time is short, 
meanings are divergent, and conditions are ambiguous” (Kellogg et al. 2006, p. 39). 
Second, our model extends theorizing on boundary spanning in organizational 
literature. We contribute to the debate on boundary spanning, in which one of the central 
ideas is that boundaries need to be bridged in order to enable collaboration (Levina and 
Vaast 2005). In contrast, our study shows the importance of keeping boundaries in place 
by reinstating them to put interdependencies on hold. In a fragmented environment 
in flux also boundaries become "permeable and fluctuating in response to changing 
positions" (Martin 1992, p. 132). Fluctuating boundaries keep actors from anticipating 
and building a shared understanding, because differences in roles, work processes, 
and knowledge arise that compromise predictability and common understanding. As 
boundaries are blurred this results in confusion and misunderstanding. Like Bechky (2003) 
and Dougherty (1992) already observed that when different occupational groups come 
from different worlds of thought and practice, it pushes them to continuously negotiate 
group boundaries. Still, our analysis shows that it’s important to reinstate boundaries 
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to be able to claim accountability and expertise to initiate fast responses. Boundaries 
form a distinction (Zietsema 2010, Lamont and Molnar 2002) that enables actors to 
keep interdependencies at bay. Boundary reinforcement is also noted by Faraj and Yan 
(2009), who describe ways in which a team internally sets and reclaims its boundaries by 
increasing member awareness of boundaries and sharpening of team identity. Therefore, 
in addition to bridging boundaries, renewed attention is required for how actors reinstate 
boundaries to execute cross-boundary coordination.
Third, our results extend theorizing on high reliability organizations (HRO). Emergency 
management organizations, like the Fire Department, are frequently characterized as a 
HRO (Bigley and Roberts 2001, Weick and Sutcliffe 2011, Weick 1993). In HRO’s increasing 
sensitivity to operations and deference to expertise are key features for managing the 
unexpected in a reliable manner (Weick et al. 1999). A hallmark of HRO’s is that they 
are "pressured by ambiguity to demonstrate more use of specialized professionals skills, 
continual redefinition of individual tasks, and development of more ad-hoc centers of 
authority located closer to the source of a problem" (Weick 1985, in: Martin 1992, p. 158). 
Studies of HRO’s indicated that to deal with unexpected events and retain sensitivity to 
operations, expert authority and decisions are mitigated down to the front line based on 
deference to expertise. Our findings indicate that this process actually results in separate 
pockets of control, ambiguity, and a multiplicity of interpretations (Vaughan 1999, Martin 
1992). We contribute to the HRO debate by showing that if coordination among multiple 
HROs occurs across their boundaries, it triggers negotiations between issue specific 
coalitions at the front line.
2.6 Conclusion
We conclude that cross-boundary coordination practices in the fast-paced environment of 
emergency management triggers fragmentation, instead of integration. A key difference 
to previous studies about coordination is that in our work fragmentation is not treated 
as a deficiency of integration, but we recognize that fragmentation has important virtues 
that are necessary for coordination in fast-paced environments. A crisis is likely to force 
multiple organizations to coordinate in ambiguous situations, where ad-hoc adjustments 
and issue specific coalitions make dealing with multiplicity and emergence inevitable. 
Our analysis shows that a lack of integration doesn’t mean crisis management spirals 
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into chaos. On the contrary, daring to let go of the aim of integration, and preparing for 
a coordination mode that is based on negotiation actually supports the very flexibility, 
sensitivity to operations, and improvisation that are claimed to be hallmarks of swift and 
effective crisis management.

3. Drawing the Line 2 
Summary
Boundary objects are commonly described as supporting cross-boundary interaction by virtue of 
interpretive flexibility; being malleable to adapt to local needs while being sufficiently robust to 
foster common understanding. Relatively little, however, is known about the processes by which the 
configuration of boundary objects is constituted in-use to support cross-boundary coordination. In this 
paper we explore the process by which boundary objects are continuously tailored through different 
coordination modes. We explore this in a multiple case study of emergency response management 
teams engaged in exercises in which officers from multiple disciplines need to continuously update 
the boundary object. We find that officers employ four different coordination modes –selecting 
tasks, phasing action, standardizing information and transforming understanding– as they engage 
with the boundary object. We use a mixed methods approach that combines qualitative analysis with 
process modeling to study the temporal sequential adaptation of the boundary object. By showing 
how boundary objects can support different coordination modes simultaneously, our work develops 
a relational perspective on boundary objects-in use. This generates a more complete understanding 
of the process by which the configuration of a boundary object is constituted in-use and why this 
supports or inhibits cross-boundary coordination.
2 This chapter is co-authored with Kees Boersma, Peter Groenewegen and Scott Poole.
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3.1 Introduction: tailoring boundary objects  
for cross-boundary coordination
Numerous vehicles, including a petrol truck, crash on the highway. In the chaos that 
follows leaked fuel catches fire and a large smoke column spreads across the highway 
surrounding the entire area in thick black smoke. Near the front of the accident, several 
blue barrels fall off another truck and start to leak a toxic substance. This exercise 
scenario poses a real challenge to four emergency response officers and their Field 
Commander. To harmonize their points of view in a command meeting the officers draw 
a map of the situation, number the cars, and locate the hazard posed by the barrels. 
The Fire Officer explains: ‘They cannot approach that area without protective gear and 
clothes. Not behind the area that is cordoned off. We have created a line there.’ Field 
Commander: ‘Right, let’s determine that from here on [draws a red line on the flip 
chart] this is a no-go area.’ Immediately after the meeting the officers return to the 
accident site to instruct their units. At that moment the Medical Officer does something 
unexpected: ‘Yes [walks through the incident to talk to the Fire Officer]. We can go 
until behind the water-screen. It’s here right?’ Fire engine commander: ‘No, it’s at the 
other end, way back.’ Medical Officer: ‘Oh my god, where?’ Fire engine commander: 
‘The water-screen is between…’ Fire Officer (shouting): ‘Medical Officer!! YOU ARE 
WALKING IN A CONTAMINATED AREA!!!’
What has just happened here? How can the Medical Officer wander off into a highly toxic 
area, around which the Field Commander has just drawn a red line, symbolizing a “no-
go area”? Our field study of emergency response coordination, suggested that the map 
the officers’ draw to harmonize their points of view in order to coordinate their actions 
provided a starting point to answer these questions. In this study we initially focused 
on cross-boundary coordination in emergency response and noticed that the central 
medium by which emergency officers coordinated was by developing a representation of 
the disaster scene to set out the action to be taken. They refer to this representation as 
a Common Operational Picture (COP). The COP is both a representation of the situation 
of the disaster, as well as an object that structures the multi-organizational response to 
the disaster (Wolbers and Boersma 2013). It characterizes, for instance, the terrain of 
the disaster area, location of hazards, available resources, and the number of dead and 
wounded. Additionally, it provides for a means of depicting the progress of the response 
operation and can help to identify coordination issues between the different emergency 
response organizations, each of which is staffed by members of different disciplines or 
professions (Comfort 2007). As our study progressed we noticed that the COP exhibited 
clear characteristics of a boundary object. 
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Scholars have devoted much attention to boundary objects as an important means to 
support cross-boundary interaction between different communities or professionals 
(Bechky 2003, Kellogg et al. 2006, Levina and Vaast 2005, Meyer et al. 2013, Orlikowski 
2002, Sapsed and Salter 2004, Yakura 2002, Zeiss and Groenewegen 2009). Boundary 
objects are able to reside between intersecting social worlds by forming a temporary 
‘anchor or bridge’ (Star and Griesemer 1989). As a temporary anchor their effectiveness 
is often attributed to the capability of being sufficiently common enough to ensure a 
minimum of shared consensus, whilst being sufficiently flexible to adapt to the specific 
needs and constraints of each of its users (Star and Griesemer 1989). Based on this 
prospect boundary objects are generally treated as means of translation based on their 
interpretive flexibility, as different groups develop different interpretations of the same 
object (Star 2010, Pickering 2003).
Hence, as the emphasis is put on the objects’ interpretive flexibility, most of the 
seminal literature implicitly distinguishes between the boundary object itself, and the 
interpretations that are developed around it. This distinction, however, guides attention 
away from the process of configuring the object itself. As our opening case shows, the 
configuration of the boundary object directly influences its users’ understandings of the 
situation, which in this case impedes cross-boundary coordination. In order to gain insight 
into the configuration process, we pose the following research question: how do different 
users tailor the boundary object, and how does this process support or impede cross-
boundary coordination? 
We advance an analysis that argues that the boundary object, its construction, and 
the interpretive uses to which it is put are inseparable; they are part of the same process. 
Our analysis builds on recent studies that regard coordination as a temporally unfolding 
and contextualized process of managing interdependencies to realize a collective 
performance (Faraj and Xiao 2006, Okhuysen and Bechky 2009, Jarzabkowski et al. 
2012). We will show how the boundary object itself is employed in various ways through 
the course of interaction, when it is tailored based on its users different coordination 
modes to bridge different kinds of boundaries. We therefore problematize the idea that 
boundary objects exist out there waiting to be used. 
Our study is based on an in-depth processual analysis of 10 emergency response 
exercises and corresponding interviews with the participating officers. The dynamic 
nature of these emergency management situations provides a unique opportunity to gain 
insight into the coordination process in which the configuration of boundary objects is 
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developed and refined in the course of action. We adopted a mixed methods approach to 
investigate the temporal and relational processes through which the configuration of the 
boundary object in-use is tailored to fit its users’ needs. This extends our initial inductive 
analysis with a process analysis that is used to map the changing configuration of the 
boundary object. By analyzing the relation between the sequences of tailoring we are 
able to show how and when the changing configuration of the boundary object supports 
or impedes coordination. This explanation offers new insights into the coordination 
functions of boundary objects, and gives a specific example of how inductive grounded 
theory can be extended by using a process analysis.
3.2 The coordination function of boundary objects
In contrast to our focus on coordination, the seminal literature on boundary objects is 
primarily focused on knowledge creation activities, where the majority of the studies 
are conducted in the context of product or software development environments. These 
studies have shown how different functional groups involved in design and development 
activities interact and share knowledge around a range of boundary objects, such as 
assembly drawings, technical specifications, and computer-aided design tools and 
prototypes (Henderson 1991, Carlile 2002, Bechky 2003, Subramanian et al. 2003). In 
these production environments studies focus on how different groups negotiate, share 
knowledge and learn (Carlile 2004, Hsiao et al. 2012), while the boundary object offers a 
shared medium for co-orientation between different groups (Star 2010). 
In our study not knowledge sharing, but acts of coordination are central in the 
use of the boundary object. The focus on coordination extends the functionality of 
boundary objects beyond the scope of interpretive flexibility towards their utilization for 
action. Boundary objects can support coordination in different ways, either to develop 
accountability, predictability or common understanding (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). 
Boundary objects can provide a scaffolding structure to develop accountability that 
functions by representing elements of the tasks individuals are working on (Kellogg et 
al. 2006). The interaction around a boundary object also enhances predictability because 
it enables actors to acknowledge the progression on a particular task (Bechky 2003, 
Carlile 2002). To develop common understanding the boundary object may facilitate 
the development of a shared understanding of activities, for instance about patient 
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progression in emergency trauma centers (Faraj and Xiao 2006). Like these studies show, 
boundary objects feature in different settings where different modes of coordination are 
required to tackle different kinds of coordination issues. 
It is important to note that these coordination issues involve different kinds of 
boundaries. A boundary is a demarcation that marks the limits of a common set of 
practices, and may be defined by function, hierarchy, expertise, cultural, discipline and 
temporal/spatial differentiation among other things (Hsiao et al. 2012, Carlile 2002, 
Bechky 2003, Levina and Vaast 2005, Orlikowski 2002). Boundaries are shaped by personal 
interpretations, patterns of interactions, and formal and perceived accountabilities (Barley 
and Kunda 2001). Encountering a boundary requires actors to coordinate the way in which 
the boundary shapes the perceived collaboration beyond a common set of practices. 
What functionality of the boundary object is used to support boundary spanning 
depends on what information needs its users have and what type of boundaries they 
experience (Star 2010). We will approach the problem of how boundary objects figure in 
coordination from the perspective of the functionality of boundary objects. In their original 
work, Star and Griesemer (1989) describe different forms boundary objects can take 
based on particular types of action and cooperation (Star 2010): repository, standardized 
form, coincident boundaries, and ideal type. We argue that a boundary object can be 
configured based on the coordination function inhibited in these typologies, which offers 
different properties for bridging different kinds of boundaries during cross-boundary 
coordination. 
The first type of boundary object is a repository, whose functionality is based 
on providing a modular configuration, as it consists of many different elements that 
are indexed in a standardized fashion and can be taken out by its users. Libraries and 
museum collections are typically described as examples of repositories. Not only in the 
original study of Star and Griesemer (1989), but also in more recent studies (Martens 
2011, Poehls 2010). The modular nature of the repository allows its users to select and 
extract parts of the boundary object without compromising the overall structure of the 
repository. Therefore, people from different worlds can use or borrow from the repository 
for their own purpose without having to directly negotiate with other users (Star and 
Griesemer 1989). 
In terms of coordination, the repository can be understood through the type of 
interdependence it fosters (Malone and Crowston 1994). It corresponds to what Thompson 
(1967) termed pooled interdependence, in which each individual or group draws on a 
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common resource, but are otherwise independent. This coordination approach is based 
on the idea that people can work separately in parallel, by assessing what modules 
are necessary for them to use, and the performance of the whole is more or less of an 
aggregate of individual performance. Along the same lines, Galbraith (1973) discusses 
departmentalization, in which a single unit takes care of a task. In this form of coordination 
the collective responsibility for a task is broken down into individual responsibilities, and 
the functional boundary between groups is sustained. 
In more recent coordination approaches, the coordination function of repositories 
is related to the process of self-synchronization, which is based on the functionality of the 
modular nature of repositories. This is a form of designed coordination in which actors can 
select the information from the repository that is appropriate for them to perform their 
tasks, whereby "information useful to processes is stored … in an easy and accessible 
form" (Davenport 1993, p. 89). Likewise, Henderson (1991) describes an example in 
which the modular nature of boundary objects is used to separate tasks. Assemblers and 
inventory control staff in product development teams view the same industrial drawings 
either as installation guidelines or as indices of part numbers, which allowed them to work 
separately on separate elements of the tasks. In this situation interdependence is pooled, 
as the functional boundary between different professionals is (re)defined on the boundary 
object (Faraj and Yan 2009).
The second type of boundary object, the standardized form is described in situations 
where the boundary object is used as a device that is intolerant of local tinkering, but 
enables integration of collective work across social worlds by holding certain elements 
constant (Fujimura 1992). The standardized form is referred to as ‘immutable mobiles’ 
(Star and Griesemer 1989): objects that can be transported over a long distance that 
convey unchanging information. It is most commonly described in clinical contexts, by 
referring to the use of standardized protocols, prescriptions and information systems 
(Bjorn et al. 2009, Cooper 2011, Mackintosh and Sandall 2010, Gittell 2002, Faraj and 
Xiao 2006). Also in other settings, like construction work, standards are established 
beforehand through CAD tools to allow the integration of work on different sites without 
local tinkering (D’Adderio 2001). In the context of education, Nolen et al. (2011) show how 
assessment forms function as immutable mobiles, when course grades are regarded as 
standardized information about what has been learned of levels of student achievement. 
These grades keep viable across different contexts, while stripping away the local details 
about what has been actually learned in the classrooms. 
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These studies show that the standardized type supports coordination by providing 
standards that reduce the need for interaction among participants, and is therefore a 
relatively low-cost way to coordinate work (Galbraith 1973). Standardization is categorized 
as a form of programming, which examines the extent to which activities can be specified in 
advance (Argote 1982, March and Simon 1958). Specifying standards in advance stimulates 
predictability and offers a form of co-orientation, which is an important condition for 
coordination that enables interdependent parties to anticipate subsequent task related 
activity by knowing what the elements of the task are and when they happen (Okhuysen and 
Bechky 2009). The standards themselves are described as a specific form of administrative 
coordination, in which tangible resources, such as documents, checklists and standard 
operating procedures are used to assign routine tasks (Faraj and Sproull 2000). Standards 
are useful for supporting cross-boundary coordination because they provide a prescribed 
work order that is transferable across different contexts. By providing an equal norm across 
different contexts this type of boundary object bridges a normative boundary, because 
different perspectives of how work should be completed are already described in advance. 
The third type, coincident boundaries, “have the same boundaries, but different 
internal contents” (Star and Griesemer 1989, p.410). For coordination, a particularly 
important instance of coincident boundary is the timeline, which defines a series of steps 
or time units, each of which can be assigned to different people or units and populated by 
different activities and outcomes. This makes time concrete through defining sequences 
of activities or events. It has been analyzed most commonly in the literature on project 
management (Lindkvist et al. 1998, Yakura 2002) and information systems development 
(Barrett and Oborn 2010). These studies describe how the boundary object is passed 
on to different groups that take control over specific elements of the tasks sequentially. 
For example, Yakura’s (2002) analysis of project timelines as boundary objects shows 
how Gantt charts are used to delegate tasks to different users in different geographical 
locations. The chart functions as a ‘temporal’ boundary object that provides closure to the 
collaboration by making time concrete and negotiable for its various users. Different time 
periods are distinguished within the boundary object, each of which corresponds to a 
specific type of activity. By using the boundary object to separate tasks, the focus is often 
put on perceived interdependence and the negotiation of priorities (Sapsed and Salter 
2004). For example, Lindkvist et al. (1998) describe how timelines become instruments of 
authority and control by triggering a negotiation process between collaborating parties. 
The coordination function of the coincided boundary form is based on arranging 
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sequential interdependence (Thompson 1967). In this type of coordination actors are 
dependent on the performance of actions by others for arranging their own work. As 
work in projects often occurs at different locations in parallel, it requires collaborators 
to stay informed about what work is being done (Kellogg et al. 2006). In order to do 
this, work is made visible by arranging the order of activities. This is a form of temporal 
coordination that is based on making time and space concrete. Temporal coordination 
bridges a spatiotemporal boundary through specifying sequences of action. 
Fourth, the ‘ideal type’ boundary object features in situations where shared 
understanding is developed through interaction with the object (Barley et al. 2012). The 
ideal type boundary object is abstracted from all domains, but is adaptable to local sites, 
because it’s potentially multivocal. The object is treated as a symbol that becomes a 
‘good enough’ roadmap for all parties (Star and Griesemer 1989), since both groups 
contextualize the boundary object in their own way (Doolin and McLeod 2012). This 
process is mainly discussed in studies of knowledge sharing (Carlile 2004) and learning 
(Akkerman and Bakker 2011, Wenger 2000). Likewise, Broberg et al. (2011) regard 
boundary objects as flexible and malleable objects that offer a temporal learning space. 
Groups resolve conflicts by transforming ideas and building trust by using boundary 
objects (Black and Andersen 2012). 
This functionality of the ideal type boundary object is recognized in a wide array 
of fields as a way of integrating understanding among different groups. An example is 
the use of prototypes in design and manufacturing (Subrahmanian et al. 2003, Leonardi 
2011). Prototypes (drawings, 3D models, and other graphical representations) become 
permanent means of negotiation in the product development process between 
developers and engineers. The boundary object is not functioning as static means of 
translation, but arises over time, through which opposing interests and interpretations 
are negotiated and transformed. Bechky (2003) describes this process in negotiations 
about a pump between assemblers and engineers that took on meanings that reflected 
both the manufacturing concerns and the engineering needs. Actors learned about their 
differences and dependencies, then jointly transformed current knowledge into a new 
contextualized understanding. 
Like these studies show, the ideal type boundary object features in organizational 
settings characterized by reciprocal interdependence (Thompson 1967). Challenging 
coordination problems require actors to interact frequently to develop a common 
perspective to coordinate their actions. Frequent contact offers the advantage of 
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adaptability by supporting mutual adjustment, which feeds into the development of 
common understanding (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). Faraj and Sproull (2000) describe 
coordination based on sharing expertise to build common understanding as expertise 
coordination. Expertise coordination is defined as the management of knowledge and skill 
dependencies (Faraj and Sproull 2000, Faraj and Xiao 2006). In contrast to administrative 
coordination that focuses on protocols and routines, expertise coordination is based 
on professional judgment. This forms the basis for the translation or transformation of 
knowledge between actors to bridge a knowledge boundary (Carlile 2004). 
In sum, we can discern the following overview of the coordination function of boun-
dary objects.
Boundary object type Boundary Coordination type(s) Coordination function
Repository Functional Designed 
coordination
Modularity supports  
self-synchronization 
Standardized form Normative Administrative 
coordination
Conveying similar norms 
across different contexts 
Coincided boundaries Spatiotemporal Temporal 
coordination
Sequencing task related 
activity by defining a  
time and location allows 
multi-tasking 
Ideal type Knowledge Expertise 
coordination
Developing shared 
understanding based on 
abstraction leads to  
collective sensemaking
Table 2. The coordination function of different types of boundary objects
3.3 Towards a process perspective on tailoring boundary objects 
The overview in Table 2 of the coordination function of boundary objects shows that 
boundary objects have certain characteristics that suit the management of a particular 
type of boundary. While this overview might indicate rather static distinctions between 
different types of boundary objects and their coordination function, there is reason to 
believe that the distinctions between them are not so fixed. As coordination is a temporally 
unfolding process of managing interdependencies, also coordination mechanisms change 
in the process of adapting to conditions of uncertainty, and novelty, when existing ways 
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of organizing activities are disrupted and must be accomplished in new ways (Crowston 
1997, Jarzabowski et al. 2012). Boundary objects are part of this dynamic as they are 
categorized as a coordination mechanism of representation that supports coordination 
by providing a common referent (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). 
This corresponds to recent insights in boundary object literature, which indicate 
that the use of a boundary object is dependent on the way it is put into practice (Levina 
and Vaast 2005). Accordingly, boundary objects can facilitate interaction in different 
ways (Trompette and Vinck 2009). As the boundary object itself is (re)configured to 
accommodate changing information and work requirements (Doolin and McLeod 
2012), different users employ boundary objects in different ways as it is embedded in 
their situated practices (Bechky 2003, Carlile 2002). As such, boundary objects require 
a fair amount of updating and tailoring to continue to satisfy the changing needs of the 
collaborating parties (Lee 2007). 
We build on and connect these ideas by investigating how the boundary object is 
tailored in different ways when people make a bid to configure the object for a specific 
coordination function (DeSanctis and Poole 1994). This builds on earlier work that shows 
how actors may employ different strategies to shape the form and use of the boundary 
object, while engaging in cross-boundary interaction (Barley et al. 2012). Understanding 
the way in which its users tailor the configuration of a boundary object, and how the 
individual tailoring influences the efficacy of cross-boundary coordination, would 
require that we begin to pay attention not to the object itself, but to the cross-boundary 
coordination processes underlying its constitution. 
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Research Setting and Data Collection
In order to obtain access to the short-cycle coordination processes through which the 
officers tailor the boundary object, we conducted a qualitative field study of emergency 
management exercises. This allowed us to study how boundary objects were configured in 
the interaction between Police, Fire Department, Medical and Municipal officers during a 
response operation. The data presented in this article was collected in the winter of 2010, in 
which 10 field exercises were observed, recorded, and transcribed in detail. In addition, 20 
in-depth interviews were conducted with all the officers that participated in these exercises. 
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We chose to focus in depth on the collaboration processes in these exercises, favoring 
accuracy over generality in the first stages of our research (Brinberg and McGrath 1985, 
Langley 1999). This enabled us to capture the process of creating the COP as a boundary 
object, which is grounded in the ongoing interpersonal interaction between the officers. Our 
data collection focused on how officers interpreted the information shared concerning this 
boundary object and how it influenced their consequent actions. For us it was very important 
to understand how these actions were embedded in context of response operations, to be 
able to capture the richness of the coordination process without abstracting it away from 
the interdependencies in the environment (Barley and Kunda 2001). 
Emergency response field exercises offer a unique opportunity to study the use of 
boundary objects in situ. They are scenario-based exercise sessions in which emergencies 
are simulated, that start with a predefined script, but continue in any possible direction 
as the events unfold. As such, the exercises resemble the reality of emergency response, 
since actions of the officers have direct influence on subsequent events and outcomes. 
Exercises differ from training sessions in that events are not interrupted for moments of 
reflection, but the response operation is left to unfold. As such, exercises are a good focus 
for analysis because the emergency management organization is similar to events in the 
field, and actors are obliged to act and forced to make decisions that influence the way 
in which the exercise unfolds. Still, it is also necessary to acknowledge the limitations of 
exercises: because scenarios are removed from reality they may lack the same emotional 
aspects, decision impact and in some cases delay in the recruitment of units (Latiers and 
Jacques 2009).
The exercises themselves were staged in different locations on training grounds 
specially designed for emergency response exercises. These training grounds were 
located at a former military airbase, on which abandoned buildings like an energy plant 
and a small village were transformed into a disaster area with caved-in buildings, a gas 
station, train yard, a section of highway, etc. These enhanced the realism and feel for the 
situation, as for example an exercise that involved a highway traffic accident was located 
at the realistically reconstructed highway with crashed vehicles and trucks. The exercise 
scenarios included: a fire in a youth hostel; fire in an adult club; a highway collision; a 
hostage situation; carbon monoxide diffusion in an elder home; a fire in a tire factory; 
an explosion after a failed SWAT raid; and a Cessna plane crash on a gas station. The 
average length of the exercises was 1h26m, ranging from 1h2m to 1h54m. Each exercise 
consisted of two or three command meetings, with approximately 15 to 30 minutes of 
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time in between to carry out the tasks set out in the meeting. This corresponds to the 
phase of group activity that Marks, Mathieu and Zacarro (2001) call transition. Following 
the exercise, an after action review was held.
In the exercises the COP is created on a white board or flip chart in a mobile field 
command center. A command meeting was held approximately every half hour to create 
or update the COP on a common display, and to discuss the progress and challenges 
of the response operation. In many countries including the Netherlands, the COP is a 
common part of response operation training and contains two elements: a geographical 
representation of the situation (drawing) and a checklist of the actions (both completed 
and “to-do”) (Wolbers and Boersma 2013).
The sequences of activities during the exercise were observed and audio recorded 
by the first author by shadowing lead officers. The first author also took field notes on 
the interactions between officers from different organizations, in order to analyze and 
reconstruct the way in which the COP was used to guide actions and decision making. 
Observations are important tools to capture this process since people often cannot 
articulate how they do what they do unless they are in the process of doing it (Barley and 
Kunda 2001). In addition, informal conversations were held before and after the exercises 
to allow participants to reflect on their actions. After the exercises, participants were 
interviewed in the spring of 2011 to ascertain their view on the response exercises in order 
to find out how they understood the COP and the actions of other emergency services 
in specific exercises. Discussions in the interviews suggested that the interviewees still 
recalled the exercises in quite some detail and felt confident commenting on them. The 
analysis of the exercise transcripts and field notes provided the input for the interviews. 
We asked the officers how they constructed the COP, both mentally and on paper, 
how they perceived the information and collaboration with other officers, and how this 
influenced their decisions for specific actions. As such, moving back and forth between 
analysis of the transcripts and the interpretations of the officers in the interviews allowed 
us to explore and explicate the dynamic of tailoring the boundary object. 
The prolonged period of data collection allowed us to zoom in and out on the 
data (Nicolini 2009), and enabled us to critically assess, compare and broaden our 
understanding of the phenomena we observed in the field exercises and heard described 
in the interviews. The research process developed iteratively as we analyzed transcripts 
of the recordings, interviewed the participants of the exercises based on the previous 
analysis and combined this with analysis of documents on the use of the COP. During this 
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process we realized that the officers tailored the COP in unique ways, each of which had 
its own temporal trajectory. This guided our focus towards the sequential order in which 
the tailoring occurred, requiring a mixed methods design to investigate this.
3.4.2 Analytical Process
We have divided our analytical approach into five stages based on a conversion mixed 
design (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009), to integrate our qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. A general overview of this mixed methods design is visualized in Figure 4. 
Quantization 
	  
Modes identified with  
Lexical Markers 
Observation and data 
gathering 
Analysis 
Member check 
Analysis 
Analysis Timeline and Markov Analysis 
Interpretation Interpretation of Timeline and 
Markov Analysis  
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
Stage 4 
Stage 5 
Qualitative Step Quantitative Step 
Figure 4. Design of the study, using notation described in Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009)
In the first stage of our analysis we started with inductive theory building (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008) to develop the theoretical concepts and connections among them from 
our process data (Langley 1999). The transcripts from the interviews and exercises were 
combined with the help of the data analysis tool MaxQDA (Corbin and Strauss 2008) 
to inform our analysis. The fully transcribed exercises allowed us to reconstruct the 
interactions of the officers with each other and the COP chronologically. We coded the 
elements of this process, which provided insight into the different ways of tailoring the 
boundary object. 
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In the second stage of the analysis we conducted a member check (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow 2009) to see whether our ideas applied to the operational experiences of the 
officers. We conducted these interviews in the summer of 2012, two years after the initial 
observations. Our acquaintance with the officers allowed us in this stage to reflect on their 
experiences during the exercises in comparison with the actual operational responses in 
the two-year period, and ask them about the relative importance of the COP in these 
response operations. In these interviews we asked the officers to describe their work 
and experiences during operational responses of the last two years. This enabled us to 
confront and build on one of the challenges in our material, the fact that the observations 
were based on exercises instead of real incident response operations. By taking this step 
and checking the analysis and results with the officers, we felt more confident that the 
results reflected the actual practices of emergency response operations.
In the third stage of our data analysis we focused on possible temporal patterns 
in the development of the boundary object during the exercise. If the officers tailored 
the boundary object to suit their coordination needs, did they do this in specific ways 
and were there discernible patterns in the process of development over time? In 
combination with a progressively deepening literature review we gradually arrived at 
four coordination modes used to tailor the boundary object: selecting tasks, phasing 
action, standardizing information and transforming understanding. We recognized that 
these could be connected to the original forms of the boundary object in the work of 
Star and Griesemer (1989), and reframed them to capture processual moves. As such, 
our inductive theoretical reasoning was an iterative process of moving back and forth 
between empirical impressions and theoretical inferences (Alvesson and Kärreman 2007).
In this stage we continued moving back and forth between these theoretical insights 
and our empirical data. We analyzed the transcripts of the exercises to discover if specific 
patterns of discourse were present that resembled each coordination mode. A human/
machine augmented analysis with help of a lexical search in the program MaxQDA (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008), aided us in providing a word frequency analysis that suggested that 
each coordination mode had specific terms associated with it that were not associated 
with other patterns. We used these as markers of the mode, if we believed it represented 
the mode accurately enough. After this semi-automatic coding, we rechecked whether 
the codes actually reflected our original definition of the coordination mode and deleted 
those codes that did not reflect this original definition. A more elaborate description of 
the logic we used to code the discourse based on the four coordination modes can be 
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found in appendix 1. The average number of coded segments per exercise is 143, and 
ranges from 132 to 171. This resulted in the following list of key terms that signaled which 
of the coordination modes the officers were in during a specific unit of analysis:
Selecting tasks Phasing action Standardizing 
information
Transforming 
understanding
Message Later Procedure Because
Meanwhile Take care Regulate Certain
Happened In a while Plan Means
Task First Distance Convenient
Created Arrange Alarming Think
Self Each other Deploy Sensible
Done Time Scaling up Why
Last Adjust Protocol Reason
Control Feedback GRIP Danger
Mono Consult Estimate
Bilateral Accounting
At this moment Safe
Pass on Understand
Priority
Busy
Ongoing
Table 3. Terms associated with each coordination mode
The third stage of analysis produced temporal sequences (timelines) of codings of 
coordination modes for the ten exercises. To facilitate identification of common sequential 
patterns across the exercises, we utilized formal modeling techniques in the fourth stage 
of our analysis. To detect patterns of action over time we performed a Markov chain 
analysis, which gives an indication of whether there are regularities in local sequential 
structure whereby acts are predictable from immediately preceding acts (Poole et al. 
2000). The output of a Markov model is visualized in a transition matrix that presents 
the probability of the occurrence of sequences of coordination modes, relative to other 
sequences. This gives an overall 'picture' of the sequential structure in the data that 
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enabled us to determine statistically whether there were common recurrent structures. 
By identifying common recurrent sequences, Markov analysis points to features of 
interaction that can then be explored in further discourse analysis. The coded discussions 
among the emergency responders (coded into categories selecting tasks, phasing action, 
standardizing information, and transforming understanding) generated a sequence of 
activity types that are the input for the Markov analysis. 
The validity of a Markov chain is assessed through testing the assumptions of order 
and stationarity based upon a log-linear analysis outlined in Poole et al. (2000), to which 
we refer the reader for a more detailed description of the statistical analysis. The first 
assumption of whether the process depicted by a Markov chain has a definite order is 
assessed by comparing the fit of models of successive order. We compared the fit of 
‘higher’ order models (2nd order) with ‘lower’ order models (1st order), and a baseline 
model that indicates no local order in the interaction (0th order). In a first-order Markov 
chain, each successive action is reliably predictable from the preceding action, which 
implies an act-response format. In a second-order Markov chain, each successive action 
can be predicted based on the previous two actions, which implies an act-response-
response format. All second order Markov chains can also be re-expressed as first order 
chains, which aids in interpretation of sequences. The second assumption is whether the 
same transition matrix exhibits stationarity, so the sequential probabilities hold for the 
entire sequence. This is tested by dividing the entire sequence into shorter segments, 
calculating their transition matrices and comparing these. 
Our tests indicated that first and second order Markov chains represented the 
sequential dependencies. First order models fit five of the episodes: Exercises 1, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6. Second order models fit three of the episodes: Exercises 2, 7, and 10. Only two 
episodes, exercises 8 and 9, showed no significant sequential structure (0th order). The 
transition matrices are presented in appendix 2. 
Markov analysis is useful because it tests whether there is structure in the overall 
episodes. To provide better resolution of this structure, we then utilized a visual mapping 
strategy (Langley 1999) by creating a timeline that visualized the transitions between 
the coordination modes based on the sequences of codings. This timeline depicts the 
sequence of coordination modes as it unfolds during the episodes and affords a more 
detailed understanding of the temporal sequencing. We moved back and forth between 
the Markov transition matrix and the line charts to look for and develop inferences about 
common sequences and the progressions of events (Langley and Truax 1994).
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In the fifth stage we went back to our qualitative data of both the discourse strings from 
the exercises and interviews with the officers, to develop an interpretation of the critical 
transitions we identified in the previous analytical stage. The process analysis from stage 
four is suited to identify regularities in short sequences, while the discourse approach is 
able to lend meaning to the regularities, but also to make sense of significant, irregular 
patterns and longer strings of discourse. By analyzing and reflecting on the discourse 
in these critical patterns, we were able to develop theoretical inferences about how the 
boundary object is tailored to support or impede cross-boundary coordination.
3.5 Findings: Tailoring the boundary object  
for cross-boundary coordination
Now we will return to our example from the introduction to develop a more satisfactory 
answer concerning why the Medical Officer wandered into the contaminated area. Before 
doing this, however, we must first explain the relation between the four coordination modes 
used to tailor the boundary object: selecting tasks, phasing action, standardizing information, 
and transforming understanding. The coordination modes are processes based upon the 
functionality inhibited in the four forms of boundary objects—repository, standardized form, 
coincident boundaries, and ideal type (Star and Griesemer, 1989)—that describe the different 
ways in which cross-boundary coordination can be supported. We regard each coordination 
mode as the property of an act that one of the professionals engages in that (1) makes a bid 
to define the boundary object in a certain way (as a repository, a coincident boundary, etc.) 
and (2) may operate on the boundary object to support a particular form of coordination. 
The coordination modes are illustrated in Figure 5, which differentiates between 
the structuring of the boundary object and the way in which it supports coordination. 
The columns differentiate coordination modes that tailor the boundary object as an open 
or a closed configuration. Closed use of boundary objects is based upon employing 
(temporary) established standards or arrangements, while open use of a boundary 
emphasizes processes that are in development: phasing action or transforming under-
standing. The rows differentiate the coordination modes that function to either segment 
or integrate work to enable coordination. Coordination modes of segmentation divide 
work into separate actions or phases, while modes of integration primarily attempt to 
bring together interdependent actions or understanding. 
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Figure 5. Coordination modes used to tailor boundary objects
Based on this analytical framework we will now go back to the case of the introduction to 
analyze how the boundary object was tailored during the response to the traffic accident, 
when the Medical officer crossed the line.
3.5.1 Tailoring the boundary object during the response to a traffic accident
Once emergency responders arrive at the scene of the accident on the highway, their first 
actions are aimed at getting an overview of the scene and identifying potentially dangerous 
situations. There is great danger for escalation in this scenario, because multiple vehicles 
are involved posing different kinds of hazards. At the front of the accident a truck carrying 
barrels, which are later identified as toxic XTC chemicals, has collided into the crash 
barrier causing the barrels to roll onto the highway. Multiple cars driving behind the truck 
failed to avoid the barrels and have collided. A small van behind the XTC truck leaks fuel 
that catches fire, which is threatening to ignite a nearby petrol truck. Black smoke clouds 
from the fire block the view of the accident and obstruct the traffic flow in the opposite 
lane. After the Police, Fire Department, and Medical Officer arrive on scene, they conduct 
an initial reconnaissance of the situation. The officers construct an individual picture of 
the situation, based on their professional interpretations and values regarding priorities. 
In this first phase of the exercise the officers approach the incident by separating 
tasks, and order their own subordinates to complete the assigned tasks independently. 
This is possible because the dynamic of the incident is still limited and the officers are 
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able to, as they say, "chop the incident into compartments". After 25 minutes the first 
field command meeting is held in the mobile command center on scene. The following 
discussion takes place between the Field Commander (a high ranking Fire Department 
commander) and the officers, while constructing the first common operational picture.
Actor Conversation Coordination modes
Field Commander All right, welcome everybody, are we all here? 
Let’s shut down the radios for now so we can 
have a quiet meeting. I would like to spend 10 
minutes on constructing the operational picture 
and any bottlenecks that we can identify. I think 
it’s good to draw the situation, and I would like 
to ask the Fire Officer to do that for us.
Transforming 
understanding
Fire Officer [starts drawing on the whiteboard] 
Here is a money truck, a petrol tanker and a 
car. At the front there is a small fire and a truck 
with an unknown cargo that consists of several 
barrels.
Field Commander Okay, just to be clear, let’s number the vehicles. 
1,2,3,4,5,6, with your permission. Is that right? 
Does the picture correspond to the scenario 
outside? Okay, let’s move on to what is 
happening right now. Fire Officer?
Fire Officer Let’s start at number 1. Here are some barrels 
that fell off the truck, but seem to be intact. 
There is no leakage at this time, so there is no 
priority for me yet.
Phasing action
Phasing action
Field Commander Okay, truck number 2.
Fire Officer Is on fire, but we have it under control. Selecting tasks
Field Commander Fire under control. Right, 3? Selecting tasks
Fire Officer The truck is leaking at the shutoff valve, but we 
have it under control at this moment.
Selecting tasks
Phasing action
Field Commander Truck 3 is leaking at the shutoff valve, under 
control.
Selecting tasks
Fire Officer Yes, they [Fire Engine 2] are working on it as we 
speak.
Field Commander Bottleneck seems to be sealing the valve. Right, 
4?
Fire Officer Ambulance, with one T1 victim inside.
[triangulation classification used by the medical 
services to identify the urgency of victims’ 
transport to hospital, T1 means within 1 hour].
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Actor Conversation Coordination modes
Field Commander T1 as patient?
Fire Officer The driver and the nurse are inside, both injured, 
but approachable at this time.
Phasing action
Field Commander They are still in the ambulance?
Fire Officer They are, but they need to be rescued.
Table 4. Exercise 3 First Field Command Meeting
In the first field command meeting the Fire Officer explains the drawing on the map. His 
conversational style shows that he is using the boundary object for segmentation through 
combining modes of selecting and phasing, by explaining that the fire department 
has managed to control specific elements of the incident, at this moment. The other 
emergency services are still keeping a distance, because of the danger posed by the fire 
near the petrol truck. At this moment their primary means of interpreting the situation 
is through the boundary object, which is constituted by the Fire Officer’s drawing. Since 
the Fire Officer is using modes of segmentation, he asserts that the Fire Department has 
the situation under control, but this does not give the other officers a clear idea on how 
they can contribute. As the other officers are not privy to the understandings of the Fire 
Officer, they are prevented from building a contextualized understanding of the situation.
 Figure 6. Drawing of the accident site Figure 7. Checklist of actions
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The second field command meeting is held 46 min into the incident, in which the following 
conversation takes place:
Actor Conversation Coordination modes
Field Commander All right, let’s get the picture clear. 
Developments: what has changed?
Fire Officer Developments: car 1 has a leakage at the barrels 
on top. One barrel is leaking an acetone like 
fluid [highly flammable]. I ordered the guys to 
put some foam on that. In addition, I’ll arrange a 
water-screen to be placed between car 2 and 3, 
so the other emergency services are not affected 
by it.
Phasing action
Field Commander Okay, so the story is not ‘thickener’, but acetone?
Fire Officer Right, and I have created a small OGS 
[procedure for dealing with toxic materials] in 
car 1.
Selecting tasks
Field Commander Yes a small OGS. What does that mean for the 
other emergency services?
Transforming 
understanding
Fire Officer They cannot approach that area without 
protective gear and clothes. Not behind the 
area that is cordoned off. We have created a line 
there.
Selecting tasks
Field Commander Right, let’s determine that from here on [draws a 
line on the whiteboard] this is a no-go area.
Fire Officer We have put additional traffic cones there.
Field Commander So the area is unsafe there, and safe on the site 
we are positioned now. From now on nobody 
can walk unprotected behind that line. Is that for 
the entire incident or for specific part?
Transforming 
understanding
Fire Officer Until car 3. I placed a water screen between 2 
and 3 and behind that it’s safe.
Transforming 
understanding
Field Commander From here on it’s safe? Transforming 
understanding
Medical Officer Yes.
Fire Officer No, from there on…
Field Commander So this is the unsafe area, if everybody moves 
around that area we can apparently work safely, 
is that correct?
Transforming 
understanding
Table 5. Exercise 3 Second Field Command Meeting
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In this meeting it becomes clear that the XTC barrels that fell of the first truck have started 
to leak and release toxic fumes that can pose a lethal threat to the emergency personnel 
near that area. To protect the emergency personnel from this chemical threat, a ‘no-go 
area’ is created around the truck at the front end of the collision. The COP is used to 
demarcate and validate this ‘no go area’ in the form of red lines on the diagram.
In this discussion about the representation of the situation based on the COP 
(as shown in Figure 6), the officers tailor the boundary object in different ways to cross 
the multiple types of boundaries they experience. The Field Commander perceives 
a knowledge boundary and engages the COP with an integration-based mode of 
transforming to develop shared understanding, while the Fire Officer is using modes of 
segmentation (selecting and phasing) to coordinate selecting and sequencing of tasks. 
This can clearly be seen through the Fire Officer’s attempt to take care of the situation 
alone. We interpret that, based upon his actions, he experiences a functional boundary 
(who is responsible for what) and a spatiotemporal boundary (in what sequence is action 
to be taken). Accordingly, his actions are aimed at solving these two cross-boundary 
coordination issues. He later commented in an interview that only the Fire Department 
has the expertise and tools to operate in hazardous environments, thus for him shared 
understanding is not a relevant cross-boundary coordination issue at that time. 
In the conversation that follows, the Field Commander tries to involve the other 
officers in his reasoning, and inquires about the meaning of the ‘OGS’ (Dutch abbreviation 
for: accident with toxic substance) procedure. The Field Commander is primarily adopting 
a mode of transforming, when he tries to pinpoint the location of the safe area, to 
encourage the officers to develop a shared understanding of the situation. He pulls other 
officers towards this mode, as the Fire Officer is encouraged to explain the location of the 
unsafe area. Yet, in the final moments of the meeting there is still a discussion between 
the officers about the exact location of the unsafe area. This is represented by the Medical 
Officer confirming the location of the area, while the Fire Officer is correcting her by 
stating "No, from there on…". The boundary object appears to be openly configured to 
the Field Commander and the Medical Officer who try to develop shared understanding 
about the location of the red line, but the Fire Officer treats the boundary object as a 
closed configuration to support his primary goal of task segmentation. 
In general, these instances in which parties disagree or misunderstand but believe 
that they are in agreement or have understanding—what Scheff (1967) called ‘false 
consensus’—tend to cause coordination problems for the officers. While interpretive 
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flexibility is central in the functioning of boundary objects, it also enables a multiplicity 
of bids for coordination modes as the boundary object is constructed. As the boundary 
object is used to support different coordination functions simultaneously, ‘false consensus’ 
manifests, which impedes cross-boundary coordination. A Field Commander stresses this 
point in his own words:
“I tend to use the term on what pyramid are you sitting. They [the officers] tend to sit 
on their own pyramid and are under the impression that they are talking about the 
same sun, but in the meantime each one is looking in another direction. I think that’s 
a problem. That tends to happen during incidents when we think we have the same 
operational picture, but in the end it turns out that the Fire Department thinks there 
are 10 victims and that the Medical Services explain: no, there are 10 persons, of which 
3 are transported to the hospital and 7 are just fine. Now we are just talking about the 
term victim. The Fire Department tends to call everybody that is walking around the 
incident scene a victim, but the Medical Services specify this into 10 persons of which 3 
are transported and 7 are taken care of and are no victims. I think that is the main task 
for a Field Commander to get that picture clear”.
The uncertainties about safe and unsafe areas that were superficially agreed on in the 
second field command meeting also appear not to be resolved by the officers, as the 
Medical Officer wanders into the toxic area affected by XTC chemicals moments after the 
meeting ends. 
Actor Conversation Coordination Mode
Medical Officer Yes [walks through the incident to talk to the 
Fire Officer]. We can go until behind the water-
screen. It’s here right?
Fire engine 
commander
No, it’s at the other end, way back.
Medical Officer Oh my god, where?
Fire engine 
commander
The water-screen is between…
Fire Officer [shouting] Medical Officer!! YOU ARE WALKING 
IN A CONTAMINATED AREA!!!
Medical Officer Oh, I have just walked straight through that area.
Fire Officer You have just inhaled very toxic fumes.
Medical Office How stupid of me. 
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Actor Conversation Coordination Mode
Fire engine 
commander
There’s a line here for the unsafe area. Transforming 
understanding
Fire Officer They are not trespassing right? Now we have to 
decontaminate them.
Table 6. Exercise 3 Walking in a Contaminated Area
We can now return to the question raised in the introduction: How can the Medical 
Officer wander into an unsafe area, when this has been discussed just a moment before 
in the field command meeting? We argue that the most likely answer lies in the types 
of boundaries the officers experience, and the fit between the coordination modes the 
officers consequently use to tailor the configuration of the boundary object to bridge 
these boundaries. If we take a closer look at the entire set of exercises, we can identify 
various sequences in which different types of coordination modes dominate the tailoring 
of the boundary object, and compare them. 
3.5.2 Phase Analysis: comparing sequential patterns of tailoring the boundary object 
across exercises
In several sequences similar transitions between coordination modes are present, 
which influence the subsequent coordination efforts. Interviews with officers and Field 
Commanders hinted at both the difficulty and importance of one particular type of 
transition: experiencing knowledge boundaries and the subsequent process of developing 
shared understanding. One Field Commander describes one of these situations: 
“Demarcating safe and unsafe areas does tend to cause problems. It’s similar for 
medical personnel, who ask the question: where is it safe for me to work, is it already 
safe? Yes, No? How is it possible when he says it’s unsafe and I see a bunch of fire 
fighters working in that area? We haven’t lost those tensions in constructing a common 
operational picture. I think that’s a, I am trying to translate that to my role, what I try to 
do is to let the officer who is providing the operational picture be more precise. What 
are we talking about and what does that mean, how long is that going to take? By 
asking those questions I try to help the others by taking that into account”.
We noticed that similar issues related to shared understanding arose during specific periods 
in the exercises. We analyzed these phases with help of the timeline charts to identify the 
transitions during the critical moments at which issues with shared understanding seemed 
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to occur. To introduce this part of the analysis, we will refer once more to the situation 
from exercise 3. The specific sequence illustrated in Table 5 shows the lack of fit between 
the closed use of the boundary object (selecting) by the Fire Officer, and the open use 
(transforming) by the Field Commander. This is visualized in Figure 8 between codes 
17 – 26 on the horizontal axis (indicated by the dotted lines). The timeline indicates that 
sensemaking is accomplished in a pattern that oscillates between the coordination modes 
of selecting (1) and transforming (4), and leads into a longer period of transforming (codes 
21 to 27), where actors try to make sense of the situation with help of the boundary object.
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 
Code number 
1: selecting tasks, 2: standardizing information, 3: phasing action, 4: transforming understanding 
Figure 8. Timeline of coordination modes in Exercise 3: Traffic accident on highway 
When analyzing the timelines of the other exercises, we realized that similar 1 – 4 
(selecting - transforming) transitions also occurred during sensemaking sessions con-
cerned with safety issues during the response operation. This specific combination tells 
us that safety issues trigger two kinds of parallel dynamics: a mode that is aimed at taking 
responsibility to deal with the safety situation corresponding to the predefined task 
division of a designated emergency response organization, and simultaneously the search 
for shared understanding of the situation. This shows a conflicting oscillation between the 
closed configuration of the boundary object aimed at task segmentation, and an open 
configuration aimed to develop a shared understanding of the situation. 
In addition to the 1 – 4 transitions, we also analyzed the transitions between the 
four dimensions from Figure 5: closed use through selecting and standardizing (1 – 2), 
open use through phasing and transforming (3 – 4), integration through standardizing 
and transforming (2 – 4), and segmentation through selecting and phasing (1 – 3). By 
analyzing these transitions we were able to discern similarities and differences in tailoring 
the configuration of the boundary object during similar safety incidents in other exercises. 
In exercise 5 in which emergency services need to coordinate the evacuation of an elderly-
care home in response to carbon monoxide poisoning, we observed several of these 
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phase transitions. This exercise starts with a period of closed use (1 – 2), and is followed 
by a period of sensemaking about safety (1 – 4), a period of open use (3 – 4), and a bit 
later by a period of segmentation (1 – 3). We will zoom into some of these critical phases, 
which are indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 9.
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 
Code Number 
1: selecting tasks, 2: standardizing information, 3: phasing action, 4: transforming understanding 
Figure 9. Timeline of coordination modes in Exercise 5: CO Threat in elderly-care home 
In the first phase of the exercise (codes 4 – 15) the boundary object is tailored as a closed 
configuration falling back on designed coordination. The officers use the boundary object 
to write down and activate standard procedures to commence the response operation 
and select the tasks that need to be completed. The officers engage in cross-boundary 
coordination modes of selecting and standardizing to bridge both a normative boundary 
(what response capacity is generally required in these situations), and a functional 
boundary (who needs to perform specific actions). 
Actor Conversation Coordination Mode
Medical Officer There are only 4 nurses in the house, and I only 
have one ambulance on scene, so that is not 
much. I’m not sure if the police are helping with 
the evacuation? I’ll ask those questions: how 
much teams are there, and is it safe inside?
Transforming 
understanding
Fire Officer No, no, they cannot go in. The Fire Department 
brings them outside to the safe area. It would be 
convenient if they can be transferred there.
Transforming 
understanding
Medical Officer Yes, that is happening now. Selecting tasks
Fire Officer Well, for now, what I know from the engine 
commander is that it’s unsafe inside. If there are 
any safe area’s inside is still the question. We will 
take care of that; in the meanwhile I have scaled 
up.
Transforming 
understanding
Selecting tasks
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Actor Conversation Coordination Mode
Medical Officer The windows and doors are open, I assume fresh 
air is getting in?
Fire Officer Yes, but there is a danger because the CO is 
coming from somewhere.
Transforming 
understanding
Medical Officer What is the safe area for us? Can we get the 
people out from there and take over?
Transforming 
understanding
Fire Officer The CO alarm is not triggered outside. When 
they are really outside in the fresh air it’s safe for 
you. All right? 
Transforming 
understanding
Table 7. Sequence from code 28 to 32 in Exercise 5: Carbon-monoxide threat in elderly-care home 
As the operation continues, there is a similar sensemaking problem occurring as in exercise 
3, this time about the location of unsafe areas from the carbon-monoxide contamination. 
This safety question brings a new boundary into play, a knowledge boundary. The 
previous division of labor agreed to in the period of closed use of the boundary object 
puts the fire department in charge of the evacuation inside the elderly-care home, based 
on their access to respiration gear. This task division puts the Fire Officer in a position 
to assess the danger inside the elderly-care home, which is visible through the focus on 
selecting, combined with transforming in the next critical sequence (codes 23 – 33). As 
the 1 – 4 transition shows, a sensemaking problem is occurring. Yet, unlike the same 1 – 4 
sequence in the highway exercise 3, in this exercise the officers engage collectively in the 
modes of selecting and transforming, synchronizing their configuration of the boundary 
object. A segment of the discourse in this sequence is presented in Table 7. 
To resolve the safety issue, in this case the officers are not tailoring the boundary 
object from different coordination modes. Instead, they collectively tailor the boundary 
object as an open configuration, oscillating between modes of phasing and transforming, 
to combine the need to build common understanding with arranging the order of activities. 
The officers do not encounter coordination issues, because they are simultaneously using 
a similar configuration of the boundary object, hence using the object to bridge the 
same spatiotemporal and knowledge boundaries. This is visible in their discourse, where 
the medical, police, and fire officers are collectively engaging in modes of phasing and 
transforming.
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Actor Conversation Coordination Mode
Medical Officer I would like you to guide those people towards 
the shelter. My people are busy providing 
medical aid in the shelter and might transport 
elderly to the hospital if necessary. 
Phasing action
Police Officer Yes.
Fire Officer We as Fire Department will take care of 
evacuating the people from building, yes? So we 
have had a quick adjustment? 
Phasing action
Head of elderly-
care home
But there are people who are confused, because 
they live here for quite some time in a protected 
environment. At the moment we pull them out 
I think some of them might counter react. You 
have they keys to the rooms right?
Transforming 
understanding
Medical Officer Yes we have, but the Geriatric department is a 
closed department I assume?
Head of elderly-
care home
Yes, it’s a closed department. Keys are also on 
there. You can enter with them.
Medical Officer It might be convenient to do a CO measurement 
there, because if the CO is not too high they can 
stay where they are?
Transforming 
understanding
Field Commander Are there persons in acute danger who need to 
be evacuated at this moment?
Transforming 
understanding
Fire Officer Yes, we have measured CO all over the building. 
The Fire Department is busy with evacuating 
them.
Phasing action
Table 8. Sequence from code 41 to 45 in Exercise 5: Carbon-monoxide threat in elderly-care home 
In another situation in exercise 7, officers are also trying to make sense of a safety issue. In 
this exercise a terrorist detonates an explosive device during a SWAT raid in a residential 
area. As the explosion tears the house apart and sets fire to surrounding houses, the 
regular emergency services are called to respond. In the first phase of the response 
operation the officers use the boundary object to develop situational awareness to be 
able to assess the possibility of another explosion. In this phase the boundary object is 
used as a tool to support integration through standardizing and transforming. The officers 
fall back on safety standards to assess in which areas access needs to be restricted due to 
the explosion danger. This is one of the few extended periods of integration we witness 
across all the exercises. These periods are represented by the dashed lines in Figure 10. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 
Code number 
1: selecting tasks, 2: standardizing information, 3: phasing action, 4: transforming understanding 
Figure 10. Timeline of coordination modes in Exercise 7: Failed SWAT raid 
Zooming in on one of these integration sequences (codes 16-19), we find a situation 
where the officers are discussing the applicability of safety standards. It appears that the 
Police and Fire department have different standards for explosion danger. Experiencing 
different normative boundaries for dealing with safety triggers a discussion between the 
officers, where they collectively engage in modes of standardizing and transforming. In 
this first part of the exercise the officers are successful in crossing the normative boundary 
they are experiencing by constructing a similar configuration of the boundary object. 
Actor Conversation Coordination Mode
Police Officer Yes, but the point is, safe distance. 250 meters.  
Is that still applicable?
Standardizing 
information
Emergency Center Yes, safe distance 250 meters, correct, over.
Police Officer All right, we will maintain 250 meters distance. Standardizing 
information
Fire Officer Two casualties are lying on the ground near that 
vehicle. The front of the building has collapsed, 
but it’s not clear to me what is exactly going on. 
There are two casualties, of which one is a police 
officer. A SWAT officer told me they are deceased.
Medical Officer All right, I just heard from the ERC that there 
are explosives inside the building. My question 
is if 250 meters is enough distance. That is a 
concrete safety question to you.
Standardizing 
information
Fire Officer For explosives is that enough?
Police Officer Yes that is safe. Transforming 
understanding
Field Commander We normally keep a different distance, 500 
meters with cover and 1000 meter without cover. 
Standardizing 
information
Table 9. Sequence from code 16 to 19 in Exercise 7: Failed SWAT Raid 
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Yet, in the second field command meeting the officers encounter an additional threat to 
safety: the possibility of an asbestos contamination that has spread in the area during 
the explosion. The Medical and Municipal officer bring this to the attention of the Field 
Commander in the second field command meeting.
Actor Conversation Coordination Mode
Field Commander Other issues?
Municipal Officer Asbestos and safety.
Field Commander Yes, that is inferior to the explosion risk at this 
moment.
Phasing action
Medical Officer Yes, well I do think this an important public 
health issue. Are we standing in a safe location in 
relation to the wind direction? 
Field Commander I presume that we are standing at a sufficient 
distance.
Medical Officer We should investigate that.
Field Commander Asbestos risk.
Medical Officer Yes, I want to know that.
Field Commander Will be taken care of, I’ll have that analyzed. Fire 
Officer, any other bottlenecks?
SWAT Commander There is no reason to assume that there are 
explosions in the surrounding houses.
Transforming 
understanding
Field Commander The decision at this moment is safe to move in? 
All right? 
Phasing action
Police Officer All right, let’s go.
Field Commander Go, decision is to investigate the asbestos risks. 
GRIP2. Do we need to change that? 
Standardizing 
information
Table 10. Sequence from code 79 to 83 in Exercise 7: Failed SWAT Raid
In this discourse we recognize that the officers are not engaging in similar coordination 
modes. The Field Commander acknowledges that asbestos is involved, but does not give 
sufficient attention to the contamination, because he is still preoccupied by the explosives 
threat. He deals with the asbestos risk in the mode of phasing, as something to be sorted 
out later. At the same time, the Medical and Municipal officer regard asbestos as a serious 
safety threat, which they are unable to assess without the help of the Fire officer. As we 
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can see in the discourse, the Medical officer is likely experiencing a knowledge boundary 
by stating "I want to know that". A few minutes after this discussion the decision to deploy 
is taken by the Field Commander and the fire units and ambulance crews enter the former 
no-go area. Moments later the Fire Officer notices that the area is contaminated with 
asbestos. This leads to a serious coordination problem as in the meantime the Medical 
officer has deployed her units in the contaminated area. These units need to be fully 
decontaminated before they can enter service again.
In sum, the timeline analysis shows that the boundary object is tailored differently to 
bridge different sorts of boundaries the officers’ experience. The activity with the boundary 
object actually defines the boundary, or at least highlights which boundary the officers are 
paying attention to at any given moment. The officers run into coordination issues when 
tailoring the configuration of the boundary object from different modes, and as a result 
fail to bridge the different kinds of boundaries they experience. Tailoring the boundary 
object in similar coordination modes supports the coordination process, because in these 
situations the configuration of the boundary object matches the boundaries that are 
experienced by the officers, which can now be bridged. 
3.5.3 Markov Analysis: general patterns of tailoring the boundary object
In the previous examples we witnessed that in two exercises the boundary object 
is configured as open and used for segmentation, while in the last exercise we see a 
prolonged period of integration. In this final part of our analysis we zoom out to compare 
what kinds of coordination sequences commonly occur and re-occur in all exercises. Figure 
11 visualizes the results of the Markov analysis, showing which sequential patterns have 
the highest probability of occurring. It shows that by far the most common coordination 
mode in all exercises is phasing action. All the dominant sequences lead to phasing 
action, suggesting this is what Markov theory calls an absorbing state (Matthews 1970). 
This means that, in general, the boundary object is tailored towards an open configuration 
to segment action, supported by either a sequence in which standardizing information, 
transforming understanding or selecting task based responsibilities was central. In 
addition, phasing action, standardizing information and transforming understanding are 
processes that have a tendency to occur in repeated chains, suggesting longer periods of 
stable use of these coordination modes. 
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Selecting Phasing
Standardizing Transforming
Figure 11. Sequential patterns with high probability, with the arrows indicating the direction 
of the sequence
This corresponds to findings in other studies indicating that once emergency responders 
arrive at the disaster scene, predetermined plans often need to be adapted to the 
dynamically unfolding situation at hand (Kapucu 2006, Moynihan 2009). Rather than 
predefined command structures, mutual adaptation enables first responders to adjust 
to changing circumstances at the disaster site (Bigley and Roberts 2001, Comfort and 
Kapucu 2006). Likewise, our findings suggest that if the officers tailor the boundary objects 
into a modular configuration to work on the task autonomously by selecting tasks, this 
represents an unstable state, and they ultimately adopt a different coordination mode. 
3.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have sought to answer the question: how do different users tailor the 
boundary object, and how does this process support or impede cross-boundary coor-
dination? We were intrigued by the case of the Medical Officer wandering off into a toxic 
area, after being in a command meeting where a line was drawn to demarcate a no-go area. 
How could she do this, when she just has affirmed her understanding of the location of the 
danger zone? Our analysis pointed to the sequential tailoring of the boundary object. We 
identified four coordination modes used to tailor the configuration of the boundary object: 
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selecting tasks, phasing action, standardizing information and transforming understanding. 
Short cycle coordination patterns in sequences of these modes suggest the possibilities 
of constructing an open or closed configuration, which can support coordination through 
either integration or segmentation. In this particular instance, the Fire Officer introducing 
the no-go area was constructing a boundary object with a closed configuration, favoring his 
unit’s autonomy, while tailoring the boundary object as a more open configuration would 
have been more helpful to foster shared understanding. 
The mixed use of coordination modes was not unique to this single exercise, as 
the subsequent process and Markov analysis showed. During the response operation 
the officers’ employ a variety of modes, because they are experiencing different types 
of boundaries. They make a bid to define the boundary object in using a particular 
coordination mode that corresponds with the experienced boundary. Our analysis shows 
that the boundary object represents not a single function (e.g. repository, coincident 
boundaries, standardized form, or ideal type), but is tailored by each of the users to 
fit the boundary they experience, thus producing individualized, yet to some degree 
intersecting boundary object configurations. 
This finding has implications for the boundary objects literature, because our paper 
pulls through distinctions made early on by Star and Griesemer (1989) that have not been 
the subject of much inquiry. Our results yield a different conceptualization of boundary 
objects that stresses their relational nature. They suggest that the boundary object, its 
construction, and the interpretive uses to which it is put are inseparable. To go back to our 
case material, it is not about the red line itself, but about the relation between coordination 
modes in the process of ‘drawing the line’ that determines whether coordination is 
supported or impeded. Based on this reconceptualization, we see three dimensions that 
have implications for the debate on boundary objects and cross-boundary coordination: 
relationality, temporality and intention. 
First, relationality is an important dimension in our study as boundary objects are 
constructed through a relational process of tailoring. The majority of empirical research on 
boundary objects focuses primarily on their benefits (Bechky 2003, Henderson 1999), and 
less on how and why they function the way they do (Carlile 2004). Since this critique, one 
of the advances in the debate is the notion that different boundary objects are required to 
cross more complex boundaries: "depending on the type of boundary faced, boundary 
objects with different capacities are required" (Carlile 2004, p.565). What our findings 
suggest, however, is that successful cross-boundary coordination does not depend on 
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the capacities of the boundary object per se, but on the relationality between the modes 
used to actively tailor the configuration of the boundary object. The boundary object 
is able to support cross-boundary coordination through a relational process, where the 
fit between the perceived boundaries and subsequent coordination mode determines 
whether coordination is supported or impeded. So structuring the boundary object to 
support cross-boundary coordination is not about the capacities of the object itself, but 
about how the object is tailored to fit its users’ needs. 
Second, temporality becomes an important dimension, as we witnessed the 
construction of a boundary object over time. As most studies of boundary objects are 
performed in production and knowledge environments, the emphasis is often put on 
how boundary objects support knowledge sharing and learning. Hence, in these studies 
the boundary object becomes better structured over time, and coordination works by 
gradually integrating diverging perspectives when experts learn contingently, to develop 
a shared inferential logic (Hsiao et al. 2012). While the emphasis on learning explains cross-
boundary coordination processes over the long term and in more stable environments, 
our findings indicate that one object can exhibit multiple coordination functions at 
the same time, and thus can be used for different purposes and cross different kind of 
boundaries simultaneously. As Doolin and McLoyd (2012) argue, boundary objects evolve 
and change, so they may not be able to span all boundaries equally effectively and may 
perform different roles in different settings over time. Alignments can be partial, shared 
understanding between groups can be spotty, which extends to the use of the object itself 
(Lee 2007). We add to this notion by showing that when actors engage with the boundary 
object together they might reach a temporary consensus, either true or false (as one of our 
respondents mentioned: "talking about the same sun"), but when they split up again this 
shared consensus might quickly dissolve and their understandings diverge. It shows that 
boundary objects are not always structured more completely through the process of use, 
but may be broken down and problematized as well. This has two implications: (1) when 
actors achieve a false consensus, they leave the meeting thinking they have a common 
object, but actually having different, conflicting or inconsistent understandings of it; and 
(2) when they reencounter the real situation and have to act in it, the boundary object that 
they remember gets reinterpreted in their local situation and so their understanding of it 
changes and diverges. The boundary object does not provide a stable, long-term cross-
boundary coordination mechanism, but functions to support short-term coordination 
cycles, in which experts gradually reconstruct the boundary object.
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The idea of false consensus leads into the third dimension of boundary objects in-use: 
intention. In the core definition of boundary objects, as a 'good enough' roadmap for 
both parties (Star and Griesemer 1989) lies the premise that actors develop a common 
orientation. The boundary object gains meaning through group interaction, or as Levina 
and Vaast (2005) claim, boundary objects are only adopted, or put ‘in-use’, when they 
are meaningfully and usefully incorporated into the local practices of each user. At the 
same time, boundary objects allow different groups to work together in the absence 
of consensus (Star 2010). As Huvila (2011) argues, boundary objects cannot be viewed 
as necessarily consensual, because the creation of boundary objects is always to some 
degree an expression of hegemony. Building on this idea, Barley et al. (2012) argue that 
actors employ different strategies to construct a boundary object to suit their needs. Also, 
Kimble et al. (2010), who criticize boundary objects as being too mechanical and ignoring 
the effect of intergroup politics and local conditions, argue that boundary objects need 
to be seen in context of the motivations of the people that choose the object as well as 
their communicative role. Our findings yield this similar tension: the boundary object is 
constructed to support cross-boundary coordination, while it is also constructed with a 
specific intent that might also impede coordination. When users make a bid to define 
the boundary object in a certain way, based on employing different coordination modes, 
these modes do not necessarily match with each other. Our study shows how the intention 
of its users actively shapes the configuration of a boundary object. 
Some limitations of our study suggest opportunities for further research. First, 
our results are based upon an in-depth analysis of ten emergency response exercises. 
Although this was a conscious choice in the design of the study so that it would yield 
comparable cases, it still favors accuracy over generality (McGrath et al. 1982, Langley 
1999). Our data yielded valuable insights, but also limited the scope of our findings. An 
interesting question is whether our findings also hold for other contexts, especially in 
related settings like high reliability organizations and project work that are less urgent 
and reactive than emergency response. How are boundary objects configured in these 
environments, and what sequences in coordination modes are visible?
Second, we have focused solely on the Common Operational Picture as a boundary 
object with a strong visual constituent. This left us to question how likely these results 
will generalize to other types of boundary objects? The visual dimension of organizing 
has recently been related to sensemaking and situated cognition (Meyer et al. 2013). 
Sensemaking involves comprehending and constructing plausible images (Weick et al. 
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2005), but the visual has been underrepresented in sensemaking theories. We gratefully 
relate to the call of Meyer et al. (2013) to encourage colleagues to explore how visual 
artifacts provide contextual cues for constructing cognitive schemas, and thus support 
or constrain decision-making. In combination with rising visual and technological 
development in our society, it becomes increasingly important to see if visual artifacts 
support, or inhibit specific methods of coordinating.
In the end, explaining the role of objects in how people are able to practice 
coordination across the boundaries of their organizations must not be about explaining 
the object itself, but about how the object shapes the collaboration. The boundary object 
is not what explains, but something to be explained; it is not the explanans, but the 
explanandum.
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3.7 Appendices 
3.7.1 Appendix 1. Coding Logic
Selecting tasks: An utterance was coded as selecting tasks when the boundary object 
is used to identify and perform specific tasks, which are completed autonomously by 
different disciplinary units (e.g., police, fire department etc.). In this coordination mode 
the boundary object is used to present an overview of the incident and each user selects 
his/her own tasks that are performed independently of others. One of the marker terms 
in the discourse of the officers that signals selecting is ‘created’. The officers regularly 
indicated that a task was completed autonomously by referring to the task as a previous 
performance (in the case of our example, creating something). An exhibit from our data 
illustrates how we coded this in the discourse after a Police Officer completed a task by 
himself without communicating this to others: "We took account of that and anticipated 
on the visible smoke. We have created a very spacious barrier and there are no people 
standing in the wind" (exercise 2). 
Phasing action: An utterance was coded as phasing action when there is discourse 
about the sequence of actions that must be completed in a specific order. In this 
coordination mode the boundary object is used to discuss how actions relate to each 
other. Two of the marker terms that signal phasing action are ‘arrange’ and ‘bilateral’. The 
officers used the term ‘arrange’ when they talked about arranging sequences of action 
in the nearby future. Likewise, ‘bilateral’ was used when the officers needed to consult 
about sequences of actions with other officers. Phasing action bilaterally occurs through 
dialogue, and it is different from selection as a coordination mode, which is performed 
autonomously. An exhibit from our data illustrates how we coded this in the discourse 
when a Medical Officer addresses the need for traffic circulation: "Traffic. We need a 
traffic circulation plan for the transport of victims. We will arrange that with the police 
bilaterally. Also, care for the people that are wandering around the incident, I will arrange 
that bilaterally with the municipality" (exercise 3).
Standardizing information: An utterance was coded as standardizing information 
when the boundary object is used to designate a specific procedure or standard to foster 
coordination. Standardizing allows persons to formalize information on the boundary 
object by referring to a specific procedure, which provides a prearranged working order 
that can be effectuated without direct interaction. These can be both single- or multi-
organizational procedures, but we only coded them as standardizing information when 
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the procedure affected cross-boundary coordination. One of the marker terms that signals 
standardizing information is ‘distance’. An exhibit from our data illustrates how we coded 
this in the discourse, when the Police Officer radios the standard for safe distance issued 
by the Fire Officer: "we were consulting the fire department, safe distance is 15 meters. If 
you are standing in front of the building facing the main entrance, there are a few persons 
stuck in the left side of the building, over" (exercise 1).
Transforming understanding: An utterance was coded as transforming under-
standing when the boundary object is used to foster a contextualized shared under-
standing between the officers. The meaning and content of tasks needs to be understood 
by all officers in order to work collaboratively and understand each other’s needs. This 
requires the officers to transform their own local interpretations into contextualized 
understanding to support the collaboration. Two of the marker terms that signal a 
transforming of understanding are ‘reason’ and ‘because’. Both terms indicate that an 
explanation is about to follow that might lead to a transformation of understanding. An 
exhibit from our data illustrates how we coded this in the discourse, when a Fire Officer 
explains the reason behind a decision to a Medical Officer: "the reason why it’s large fire, 
is because the carbon monoxide is coming from somewhere, most likely because of a 
fire" (exercise 5).
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3.7.2 Appendix 2. Markov transition matrices
T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .50 .13 .33 .04 24
Standardizing (2) .16 .42 .33 .09 43
Phasing (3) .07 .29 .50 .15 59
Transforming (4) .06 .24 .53 .18 17
Exercise 1: First Order Markov Chain
T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .24 .20 .44 .12 25
Standardizing (2) .22 .33 .26 .19 27
Phasing (3) .16 .12 .41 .31 50
Transforming (4) .14 .19 .31 .36 36
Exercise 2: Second Order Markov Chain: re-expressed as First Order Matrix
T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .27 .14 .35 .24 37
Standardizing (2) .50 .07 .43 .00 14
Phasing (3) .21 .11 .47 .21 53
Transforming (4) .29 .03 .32 .36 31
Exercise 3: First order Markov Chain Model Fit
T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .39 .23 .32 .07 31
Standardizing (2) .25 .31 .28 .16 32
Phasing (3) .09 .10 .12 .28 40
Transforming (4) .17 .28 .17 .38 29
Exercise 4: First Order Markov Matrix
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T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .31 .23 .35 .12 26
Standardizing (2) .23 .42 .23 .13 31
Phasing (3) .11 .07 .60 .23 75
Transforming (4) .08 .18 .39 .36 39
Exercise 5: First Order Markov Chain
T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .26 .21 .32 .21 19
Standardizing (2) .14 .31 .48 .07 29
Phasing (3) .13 .14 .61 .12 69
Transforming (4) .00 .30 .40 .30 20
Exercise 6: First Order Markov Chain Matrix
T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .19 .13 .63 .06 16
Standardizing (2) .13 .29 .39 .19 31
Phasing (3) .11 .18 .49 .22 65
Transforming (4) .06 .25 .34 .34 32
Exercise 7: Second Order Markov Chain Matrix, re-expressed as First Order Matrix
(Exercise 8: 0th order)
(Exercise 9: 0th order)
T2
Selecting 
(1)
Standardizing 
(2)
Phasing 
(3)
Transforming 
(4)
Row 
Count
T1
Selecting (1) .30 .11 .33 .26 27
Standardizing (2) .28 .33 .28 .11 18
Phasing (3) .11 .10 .52 .27 63
Transforming (4) .21 .09 .48 .21 33
Exercise 10: Second Order Markov Chain Matrix, re-expressed as First Order Matrix
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4. You Didn’t Know This Was Relevant 
for Us? Excuse me! 3 
Summary
The common operational picture is used to overcome coordination and information management 
problems during emergency response. Increasingly, this approach is incorporated in more advanced 
information systems. This is rooted in an ‘information warehouse’ perspective, which implies 
information can be collected, sorted, and exchanged in an accessible and univocal form. In practice, 
however, professionals interpret similar information differently. Therefore, in this chapter the focus 
is on how emergency responders develop collective sensemaking from information. We employ a 
‘trading zone’ perspective, in which information is negotiated, to study information management in 
an ethnographic study of disaster exercises in the Netherlands. The analysis shows how professionals 
attribute different meanings to information that distorts the coordination process. We end by 
stressing the importance of actionable knowledge and reflexivity.
3 This chapter is published as: Wolbers, J., K. Boersma. 2013. The Common Operational Picture 
as Collective Sensemaking, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 21(4): 186-199.
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4.1 The Common Operational Picture as collective sensemaking
‘Once asbestos is part of the incident a whole new procedure has to be started up. 
What I need is our hazardous materials expert on the spot as soon as possible. I know 
about some of the asbestos procedures, and what should happen, but I think it is very 
important for us to ask for expert knowledge. I had the feeling the fire officer made the 
decisions very quickly by himself. He has taken measurements because of the asbestos: 
he took care of the decontamination on the street. It was like: “I do this” and “I do that” 
... I had the feeling that the fire fighters were not collaborating with others. If I knew 
about that asbestos earlier I would have responded differently but they didn’t tell us. 
“You didn’t know this was relevant for us? Excuse me!”’
This quote is from an officer who represents the municipal authorities. He made this 
remark as a reaction to a fire officer’s action during a training session. It indicates that 
emergency response organizations rely upon each other’s information to align work 
processes. At the same time, the quote reveals that the representatives of the different 
professions often ‘forget’ to share information because they tend to operate within their 
own professional ‘silos’.
It is well documented that emergency response organizations struggle with 
information sharing, communication and coordination (Bharosa et al. 2010, Comfort 
2007, Netten and van Someren 2011, Quarantelli 1997). During emergency response 
operations, organizations with different backgrounds, specialized operational expertise 
and different professional languages need to coordinate their actions across jurisdictional 
and organizational boundaries (Comfort and Kapucu 2006). This coordination problem is 
even more challenging because each response organization has operational field units 
at different levels, different functional command structures and separate back offices for 
information and resource management (Kapucu 2006, Moynihan 2009). 
Adequate information management is regarded as crucial to overcome problems 
with coordination and information sharing between different organizational domains 
(Donahue and Tuohy 2006, Manzi et al. 2002) and is an important part of the response 
organizations’ information sharing culture (Marincioni 2007, Schooley and Horan 2007). 
Encouraging the willingness to share information is believed to support collaboration 
and could foster organizational learning and facilitate adaptation and improvisation 
(Waugh and Streib 2006). However, failing communication and inadequate coordination 
between organizations, across levels and between back offices are also often blamed 
for problems with information management, such as information overload (Bharosa et 
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al. 2010), difficulties with information technology in-use (Quarantelli 1997), insufficient 
evaluation/validation of the information (Rake and Nja 2009) and insufficient attention for 
sharing data with others (Dearstyne 2007).
Paradoxically, information management is seen as both the problem and the 
solution for reaching sufficient situational awareness to support coordination. Emergency 
management agencies try to solve the information management problem by advocating 
more advanced and better-equipped information systems. The promise is that these 
systems should support its users to reach shared situational awareness by creating a 
common operational picture (COP) (Comfort 2007, Endsley 1995). Examples are time 
critical information systems (Schooley and Horan 2007) and systems from the logic 
of Netcentric Enabled Capabilities (Boersma et al. 2012). To solve the information 
management problem, the focus is put on building system architectures, in which the need 
is stressed for integration and linkage of information, fast access, timeliness, updating of 
information and standardization of information (Meissner et al. 2002).
Yet, the focus on building system architectures overlooks the social aspect of sharing 
and interpreting information. The different expertise of the emergency responders 
requires them to first develop common ground from which they can interact with each 
other (Clark and Brennan 1991). For example, Morris et al. (2007) described that the reason 
behind the success of the coast guard forces in accomplishing one of the few effective 
initial responses to hurricane Katrina was the attention to cooperation, adaptation, and 
flexibility in the work of the coast guard that "embraced the many languages of other 
stakeholder organizations" (Morris et al. 2007, p. 101). Learning how to bring together 
each other’s complementary skills, learning from the experience of others and closely 
examining information (Moynihan 2008) is regarded as highly consequential for successful 
information sharing. Therefore, in order to understand how first responders interpret 
each other’s needs and requirements for coordination, a sensemaking perspective on 
information sharing is necessary to capture the ambiguity of information, the presence of 
multiple perspectives and the role of representations in the common operational picture 
(Houghton et al. 2002, Weick et al. 1999).
In this chapter, we are interested in the question how the different emergency 
response organizations share information about their actions and the ongoing crisis, 
how they give meaning to the information, and how the information, is articulated in 
their narratives. The main question is: How do emergency responders make sense of 
exchanged information and how does this affect their shared situated understanding of 
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the emergency situation and response? The data collection for this article took place in 
the Netherlands during exercises for commanding officers in a field command center 
aimed at creating a common operational picture. As the coordination problems between 
Dutch emergency response organizations are not unique (i.e., they also exist elsewhere), 
we think this article has more general lessons to offer.
The chapter is organized as follows. We will first present a theoretical discussion to 
uncover the different perspectives of information sharing in the emergency management 
literature. Next, we will explain our methodology and continue with the description of 
the findings. Here we will present three cases that illustrate how sensemaking plays a 
crucial role in the information sharing practices of emergency responders. We end our 
argument by presenting a discussion about the importance and implications of taking a 
sensemaking perspective on information sharing in emergency management research.
4.2 From an ‘information warehouse’ towards a ‘trading zone’
The COP is considered as one of the most promising solutions in emergency management 
to improve the quality of information sharing and to support the development of situational 
awareness (Comfort 2007). The COP is often manifested as a geographical representation 
combined with a checklist that describes the characteristics of the response operation. 
Despite its common use in emergency management, a univocal definition of the COP 
lacks both in the field and in the literature. There are disagreements as to whether the 
COP is a product, process or operating environment (Copeland 2008). Roughly two 
types of definitions can be distinguished: one that focuses on capabilities of information 
dissemination and another that stresses the need for reaching a sufficient level of shared 
understanding.
An example of the first type of definition is the way in which the COP is described 
in the US National Incident Management System: "a common operational picture is 
established and maintained by the gathering, collating, synthesizing, and disseminating 
of incident information to all appropriate parties involved in an incident. Achieving a 
common operating picture allows on-scene and off-scene personnel to have the same 
information about the incident, including the availability and location of resources, 
personnel, and the status of requests for assistance" (FEMA 2009, p. 4.5). In this 
definition, the COP is treated as a means to capture information and putting it in a place 
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where it can easily be accessed. The COP is treated as a solution to the problem of 
incomplete information, whereby making information better and more widely accessible 
solves the issue at hand. As a result, the current generation of COP is treated as an 
‘information warehouse’ where its users can select the information that is appropriate for 
them to perform their tasks (Leedom 2003). In the information warehouse, "information 
useful to processes is stored … in an easy and accessible form" (Davenport 1993, p. 
89), whereby the modular nature of the warehouse supports self-synchronization. Yet, 
the warehouse metaphor overlooks that different actors give different meanings to 
information at different points in time.
The second type of definition stresses the need for shared understanding and treats 
the COP as a way to "achieve a sufficient level of shared information among the different 
organizations and jurisdictions participating in disaster operations at different locations, 
so all actors readily understand the constraints on each and the possible combinations 
of collaboration and support among them under a given set of conditions" (Comfort 
2007, p. 191). But also more generally, the "common operational picture was specified as 
individuals knew who was doing what, who knew what; i.e., individuals had an accurate 
transactive memory" (Carley 2002, p. 3). These definitions do stress the importance of 
shared understanding. The COP is not just an ‘information warehouse’ that supports 
self-synchronization but also a tool that supports its users to understand each other’s 
needs and constraints during their collaboration. It recognizes that there are likely to be 
differences in mutual knowledge, belief, customs, and assumptions between different 
communities (Bechky 2003) that cause conflicting interpretations of information that need 
to be made workable in order to organize a coherent response operation (Artman and 
Wærn 1999).
Although the second type of definition subscribes to the importance of developing 
a level of shared understanding, they still overlook the way in which shared understanding 
is reached by using the COP. To get a deeper understanding of the problem of information 
management, we need to open the black box to see how information sharing supports 
shared situational awareness. Building a sufficient level of shared understanding to us 
is a sensemaking process in which organizational members (de/re)construct information 
influenced by their institutional background to find out what is going on in times of 
uncertainty (Weick et al. 2005). This sensemaking process is based upon the knowledge 
responders have gained through (1) education, including training/exercises; (2) (war)
storytelling; and (3) past experiences (Endsley 1995, Taber et al. 2008). Emergency 
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responders have to constantly make sense of the situation because of the rapidly changing 
environment. During crisis management, not just individual sensemaking processes are 
important, but even more important is collective sensemaking, that is, how members 
from different communities try to generate shared understanding for coordinated action 
(Maitlis and Sonenshein 2010). Collective sensemaking in emergency management is 
about combining different cues, roles, scripts, and actions that arise from the actors’ 
different institutional backgrounds (Weber and Glynn 2006) into a collaborative time 
critical response (Faraj and Xiao 2006).
Weak collective sensemaking is a major problem during crisis situations. For 
instance, Weick’s (1993) analysis of the Mann Gulch fire shows that the lack of group level 
sensemaking processes resulted in poor decision-making and eventually in the loss of the 
lives of 13 fire fighters. Weick (1990) also made a similar analysis of poor sensemaking 
between the pilot crew of a KLM 747 moments before they crash into a Pan-Am 747 on 
the Los Rodeos airport in Tenerife. The co-pilot of the KLM flight stated ‘we are now at 
take-off’, while the tower and the Pan-Am crew interpreted this as being in the take-off 
position, the KLM crew had actually faulty initiated the take-off run.
While these sensemaking problems arose among actors with a similar institutional 
background, Dearstyne (2007) claims that sensemaking issues between actors with 
different institutional backgrounds lead to inter-organizational coordination problems. He 
shows that fire departments and police had trouble collaborating and sharing information 
during the World Trade Center attacks. Especially striking is his note that fire commanders 
on the ground experienced a lack of information about the burning towers, while police 
helicopter crews were filming them from above. These kinds of coordination problems 
between actors with different institutional backgrounds are central to large-scale 
emergency response operations.
Coordinating between actors with different institutional backgrounds is described 
by Faraj and Xiao (2006) as a process of dialogic coordination. By engaging in dialogue, 
professionals are able to confront their different professional languages (jargon) through 
epistemic contestation and achieve joint sensemaking. During the process of collective 
sensemaking, emergency responders need to coordinate their actions temporarily 
and locally across their organizational boundaries, in which they must navigate their 
differences in norms, meanings, and interests with members from other organizations 
to achieve a shared goal (Kellogg et al. 2006). This is especially challenging because 
in fast-paced environments, goals can be translated as such only in a limited amount 
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of time as the emergency situation changes, and the goal becomes outdated. As a 
consequence, actors often ‘forget’ to share information because in their view information 
is no longer significant or is outdated. In this way, the perceived relevance of information 
is compromised at different points in time, resulting in a dynamic information sharing 
situation that is constantly in flux.
The actors’ different institutional backgrounds and the time criticality show that 
information sharing cannot be reduced to gathering information from a warehouse. 
We propose a different perspective on the COP in which information sharing is about 
sensemaking that is better characterized by using the metaphor of a trading zone. In the 
literature, the trading zone is used as metaphor to describe the process of negotiation 
between actors from different communities in which they work out ‘exchanges’ ‘in 
exquisite local detail, without global agreement’ (Galison 1997, p. 46). During the 
exchanges, actors must make sense and reach consensus about procedures of exchange 
in a mutually comprehensible language. In emergency management, trading is not just a 
metaphor because it sometimes literally means that actors have to reach an agreement 
on for instance the size of an evacuation zone. During this process, actors have to share 
their expertise to convince the other about the value of the alternatives. In this way, 
actors exchange ideas, learn from one another and make sense of each other’s position 
and institutional background. Working out exchanges in this way is useful in conditions 
of uncertainty and change because the collaboration "doesn’t depend on shared ideas, 
interests, or norms, which are difficult to accomplish when time is short, meanings are 
divergent, and conditions are ambiguous" (Kellogg et al. 2006, p. 39, Vaughan 1999).
In the literature, exchanges or trades often occur through the use of a boundary object 
(Hsiao et al. 2012, Kellogg et al. 2006). Boundary objects are coordination mechanisms of 
representation, in which coordination is reached by disseminating information and providing 
a common referent as basis for aligning work between organizations (Okhuysen and 
Bechky 2009, Henderson 1991). The COP can be regarded as a boundary object because 
constructing a COP is about sharing and constructing information about the response 
operation in such a way that it enables its users to continually redefine and mutually adjust 
their relationships. The COP provides a platform that allows experts to coordinate and 
negotiate their plurality of points of view through general procedures of exchange, without 
making their perspectives uniform or completely transparent to each other (Trompette and 
Vinck 2009, Hsiao et al. 2012). In turn, the trading zone perspective provides a way of 
analyzing how this exchange process influences the actors’ sensemaking efforts.
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In summary, for us, the COP resembles not an ‘information warehouse’ but a form of 
materiality that facilitates the ongoing negotiation process that takes place in a ‘trading 
zone’, in which actors share and give meaning to information to synchronize their actions. 
How we analyzed the data by applying the trading zone perspective to the sensemaking 
processes of the officers-in-command will be explained in the next section.
4.3 Methodology and cases: a narrative analysis of the ‘trading zone’
Analyzing the collective sensemaking processes (Weick 1995) in the trading zone (Galison 
1997) requires a perspective in which the negotiation of meaning of information that 
is embedded in local contexts and in multiple realities becomes visible. Therefore, 
we adopted an ethnographic approach that allowed us to study the richness of the 
sensemaking process and grasp enough detail of the context in which these processes take 
place (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). This approach (Hammersley 1995) is especially 
useful in unraveling the consequences of the actors’ different institutional backgrounds 
as it enabled us to follow the real-life conversations and negotiations between the 
emergency responders.
We collected our data through visiting field command center exercises of the 
first response organizations in different safety regions in the Netherlands, as part of 
our contract research into the information management practices during emergency 
response operations. First results of this research are published in Stuurman (2011) and 
Wolbers, Boersma, and de Heer (2012). We observed 10 exercises in a field command 
center in which emergency officers in command of police, fire department, medical, 
and municipal authorities meet to share information and make decisions during an 
emergency. These consisted of both scenario driven and virtual (by means of computer 
simulations) exercises. The 10 incidents included a collision at sea, gas explosion, 
railroad accident, highway accident, hostage situation in a school and a helicopter crash 
on a water treatment plant. For each scenario, the officers practiced delegating tasks 
through their teams by communicating with officers from other emergency services. 
Although the incidents were fictional, the officers were confronted with time pressure, 
information overload and, most important for our study, with professionals from other 
organizations than their own. We therefore feel that the exercises illustrate the situations 
in which responders get confronted during real incidents and offer valuable research data 
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(Latiers and Jacques 2009). However, we must also mention the limits of using the data 
of exercises for analysis. Because the scenarios are removed from reality, there is limited 
recruitment delay, and participants are potentially protected from the ramifications of 
poor decision-making.
For this case material, we observed and recorded conversations in ten exercises, 
and afterwards eight officers were interviewed (see Stuurman 2011) who participated in 
the same group in multiple exercises. The officers were selected based on their presence 
in the same observed set of exercises and were asked to reflect upon the collaboration, 
communication, and their actions and decisions. In the observations, we recorded the 
interaction, and in the interviews, the officers were provided with parts of these dialogues 
and situations. In doing so, we did not make an evaluation as such, but our focus was on 
finding patterns in the first responders’ actions and interactions in the context of their 
professional routines. By reflecting on actions and storytelling, we were able to unravel 
their sensemaking efforts during the multi-organizational response.
Besides the interviews and observations, we analyzed documents (including reports 
of the Inspectorate of Security and Justice, and the Dutch Safety Board) with the purpose 
of understanding the broader context in which the exercises were taking place. In addition, 
these reports were used to see whether our findings from the relative small sample of 
exercises are also reflected in real emergencies. Also, documents about procedures and 
responsibilities of the different emergency response agencies were analyzed to inform our 
data analysis, as well as documents about the multi-organizational coordination structure. 
Although these procedures are not referred to directly in the article, they did inform 
our analysis by helping us to get background information on the technical terminology 
(such as evacuation standards or water screens) and help us judge whether interactions 
between officers in the trading zone were regarded as appropriate or not.
The data collection resulted in 70 pages of interview transcripts and 140 pages 
of observation transcripts. The fully transcribed exercises allowed us to reconstruct the 
interactions of the officers with each other and the COP chronologically. We analyzed 
the transcriptions by adopting an interactional narrative analysis (Riessman 2005). This 
type of narrative analysis zooms in on the dialogue between teller and listener to analyze 
the dialogue as a process of co-construction, where teller and listener create meaning 
collaboratively (Riessman 2005). The transcripts from the interviews and the data from the 
observations were combined with the help of the data analysis tool MaxQDA to inform 
this analysis and to guide data reduction.
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Analyzing narratives enabled us to zoom into the underlying cues, roles, scripts, and 
recurrent action that arise from the different institutional context of the emergency 
responders, as well as their organizational values (Gabriel 2000). Through their narratives, 
actors implicitly and sometimes explicitly negotiate about their interpretations and actions 
(Czarniawska 2004). Implicit problem conceptualizations are made tangible by signaling 
potential problems, clarifying misunderstandings and exchanging information (Putnam 
1994). We used these cues to inform our analysis and identify challenges in sensemaking 
and negotiation between officers. With the help of (lexical) search in MaxQDA and close 
reading, we were able to identify interesting narratives.
We will present our data by focusing on three more in-depth narratives that occurred 
during the exercises to allow for enough detail in the descriptions. These narratives were 
selected based on the richness of the interactions between the actors that illustrated 
the negotiations of interpretations in the trading zone most clearly. In addition, these 
three scenarios were chosen because they are illustrations of how (implicit) contestations 
had immediate impact on action. It shows that the trading zone perspective is not just a 
scholarly, analytical perspective: problems with negotiation have a direct impact on the 
actual response operation.
4.4 ‘Trading zones’: constructing the COP during emergency 
response operations
4.4.1 Setting the scene
The Dutch emergency management system consists of an emergent structure that can 
be scaled up after the emergency response center (ERC) alerts the police, fire and/or 
medical services. The ERC follows a set of predefined protocols to call the officers-in-
command from these organizations to the incident scene. Each officer is responsible 
for commanding his or her own operational units on scene. Additionally, the officer-in- 
command is responsible for taking care of the inter-organizational coordination with 
other emergency services. To support this responsibility, a mobile field command center 
is installed on scene and staffed with the officers-in-command and the field commander. 
The core staff consists of the field commander, police officer, fire officer, medical officer, 
and municipal officer. If the nature of the incident requires additional expertise, other 
liaison officers of, for example, the Railroads or Waterworks can be added to the team.
124  |  Chapter 4
In the Netherlands, exercises have the specific aim to improve the quality of multi-
disciplinary collaboration. Evaluations of incidents have shown that "in the heat of the 
moment employees temporarily lose sight of the interests of the other emergency 
services" (Scholtens 2008, p. 200). As such, multidisciplinary collaboration should be 
effectuated at a much earlier stage, and exercises are aimed at effectuating these, both 
disciplinary and multidisciplinary, work practices (Bharosa et al. 2010).
In the following cases, we will study the officers-in-command and the field 
commander that operate in the mobile field command center. We will analyze the 
conversations between the officers-in-command in the field command center. We regard 
the process of constructing the COP as a trading zone in which the different interpretations 
and narratives about the incident are co-created and negotiated.
4.4.2 Case 1: "Is one hundred meters far enough?" 
Several residents called 112: they smelled gas in the direct environment of a flat building. 
Moments earlier, a suicidal man in the house has opened the gas valve on his oven and 
tried to trigger an explosion. The dispatcher in the emergency room sends a fire engine 
to the scene to investigate the threat. On the spot, the fire fighters indeed measure a high 
concentration of gas in the building. They decided to scale up and call for the assistance 
of the fire, police, and medical officer. Next –according to the procedures of the Dutch 
emergency response– a field command center is created at the location of the incident. 
Soon after the officers of the police, fire brigade, and medical teams arrived at the scene, 
they organize a brief meeting. A possible evacuation of the apartment and the security of 
the first responders are central elements in the discussion.
4.4.3 Negotiations during the field command meeting
In the first meeting between the officers, we heard a discussion about the size of the area 
that has to be evacuated to protect the first responders and the bystanders:
Police officer  I think we still need to withdraw from the scene a bit further. Five hundred 
meters ...
Fire officer  Five hundred meters evacuation zone ...
Police officer   Okay then, at five hundred meters. And for our people: safety? Are we ... will 
you go ... we go in? Will there be gas in there?
Fire officer  We cannot measure the amount of gas, so we do not know how safe it is.
Police officer So you will evacuate the building as well?
Fire officer  Yes.
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Police officer  So then we will only set up the road blocks?
Fire officer  Yes and we will transfer the people who come out of the building to you.
Medical officer   There are some people waiting by the ambulance. I understand that five 
hundred meters away from the building is safe?
Fire officer  Yes, we now take those five hundred meters for safety.
Medical officer  Fine.
Central in this conversation is the safety of the first responders. The notion that ‘we cannot 
have more victims (i.e., wounded rescue workers)’ is central in their discussion. It is quite 
difficult, however, to estimate the risk of the incident and the size of the area that will be 
affected by a possible explosion. Because the fire fighters –the experts in such situations– 
cannot give closure about the risk, the police and other first responders decide to back 
off. Interestingly, the officers from the different response organizations use ‘we’ in their 
conversations indicating that they talk about a problem that will affect all of the rescue 
workers regardless of their organizational background.
One important issue the officers have to negotiate about is the size of the area that 
has to be protected so that no one without protected clothing (including citizens and 
rescue workers) can enter the scene. It is quite difficult, however, to make that decision as 
the fire fighters can only estimate the risk –an explosion in the apartment is still one of the 
possibilities at the time of the first conversation. During the next meeting between the 
officers, we witnessed the following conversation:
Field commander   We have to sit down here a bit longer, because we still have no overall picture 
of the area and the distance of five hundred meters. There is not only a 
construction site, a separate building and a school, but there is a lot more. What 
are we going to do about it?
  ... a discussion between the different officers follows and the Field Commander 
makes a short résumé ...
  Are we saying that we need to use the sirens in the area? Windows and doors 
closed? Or do we say that the risk is not big enough yet? Because we have to 
secure that whole area of five hundred meters ... that is a very big circle.
Fire officer   I won’t take a risk; if the building explodes and collapses, parts will fly every-
where ... I have seen that once in Amsterdam, the pieces reach pretty far. And 
you cannot take any chances. It is certainly not advisable in this situation to 
protect an area less than five hundred meters.
Field commander  Okay, so basically you are saying, let the sirens go off?
Municipal officer   I do think we need to look closely at the communication ... And we also have the 
railroad. So there is also a little ...
Field commander  There is also a railroad?
Municipal officer  Yes. It is within five hundred meters.
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4.4.4 Participant reflections on the negotiations
It becomes clear in this conversation that the officers have a dilemma here: the fire officer 
does not want to take any risk and advices to secure the area within the radius of 500 m. 
As the fire brigade is in charge of the evacuation within the zone, their advice is taken very 
seriously by the other first responders. However, it is quite impossible for the municipality 
and the police to implement the advice since that can only be done against high costs 
(literally): it is almost impossible to control an area that big. The police officer who was at 
the meeting explained us his feeling he had during the conversation:
"I would like to create a 500 meter radius around the area and I want no traffic coming 
through there. Get it done! Well, it really doesn’t work that way. I mean, the problem is 
that it assumes that you are in control. But then you hear that there are many side roads 
that we cannot take care of, because they are in an area that we cannot reach by (police) 
car. Also, we learn that we have not enough people. This information all comes in and 
tends to overrule all the other information".
A closer look at the use of language in the narratives reveals that the professionals start to 
use ‘I’ instead of ‘we’, indicating that they revert to their personal and/or own professional 
framework. In either case, this perspective is informed by their proficiency (education 
and/or experience). In this case, the officer of the fire brigade is referring to an earlier 
experience –not uncommon in such situations of uncertainty (e.g. Boje 1991). Towards the 
end of the meeting, however, it becomes clear during the negotiation that the concerns 
of the other officers challenge the decision of keeping a 500 m evacuation radius. The 
officers discover that the situation in Amsterdam, to which the fire officer referred, was in a 
much more open area. An explosion in such a situation would mean lots of flying pieces of 
material. However, in the area that would be affected by the explosion at hand are a lot of 
buildings, meaning that there are a lot of buffers in the area that will prevent material from 
flying around. The fire officer and the police officer give two contrasting perspectives on 
dealing with this threat. The fire officer explains his point of view in an interview.
"In first instance, a safe distance of 500 meters. A gas leakage. I have seen them in 
Amsterdam and on television. I don’t know what’s leaking and how big it is. I will take 
a large safety precaution of 500 meters, which we can reduce to 100 or 200 meters 
later on. But if I don’t have enough information, then I will choose for safety, instead 
of moving up to 100 meters. We might see a chain reaction or explosion. I might have 
taken too much safety, but I’m always of making sure first".
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In a similar exercise a day later, a different police officer, who is also a team leader and 
expert on explosives and safety, estimates that an evacuation area of 500m is way too 
large for a gas explosion. He states that a gas explosion only damages an area around 
25–50m, so a distance of 100m should be enough. In this exercise, a distance of 100m 
is chosen, and this way the police do not get into trouble with the large evacuation area.
"Well, this is a gas explosion. It will damage an area of 25–50 meters. But you must 
also check what’s in front of the building. Is it an open space, or are there all kind 
of structures in the way? If there are buildings in the blast radius they will keep the 
explosion from going further. On the end of the explosion a window might shatter, but 
that’s it. It will not go further".
At first glance, this can be seen as a technical discussion about the effects of an explosion, 
but the negotiation is vital for the different professionals to come to an agreement about 
the actions that have to be undertaken. The interpretation of the risk and the actions, 
however, differs from the various professional backgrounds. The officers used the field 
command center meeting as a trading zone to develop a common understanding of the 
situation.
However, the professionals did not reach closure at this time. The different 
interpretations of the officers are not discussed in detail in the field command meetings. 
It did not become clear enough in what way the narratives are at odds and how they are 
complicating the response operation of other disciplines. The second narrative is mainly 
held in the personal ‘I’ framework, which gives room for different opinions, but does not 
show why some decisions are problematic for others.
4.4.5 Case 2: "Can we go on board?"
A captain on the ship Stavria reports to the coast guard that his ship has an engine 
failure and that he has run aground. Not soon after this, a fishing boat with 75 tourists on 
board reports that it had to avoid a collision with the Stavria and has also run aground. 
As a result of the sudden evasive manoeuvre, some passengers got injured; it is unclear 
how many and how serious. First ambulance crews on scene board a coast guard’s ship 
to get to the incident scene. They enter the fishing boat to make an initial estimation of 
the amount of wounded passengers. Once on board, it appears that there are dozens of 
people injured.
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4.4.6 Negotiations during the field command meeting
During the first meeting of the officers in the field command center, a liaison officer 
of the Dutch Waterworks joins them with the announcement that the Stavria is loaded 
with natural gas condensate, which has partially escaped. The highly toxic cloud of gas 
condensate threatens the passengers of the fishing boat. The natural gas condensate 
requires the officers to discuss the dangers for their units and the passengers:
Field commander   There is some additional information for the common operational picture ... 
Let’s see ... Is it really urgent?
Waterworks officer  Yes, the Stavria is loaded with natural gas condensate.
Field commander  Jeez.
Waterworks officer   And it has escaped. Several passengers on board of the Stavria became ill. 
And they have to be treated, they are in danger. But my units have to stay 
upwind, at a safe distance from the Stavria.
Field commander  What is the direction of the wind at the moment?
Waterworks officer   South-east. And that means that the fishing boat is right in the midst of the 
smoke...
Medical officer  So the people cannot be disembarked?
Waterworks officer No.
  Outside of the field command center, the fire officer and the officer of the 
Dutch Waterworks have an informal conversation.
Fire officer   ... this situation requires a water screen. Do you have a fire boat at your 
disposal that can take care of this?
Waterworks officer  Yes ... yes, we have such a ship ... yes, we can make that screen.
The announcement of the natural gas condensate disturbs the consultation round in the 
field command meetings. The field commander immediately asks for more information 
about the wind direction to estimate the size of the threat. At this moment, the information 
forces the officers to be flexible and immediately start thinking of alternative solutions to 
protect not only the victims, but also the emergency crews responding to the incident. 
Meanwhile, ambulance crews have boarded the fishing boat to provide first aid and are 
now also under threat of the gas condensate.
4.4.7 Participant reflections on the negotiations
For the fire officer it is really important to understand the risk of the gas leak and how the 
danger can be reduced. This is, for a great deal, a technical problem for which he has 
the expert knowledge (as part of his institutional background). In an interview with us he 
argues:
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"We are talking about natural gas condensate. I want to know: How is it stored? Is 
it condensed? Did it leak? At that moment this was not clear. So you ask: how much 
expertise do we have? And can you close the leak? But at the same time: I did not know 
how big the leak was and what the crew on the ship could do, whether they are trained 
to do this or not ... We have a fire boat with a large water cannon. Well, let me bring 
that to the scene. I order a water screen to be put in place, so they are safe. For the rest 
... that ship has no emergency. Then we have enough time".
However, the medical officer has other concerns because her ambulance crews are on the 
fishing boat. She wants to act as quickly as possible because both her people as well as 
the victims have to abandon the ships as soon as possible. Normally, the medical team 
distances itself from the scene if there is any danger to personnel: safety first.
"My people are on board of the ship. Only on the ship of the Dutch Waterworks they seem 
to be safe and from there they can work. We could not give any facts on the situation on 
board of the Stavria, since we have not been there. Then we got information about the 
ship, the wind, and so on: what is going on!? And then that misery that appeared in the 
field command center about the natural gas condensate... At that time we have a major 
safety issue for our own crews!! We have to save the victims, but because of the safety 
issue we couldn’t do that. So we know that there will be more victims, because that fishing 
boat with eighteen people on board was still in the midst of the natural gas condensate".
At this moment in the meeting, the officers have a different perception about the priorities, 
and as a result, about the amount of time that is left. These different perceptions are 
reflected in the way in which the officers engage in the negotiation. In contrast to the 
perception of the fire officer, who is convinced that placing a water screen buys him all 
the time he needs, the medical officer interprets the situation as much more threatening. 
Her narrative addresses the need to get the ambulance crews and victims out from the 
unsafe situation rapidly. Next to the rescue operation on the ship, the medical officer also 
anticipates a logistical problem when all the victims are brought on shore at once and 
need to be transported to the hospital. It is noteworthy that the discussions in the field 
command meeting focus solely on the rescue operations, but there is little attention for 
the care and transportation of the victims. This, however, is crucial information for the 
medical officer. While the rescue and safety operations are treated as a multi-disciplinary 
problem (i.e., all the disciplines have to be involved in the action), the further treatment 
of the victims as soon as they are ashore is seen as a problem only for the medical team.
"At the moment we have the water screen in place, we can only do one thing and that 
is rescue the victims from the ship as soon as possible. We cannot perform a full triage 
on all the victims and see who needs to go off the ship first. We even cannot use our 
130  |  Chapter 4
normal work practice, that is stabilizing victims first and create a prioritization. I need all 
available coastguard and lifeguards to get everybody off the ship at once. Because at 
the moment the water screen ceases to exist we find ourselves in a potentially unsafe 
situation. I need a lot of help from other partners to do this, so a lot of ships, people, 
and hands. That also means that if we get to the harbor I get at least 60 victims on shore, 
that will be an utter chaos. I need all the help I can get to solve that problem".
The reflections of the medical officer show that organizing a coherent triage and 
transportation of mass casualty scenarios is a daunting task (e.g. see: Tierney 1985, 
Koenig and Schultz 1994). She will need the help of all the available emergency agencies 
to structure this process. Yet, the fire crews themselves are busy dealing with keeping 
the water screens operational and taking care of the gas leakage on the Stavaria. In the 
field command meeting, the interests of medical and fire operations must be negotiated 
and balanced to organize a coherent response operation. This involves both getting the 
gas leakage under control and providing medical care and transportation for victims. The 
exercise example shows that organizing such a coherent response operation requires the 
officers to negotiate their interests, but also to value the mutual dependency on safety 
standards and operational capability with other emergency agencies.
4.4.8 Case 3: "How old are the kids?"
A man with a gun entered a high school and started shooting. He injured a couple of 
students; it is unknown how many. The man took some children and the teacher hostage in 
the chemistry classroom. In the chaotic situation that follows, one of the children switched 
on a smoke detector causing a fire alarm. The emergency response room receives the 
alarm and sends a fire engine to the school. At the same time, the concierge called 112. 
Next, the hostage taker releases a girl with a letter addressed to the management of the 
school. The girl is able to tell that the teacher is strapped to a chair and that the hostage 
taker threatens to set fire to the room. After the first responders arrived, the officers of 
the different disciplines gather in the field command center and they discuss a possible 
raid by the police SWAT (Special Weapons And Tactics) team. The medical officer wants 
to know more about the victims, so he can arrange enough ambulances and inform the 
hospitals.
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4.4.9 Negotiations in the field command meeting
The first conversation between the officers of the different organizations unfolds:
Medical officer  Okay. How old are the students?
Police officer I have no... no idea. 
Field commander  High school students.
Medical officer  But twelve or seventeen years old makes a lot of difference to me...
Field commander   Uhm... there are twenty-seven pupils in total. Is that the only class that is still 
present in the school building? The rest of the building is evacuated?
Fire officer  Yes, I think so, but that is still an assumption.
Field commander   Okay. I would ask you then to verify if that assumption is correct or not. 
This is an action.
Police officer  Alright, that is clear. The concierge has removed all of the other kids and he 
only missed these children. So that is for sure.
Field commander   Okay. In any case, you know that you have to take care of twenty-seven 
students who are still in the building.
At first glance, this conversation does not seem to involve a direct negotiation of interest. 
Yet, the lack of a negotiation between the police and medical officer about the age of the 
students leads to a crucial challenge in the response operation. In this conversation, we 
see the medical officer asking for the exact age of the children – important information 
for his units. However, the dominant narrative in the field command center is about the 
number of children that are still in the building. For the others, at this time more dominant 
disciplines, this information is vital for their actions.
4.4.10 Participant reflections on the negotiations
The medical officer is a bit disappointed about this attitude. He argued:
"For us this information is extremely important to have... It really matters if the children 
are eleven or seventeen years old, in order for us to be prepared. In particular, it has an 
impact for the care in the hospitals. A hospital can easily accommodate five seventeen 
year olds, but five eleven year olds, that is another story. An eleven-year cannot be 
treated as an adult with medication and injections and so on... So therefore, for us the 
age of the children is quite important. And I really did not get a good answer to my 
question in this respect, no".
 
In order to understand this problem, it is good to realize that the medical officer is always 
representing a network of organizations, including hospitals, ambulance services and 
medical doctors, and so on. These organizations have their own rules and procedures 
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implemented. For example, for the hospitals the children’s age is crucial information: 
a pediatrician must be available to take care of under-age kids.
This aspect of the medical response operation is not understood by other 
professionals; at least, it is hard for them to understand how this affects the work of 
the medical team’s officer at the location of the incident. The medical officer takes the 
decision –by himself– to not further discuss this point, but to let the actions of the other 
rescue organizations prevail. Although this might be a reasonable choice to keep initial 
speed in decision-making, failing to get the children’s age might eventually backfire since 
it can lead to serious problems in transporting a yet unknown, but possible large amount 
of under-age victims to pediatric hospitals later on.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed how emergency responders interpret information by 
using the metaphor of the trading zone and have shown how this affects their collective 
sensemaking. In the trading zone, the officers reach coordination by telling each other 
stories about their actions and perceptions (e.g., of risk and the evolution of an incident). 
The cases illustrate the way in which information is traded, based on its contextualized 
meaning to different professional communities, during the negotiations between officers 
in the field command center. In response to an explosion with asbestos, a collision on sea, 
and a hostage situation in a school, it becomes clear that not just the information itself is 
important for coordination, but particularly the way in which information is interpreted and 
subsequently guides the operations of the emergency responders. We have shown that 
information is not univocal, but incorporates different professional languages and is often 
incomplete as the situation it represents is in constant flux. In addition, information must 
be made actionable to its different users to support the inter-organizational coordination 
efforts in emergency response. Therefore, information management during emergency 
response operations is about interpreting information and negotiating its relevance for 
different professions. In our analysis, we have encountered mainly two problems with the 
interpretation and negotiation of information between officers in the trading zone.
First, in the trading zone, there can be a limited understanding of what consequences 
information has for the action and needs of other professionals. The officers identify each 
other’s specialized knowledge and roles differently throughout the incident response 
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operation because the officers can represent different specialized clusters of organizations 
during the response operation. This occurs, for instance, in case 3 when the medical officer 
resembles a wide network of medical care institutions of which, especially the different 
back offices, are not known to the other officers. Consequently, the other officers do not 
identify pediatric care as an important agency. This example shows that the relevance of 
information to others is coupled to the identification and understanding of different roles, 
thus a problem of referral that requires knowledge about functions.
Second, in the trading zone, a dominant narrative can develop that does not allow 
different interpretations of information to become visible. In their dialogue, the officers 
are confronted with different professional languages, that is, knowledge of each other’s 
specialized jargon, roles, and norms. These are sometimes visible (i.e., the fire fighters 
refer to specific procedures) but also include non-visible elements, such as standards 
of work practice and preferences about priorities. For instance, the efficacy of a water 
screen is contested in case 2. These kinds of problems show that different meanings are 
attributed to information in action, calling for a way to trigger reflection on the origin of 
these meanings.
We do recognize the limitations of our relative small set of narratives for supporting 
this claim. Still, we believe that these examples can be illustrative for social dynamics 
seen during negotiations in real-life response scenarios. We found evidence of similar 
negotiation issues in evaluation reports on actual incidents that support the trustworthiness 
of our claims. For instance, during a large headland fire on the ‘Strabrechtse Heide’ 
in 2010, police and fire officers had trouble with negotiating about the necessity and 
timing of installing roadblocks on a smoke affected highway (Inspectorate of Security and 
Justice 2011a). Also, during the response to the chemical fire in the Dutch city Moerdijk, 
privatized fire crews and crews from different regions had trouble negotiating the amount 
of fire extinguishing water necessary for balancing between controlling the fire and 
preventing environmental damage (Inspectorate of Security and Justice 2011b). Finally, 
the medical response to the Turkish airlines crash in 2009 shows negotiations about the 
need for Mobile Trauma Teams between medical officers and the emergency response 
centers (Dutch Safety Board 2010). Requests for mobile trauma teams were declined in 
the first half hour of the incident due to incorrect priorities. While these cases (taken from 
investigation reports) illustrate negotiation practices at a higher level of abstraction, the 
cases we studied gave us the opportunity to zoom in on similar negotiations in detail.
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4.5.1 Actionable knowledge and reflexivity
The two information management challenges about understanding the consequences 
of information and the existence of a dominant narrative show that making information 
widely available is not enough for effective crisis management. It is the development 
of shared understanding, based on information exchange, which is essential for the 
coordination between multiple organizations. As a result, the ‘warehouse metaphor’ is 
not appropriate: our proposed metaphor of the ‘trading zone’ is more adequate. By 
putting the negotiation of information central, the metaphor of the trading zone reveals 
that information sharing inhibits knowledge that needs to be put into action and requires 
reflexivity about its meaning to different groups. Therefore, we will discuss two concepts 
that take this inference further: making information usable by developing actionable 
knowledge and enhancing shared understanding by supporting reflexivity-in-action.
First, actionable knowledge is knowledge that "leads to immediate progress on 
a current task or assignment" (Cross and Sproull 2004, p. 446). Developing actionable 
knowledge can support the connection between information itself and the way 
information is seen as input for action. Since in the trading zone it appears that there is a 
limited understanding of what consequences information has for the actions in different 
organizations, developing actionable knowledge can help build this understanding. In 
detail, five components of actionable knowledge can be identified: solutions (both know-
what and know-how), referrals to people or databases, problem reformulation, validation, 
and legitimization (Cross and Sproull 2004). Making knowledge actionable by engaging 
with these components allows one to collaboratively create a shared understanding by 
addressing the implications of shared information.
Secondly, enhancing reflexivity is a crucial condition to address the problem 
of dominant narratives during information sharing in the trading zone. Reflexivity and 
knowing-in-action (Schön 1983) can make differences in the interpretation explicit. 
Knowing-in-action is about not only including one perspective in a story, but to include 
the other professional perspectives as well. Reflexivity allows the professional to redirect 
his or her decisions without being hindered by professional boundaries. This, of course, 
is a learning process that (literally) needs training and education (Schön 1987) to see 
the constraining and enabling characteristics of multi-organizational work. Reflection, as 
Schön (1983) has argued, starts with the recognition of the problem and continues with 
the development of affective responses and empathy.
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Therefore, a multi-organizational emergency response operation involves asking and 
answering the questions (Yanow 1997): What do I do? Why do I do it? What does it 
mean for me, as a professional and for the other professionals I work with and for? In 
this way, emergency responders can become more sensible of each other’s sensemaking 
processes and the meaning of information for action. Reflexivity-in-action and actionable 
knowledge are two additional concepts that we address to unpack the process of 
negotiating information in the trading zone. Still, taking this scope on information sharing 
and collective sensemaking might leave out other dynamics.
4.5.2 Further research
Further research towards other mechanisms in the trading zone is required to contribute 
to a broader understand of information sharing in crisis and disaster management. 
Examples of other mechanisms in the trading zone that might be unpacked are cognitive, 
such as mental models (Majchrzak et al. 2007); social, such as groupthink (Walle and Turoff 
2008); power, such as orchestrations of interests (Kellogg et al. 2006); and linguistic, such 
as the creolization of a mutually comprehensible language to support negotiation in the 
trading zone (Galison 1997). Besides attention for other mechanisms in the trading zone, 
further research might also touch upon the idea that multiple trading zones can exist at 
different levels of the disaster response organization. As a consequence of the modular 
nature of the up-scaling process during emergency response, different teams at different 
locations need to coordinate their actions. In this way, different, possibly overlapping, 
trading zones exist that might employ different kind of ‘trades’, such as more strategic or 
political sensitive decision-making processes.
4.5.3 Implications for practice
Next to the implications for theory, the perspective of sensemaking in the trading zone 
also houses tangible implications for practice. The narratives in the exercises illustrate 
that it is important to allow time for the stories that contain different interpretations of 
the officers. Field command meetings are often characterized by quick decision-making 
based on the separate professional frameworks of the officers. In effect, their different 
interpretations of the same information do not always show. Narratives are not completely 
told, or there is not enough recognition of other interpretations or work practices. Yet, it 
is important to share narratives in field command meetings. This claim appears to be at 
odds with the goal to keep field command meetings short and decisive so that officers 
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can return ‘to the field’. However, in our empirical study, we found that problems will 
appear later in the response operation if shared sensemaking is neglected. So, in the field 
command meetings, moments of reflection must be created to overcome differences in 
interpretation.
Learning how to become reflexive-in-action requires practitioners to rethink 
operational training and education. Training sessions might explicitly focus on telling 
narratives about bottlenecks in the response operation to make interpretations of 
information from different professional frameworks explicit. We witnessed that the 
focus of training sessions often lies on increasing the speed of decision-making. Our 
recommendation, however, is to find a balance between promptness and the quality of 
decision-making that incorporates multiple perspectives. To allow this, officers must bide 
the time for reflexivity. We recognize that balancing between speed of decision-making 
and reflexivity is difficult. Still, it is important that team members listen and learn from 
each other’s perspectives and allow time to think ‘out of the box’. In the end, making 
better-informed decisions avoids problems later on in the response operation and can 
only save time.
In this article, we have illustrated that the perspective of the trading zone offers a 
new approach to study information management that puts collective sensemaking to the 
fore and offers lessons both for theory and for practice. We feel that it is time to employ 
such a perspective to increase our understanding of the complex information sharing and 
meaning-making processes in emergency management. The trading zone perspective is 
a crucial and missing perspective, which is needed to reflect upon the complex problems 
in emergency response. It is necessary to employ multiple perspectives to understand 
these complex phenomena. The trading zone perspective can be combined with other 
perspectives (e.g., decision-making and learning) to better understand and support the 
multifaceted social processes behind the challenging task of information management 
during emergency response operations.


5. Incorporating Time Dynamics 
in the Analysis of Social Networks 
in Emergency Management 4
Summary
Timely and adequate communication is essential for the response to emergency situations. The 
current vision on emergency response embraces the networked organization as an answer to the 
dilemmas of communication and information flows in crisis situations. With stabilization of the 
network paradigm, the focus question turns into how networks are perceived and in what manner 
they function. We argue that there is a need to attend to the way networks and their functioning 
are assessed. Derived from this research agenda, attention is paid to the manner in which the time 
critical nature of the communication during emergency situations can be captured in network terms. 
The focus on how network interaction unfolds over time is demonstrated by attending to a case of 
a tunnel incident in the Netherlands. It is argued that a structure-oriented network analysis misses 
much of the actions, and that using the data to probe the communication patterns with additional 
methods for time dependency enhances our insights. Three approaches, time slices, two-mode 
analysis and information pathways, are introduced and the outcomes are interpreted.
4 Published as: Wolbers, J., P. Groenewegen, J. Molle, J. Bim. 2013. Incorporating Time
Dynamics in the analysis of Social Networks in Emergency Management, Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management, 10(2): 1-31.
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5.1 Introduction
Emergency situations require timely and adequate communication. During an emergency 
response operation, information needs to be updated through a variety of channels 
between different parties involved. These communication patterns between the response 
organizations can be studied from a network perspective. From an organizational 
perspective, emergency response networks are an interesting phenomenon, because 
they show a constantly changing pattern of emergent inter-organizational interactions. 
The types and number of organizations involved are different for each incident, making 
the response network highly contingent on the situation at hand. In addition, information 
exchange during emergency response operations is difficult because each organization 
in the response network has operational field units at different levels, different functional 
command structures, and separate back offices for information and resource management 
(Comfort and Kapucu 2006). Information exchange in the network is characterized by a 
constantly changing pattern of communications that is necessary to connect and update 
the new organizations responding to the incident. As information flows through the 
network from various positions at different times and new organizations are included in 
the network, the communication patterns become increasingly complex. In the theoretical 
debate this problem is conceptualized around the question how to coordinate the actions 
of all types of organizations active during the response operation (Comfort 2007, Militello 
et al. 2007, Kapucu 2009).
In response to this question, a mix of two governance structures is discussed in 
the emergency management debate. Centralized command and control structures are 
pitted against network structures as archetypical differences in governance (Kapucu 
2006, Moynihan 2009, Janssen et al. 2010). However, in most emergency situations these 
structures operate next to each other depending on the dynamics of the crisis. This unveils 
a design paradox for emergency management. On the one hand, unambiguous command 
is needed for the timely direction of the involved units (Bigley and Roberts 2001). On the 
other hand, the collaboration with (unforeseen) emergency partners requires a loosely 
coupled network that functions by virtue of flexibility, on-the-spot decision-making, and 
adaptation towards the continuously changing situation.
The mixed use of governance structures during response operations makes an 
accurate explanation of incident response dynamics by scholars rather challenging. In 
response, several researchers have turned to the tools and techniques of social network 
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analysis to explain how organizations connect with each other and share information in 
response operations (Kapucu 2006, Uhr and Johansson 2007, Uhr et al. 2008). Some 
have concluded that emergent network structures better explain collaboration and 
coordination as it actually occurs (Neal and Phillips 1995, Waugh and Streib 2006). 
Experimental studies have also concluded that network structures permit more accurate 
information exchanges, resulting in improved decision-making (Schraagen et al. 2010).
However, other reports from the field indicate that network studies do not provide 
a fully satisfactory explanation of emergent organizing patterns. It has been argued that 
networked activity in exercises leads to information overload and disorganization even if 
information-sharing principles have been well established (Militello et al. 2007). As such, 
the manner in which the organization of command and information sharing has an effect 
on the outcomes of networked emergency management has not yet been fully addressed 
(Hossain and Kuti 2010).
Part of the problem is that in most network studies the incident response dynamics 
are not represented accurately enough. If we zoom in on the way in which these 
dynamic processes are depicted, we notice that in most network studies rather static 
and descriptive measures are used to illustrate emergency response operations. There is 
not enough recognition that social network analysis is in essence a static analysis, since 
it only provides a temporary snapshot of the interactions that are occurring (Choi and 
Brower 2006). Thus, the dynamic and emergent organizing practices are often only taken 
as conditional and are essentially left out of the analyses.
We respond to the call of Abbasi and Kapucu (2012, p. 1) who state that “tools and 
measures are missing to evaluate the efficiency of inter-organizational response networks 
in the rapidly evolving and changing environment of disasters”. Building on this, we argue 
that answers need to be obtained by employing a more relevant network toolset. The 
search for this toolset lies at the heart of our research. The body of research to date has 
not fully addressed the relationship between the structure of governance (viewed as a 
continuum between “centralized” and “networked”), the execution of information sharing 
(another continuum ranging from highly restrictive “need to know” to completely open 
“responsibility to share”) and the operational outcomes in emergency management 
situations. An important unaddressed need is the selection of a useful method for capturing 
the dynamical processes within an emergency management network. Therefore we ask the 
research question: how does network interaction unfold over time and in what manner can 
the network process that unfolds in different phases of an emergency best be captured?
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In the next section, we discuss the existing methods for capturing the emergency network’s 
dynamical processes and discuss its merits and limitations. We employ three new network 
tools to account for the dynamic organizing patterns: time slices, two-mode analysis, 
and information pathways. Our objective is to illustrate how these tools work and better 
depict network dynamics by using a case study of an emergency response operation 
in the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol train tunnel. In this case many different actors are 
involved that need to collaborate in a short time span. We will argue that traditional social 
network analysis (SNA) gives a limited depiction of incident response dynamics and show 
how this problem can be addressed by using other network analytical tools.
Before we move on to the case study, we will show in more detail how the social 
network analysis has been applied to the analysis of emergency response to depict the 
emergent organizing patterns.
5.2 The Use of Social Network Analysis to Depict Emergency 
Response Operations
In emergency management the decentralized character of networks is proposed to be 
the favored response to information and decisional challenges under pressure (Moynihan 
2008b, 2009). In such situations, the fundamental form envisioned for networked operations 
is aimed at establishing an authority-based lateral and vertical flow of information, which 
has the ability to guide a rapidly evolving network of responding organizations. This 
network of organizational actors is based upon mutual independence, where one unit is 
not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some large hierarchical arrangement 
(O’Toole 1997). As such, networks operate according to their own logic, in which “a basic 
normative characteristic of networks is that they are not hierarchical, relying on lateral 
linkages and self-regulation” (Alter and Hage 1992, in: Moynihan 2008a, p. 208).
As structures that are based upon self-regulation and lateral linkages, networks 
are dynamic and comprise multiple organizations that can be located in geographically 
different sites (Kapucu and Garayev 2013). In the field of public administration these 
characteristics are used to explain how networks function as governance structures. 
Bigley and Roberts (2001) describe the Incident Command System (ICS) as nucleus of 
a fast response network. Similarly, Moynihan (2009) describes the governance structure 
of the ICS as a network of multiple response organizations operating under a temporary 
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central authority with a hierarchical structure. The hybrid governance structure of the ICS 
maintains clear lines of authority, while offering scalability and the ability to self-adjust 
according to members’ specific expertise and local circumstances.
One of the merits of network structures is its enhanced capacity for adaptation 
to fluctuations in the environment. Especially in emergency management dynamic 
change, achieved communication quality and emergent conditions play a crucial role in 
how response operations take shape. Responsive, high quality decision making based 
upon up-to-date information is an operational necessity for emergency management 
organizations, which must operate, collaborate and quickly adapt within a challenging, 
dynamic and pressure-filled environment. The reliability and pace of information flow 
among the many organizational nodes are, therefore, vital to success. This state of affairs 
places a premium on understanding how those flows are structured and how that structure 
changes over time.
During the response, operational structuring of the network depends on the 
assessment of the available information about the incident. When we regard the network 
structuring as dependent on information flow between responders, the deployment and 
delineation of the networked response organization might thus best be depicted by 
starting the analysis of the network with the first responding unit. One way to do this is to 
track the addition and subtraction of member nodes and the attendant information flows 
over time. This reveals that response networks evolve in a modular fashion, and that the 
key to effective response lies in effective collaboration and decision-making enabled by a 
combination of flexibility, clear lines of authority, and clear delineation of responsibilities 
throughout the incident. This view is also embedded in the developmental and modular 
nature of modern incident command systems that are designed to govern through 
networked social and technical infrastructures. The most widely known example is the 
standard organizational templates that are proposed by the FEMA (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) in the ICS (Kapucu and Garayev 2013).
Given that emergency response networks can evolve over time, researchers need 
access to a set of tools to help them represent, track and analyze that evolution. As 
the remainder of this section will show, our research indicates that very few emergency 
management studies address this need in a serious manner (Choi and Brower 2006).
We have assessed the emergency management literature to get a better idea 
on what network studies focus. We conducted a search on Web of Science based on 
the keywords: “emergency management OR disaster”, and refined these results by 
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“network analysis”. This resulted in 27 hits. In addition, we searched the main emergency 
management journals (Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Journal of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, International Journal of Emergency 
Management, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Disasters) with 
the same keywords, since these journals are not all indexed completely in Web of Science. 
This resulted in another 56 hits, of which only the relevant social network publications 
were selected.
Our review of the use of SNA in emergency management shows that one of the 
major issues is that it provides only a static snapshot of a situation in flux. The majority of 
these studies depict the network in terms of its different centrality measures (Mendonca 
and Wallace 2004, Kapucu 2005, Kapucu 2009, Houghton et al. 2006), connectedness 
(Hensgen et al. 2006), and subsets (Loosemore and Hughes 2001, Hensgen et al. 2006, 
Kapucu et al. 2010), or how actors are connected in different types of networks (Uhr et 
al. 2008). The measures used serve as good indicators of the composition and structure 
of the networks, but scarcely any attention is paid to the dynamic nature of the process 
of networking.
Broadly speaking, we found three types of studies that employ a different set 
of social networks measures to explain collaboration patterns during emergencies 
or disasters. First, there are studies that use networks as conceptual logic that focus 
on structural representation of emergent organizing structures. Second, there is an 
extensive set of studies describing network governance structures in large-scale response 
networks. Third, there are a few studies that use social network theory to explain the 
different kind of relations (e.g., trust, advice, and friendship) between first responders 
during response operations.
In the first category, an early example of a network study is the work by Drabek and 
colleagues, which focuses on network structures and uses block modeling and centrality 
as tools (Drabek et al. 1981) to study information sharing between first responders, 
citizens, and authorities. In a qualitative analysis they linked these data to the sense of 
stability or the dynamics of the communication networks. In a later study, Topper and 
Carley (1999) analyzed the emergency organizations as an emergent (integrated) network 
organization after the oil spill in Alaska by the Exxon Valdez. They based their study on 
two sources: the Coast Guard reconstruction of the incident and the newspaper reporting. 
Both studies focused on connectedness and ordering of information in the emergency 
management core (Drabek et al. 1981, Topper and Carley 1999). While these studies 
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focus on a structural representation, and not on the dynamic features of networks under 
pressure, they already discuss the addition of volunteer and other organizations that are 
active in the overall response network. This point is also illustrated in the analysis of the 
radio communication after the 9/11 attacks where the dynamic emergence of primary 
and secondary hubs is described (Butts et al. 2007). Another network study that focuses 
on structural representation is the work of Gillespie and Murty (1994) who analyze a post-
disaster inter-organizational network and identify cracks in the network by looking at central 
and peripheral actors in a structural equivalence analysis. Finally, Uddin and Hossain (2011) 
show a disaster preparedness network of soft target organizations (retail malls), and discuss 
degree centrality measures and tie strength. They conclude that malls with high a level of 
connectedness and strong ties tend to be better prepared for disaster response.
The second category is dominated by the work of Kapucu and others (Kapucu 2009, 
Kapucu and Demiroz 2011) that do an extensive job of analyzing large-scale (governmental) 
response networks to multiple hurricanes in the US. Kapucu et al. (2013) discuss the 
response of organizations in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact network 
to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality analysis 
of the two networks shows that in the more successful response to hurricane Rita, more 
cohesion and coordination were present in the network. This analysis is supported by 
the earlier similar analysis of the same hurricanes, where the authors found out that local 
levels are shown to be faster in response than federal and national authorities (Kapucu et 
al. 2010). The finding that local levels are better connected is also shown by Andrew and 
Carr (2013), who analyze closeness and betweenness centrality in preparedness planning 
communication networks in the Dallas–Fort Worth–Denton area. Finally, Kapucu et al. 
(2010) use a similar centrality analysis to show differences in centrality in the response 
to four subsequent hurricanes in Florida. Interestingly, this analysis shows that there was 
no significant difference among coordinated response to four hurricanes. In other words, 
there was a failure to learn at the network level.
The analysis of network governance structures is also used to study non-US cases. 
Vasavada (2013) analyzed network governance structures of the total network active 
during earthquake recovery in the state of Gujarat, India. Different centrality measures 
are used to conclude that the existence of a network administrative organization that 
functions independently of the network is not a reflection of how the response is actually 
organized. Instead, as the response operation unfolds, a lead organization-governed 
structure is created. This increases trust and goal consensus in the network. A similar 
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analysis is performed by Kapucu (2011), who analyzes the large differences in the structure 
of international UN response networks to the Nargis cyclone in Myanmar and the China 
earthquake in Sichuan province. Moore et al. (2003) also study network governance 
positions to understand the response network active during the 2000 Mozambique 
floods. They show, by using betweenness centrality and two-mode analysis, that local 
NGOs remained peripheral to the coordination process, while the Mozambique Red 
Cross took a more central position and had significantly more out-degree connections.
In general, we see that in the second category of network governance studies 
mainly centrality measures (degree, closeness, and betweenness) are used to understand 
the networked collaboration. These measures do serve as a good indication of the 
composition and structure of the networks, but scarcely any attention is given to the 
dynamic nature of the process of networking. These analyses focus more on providing an 
overall score of the relative position of actors throughout the entire response operation 
(Kim et al. 2013). The possibility that this position is subject to change in different phases 
of the response operation is not reflected in the analysis.
The third category focuses on mapping social networks as an indication of the 
mechanisms underlying the patterns of communication between responders in emergency 
response operations (Uhr and Johansson 2007, 2008). Uhr and Johansson (2008) show 
what role informal connections play in the response network formed for a chemical spill 
in Sweden, by analyzing trust, advice, and friendship networks during the same response 
operation. They conclude that analyzing these different types of networks uncovered 
hidden social dynamics in the response operation. Actors structured their advice network 
based upon friendship and trust (past work experience) and not so much upon formal 
work requirements. Interestingly, Uhr and Johansson also argue in their discussion that a 
limitation to their work is that they failed to illustrate how the network evolves over time. 
The friendship network does not account for the situation that people were sometimes 
not active at the same time. Here we see the similar problem that degree centrality 
provides only a summary of the course of events. This issue is also visible in the work of 
Harris and Clements (2007), who apply degree and betweenness centrality to map the 
personal relations of the Missouri public health emergency professionals using a planning 
system in 2006. They find that most planners communicated regularly with planners in 
their region, but seldom with planners outside their region. Because their argument is 
based upon a longer planning period, this limitation of degree centrality measure is not 
that influential to their argument.
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In these three different categories of network studies in emergency management literature, 
we see the limitation that network analysis is mostly used to provide a static summary 
of interaction patterns. Yet, we also see a number of recent studies emerging that are 
shifting their attention to the dynamic processes occurring in the response networks 
(Abrahamsson et al. 2010, Hossain and Kuti 2010, Abbasi and Kapucu 2012). Also, Conti 
and Doreian (2010) recently discussed a number of cases, one of which is from the original 
studies by Drabek, in which they conclude that a variety of network analytical methods are 
necessary to capture the geographic contingent nature of communication in emergency 
situations. We can add to this development by explaining the dynamic nature of network 
processes. To better understand the nature of networked coordination, we need to move 
away from the somewhat static conceptualizations that most network studies offer us.
We argue that applying dynamic social network methods, which are new to the area 
of emergency management, should provide room for analyzing the time depen dency of 
the processes occurring in the network. This follows the assertion that timing of communi-
cation in response is a key factor to take into account in assessing the effectiveness of 
networked emergency response. Tools for a dynamic network analysis should focus on the 
flow of information based on the frequencies on linkages in different time periods in the 
network, to allow an analysis of information spreading from a time perspective.
5.3 Towards a Network Toolset to Measure Network Dynamics
We propose three different network tools that together provide a toolset to measure 
network dynamics. Our objective is to introduce to the domain of emergency management 
applicable tools that have been proven to work in other fields. We hope that this cross-
fertilization of methods will enable emergency management researchers and practitioners 
to transcend the limits of static depictions, thereby gaining a clearer understanding of the 
dynamics of response operations communications.
First, we propose to use time slices of actual interactions to get a better idea of 
how the network develops over time in different stages. Each time slice consists of all 
of the node-to-node information exchanges that occur among network nodes within 
the network in a defined period of time. The network is thus chopped into different 
periods of interaction. This type of analysis allows the researcher to get a better idea 
about how the network develops over time and what changes appear in the network 
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structure. It does require data (about incidents or disasters) that include time stamps or 
time indications to be able to discern the different periods. Time slices have been used 
before to depict the dynamics of the structure of social networks over time (Eckmann et al. 
2004, Moody et al. 2005, Butts et al. 2007). These, however, depict changes in positions 
and do not necessarily take into account the dynamic patterns of communication. We 
feel that employing time slices to communication patterns contributes to the analysis of 
information sharing dynamics in networks.
Second, we propose a two-mode analysis based upon the time slices. In two-mode 
analysis there are two modes, in which mode 1 consists of the time periods and mode 
2 consists of the actors. A link between time (mode 1) and actor (mode 2) shows who is 
active at what time. This allows us to display in one picture the most active actors not 
only in each time slice, but also across larger sets of time slices. By using two-mode 
analysis, we can see at what points in time the network takes different shapes and how the 
actors are connected to each other. Thus, in contrast to the more generally used centrality 
measures, two-mode analysis allows us to see how the centrality of actors changes over 
time. Likewise, two-mode analysis was used by Moore et al. (2003) to analyze the response 
network during the Mozambique floods.
Third, we propose to use information pathways to specifically follow the information 
spreading from a time perspective. Information pathways are used to track the information 
flows through the network and analyze how flows are connected to each other at different 
points in time. We have argued that the effectiveness of the collaboration structure is 
contingent on the timely assessment of the available information. To analyze the spreading 
of information from a time perspective, one should incorporate the frequencies of contact 
along different linkages in the network. This is what Kossinets et al. (2008) describe when 
they focus on analyzing information pathways in a network dependent on the time of 
interaction. They state that overall measures of connectedness are not applicable to the 
study of network information flows, but whether and to whom information spreads is 
dependent on the timing of interactions.
Information pathways are based upon edges and indirect paths. The edges are the 
direct connections between nodes, thus the connection between node i–j. Indirect paths 
are connections that move through another actor, for instance i–k–j. This is relevant in 
terms of timeliness of information exchange, because the quickest path with the most up-
to-date information can also move through another node. For example, this occurs when 
actor i exchanges information with actor k at t1 who informs actor j at t2. If actors i–j have a 
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direct link only at t3, the indirect path is quicker in exchanging information than the edge. 
So the indirect path is the optimal information pathway. This means that despite a direct 
connection might be visible between i–j in the overall degree centrality network, in fact 
the quickest information pathway moves through i–k–j. In this way, “some of the direct 
connections in the network become much longer, due to low rates of communication, while 
other multi-step paths become much shorter, due to the rapidity with which information 
can flow along them” (Kossinets et al. 2008, p. 442). Analyzing only degree centrality 
to calculate information flow might thus be misleading. By using information pathways, 
we can see how actors are connected or isolated through timing, which determines how 
information can flow through the network. The next section introduces the case study we 
use to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed tools.
5.4 The Case of the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport Train Tunnel Fire
During the afternoon rush hour of 2 July 2009, a fire incident took place in the Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol train tunnel. In one of the two adjacent tunnel tubes, dirt collecting in 
a cable tray next to a railway track, ignited by a spark released from the braking wheels 
of a passing train, started to smoulder. The smoke caused by the smouldering dirt was 
first noticed by train drivers of trains passing through the tube. Together with reports of 
malfunctioning signals, the signs of fire were communicated to the remotely operating 
Railway Traffic Controller, who responded by stopping the train traffic in the direction 
of Schiphol, requesting the Switching & Report Center to dispatch a technician, and 
preparing a possible evacuation of the tunnel.
At the same time, the smoke and the smell of the fire were noticed by a train driver 
and a Schiphol employee at one of the platforms. The latter informed the Coordination 
Center Schiphol, which immediately began requesting several emergency services to 
dispatch. In addition, both the Royal Military Police and the National Railways received 
alarms from one of their employees. Triggered by these alarms, the emergency response 
was put in motion in a scattered fashion. Several involved parties quickly started the 
evacuation of the platforms, but the decision to start evacuating the tunnels was delayed 
by uncertainties about the severity of the signs of the fire, the positions of the trains held 
in the tunnel tubes, and the fire fighters’ intention to explore the tunnel.
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Although the fire turned out to be harmless, as it died out by itself, the inadequate coor-
dination between the parties impeded a coherent emergency response. Consequently, 
three trains full of passengers were held in the tunnel under fearsome circumstances, 
which would have had potential lethal consequences if the fire had posed an actual threat.
One important aspect of the tunnel at Schiphol Airport is that the authority above 
the ground and underground differs. The tunnels and overall rail traffic in the tunnel are the 
responsibility of ProRail, the body responsible for the rail infrastructure. Passenger trains in 
the tunnels and station are the responsibility of the National Railways, and safety concerns 
rest with the railway police, a specialized National Police unit. In addition, Schiphol Airport 
as an entity has a separate legal status, and its own fire service, while its police are a part of 
the border guarding Royal Military Police KMAR and are at the same time responsible for 
safety and security in the airport area. In addition, Schiphol is located in the safety region 
Kennemerland, which is generally responsible for emergency operations and sending 
additional capacity for all three emergency services, fire fighters, medics, and police.
Summarizing, in this specific situation responsibility for alarming, dispatching, 
and decision-making rests with six different organizational realms with their own safety 
and communication centers: ProRail, National Railways, Royal Military Police (KMAR), 
Railway Police, Safety Region Kennemerland, and Schiphol Airport Emergency Services. 
Figure 14, originating from the official investigation report, gives the structure of official 
communication lines (solid black) and the crucial connections for responders occurring 
during the incident (dotted blue). The red actors belong to the fire department, white 
belong to ambulance services, blue to police and yellow are the railway organizations. The 
purple actors in the middle are the dispatch rooms of safety region Kennemerland and 
Schiphol Airport. The Airport Fire Officer (AFO) has the authority over the fire department 
response on site. The AL is responsible for coordination between the railway actors.
The case under investigation was selected for several reasons. First of all, it concerns 
an operation that involved actors from various organizations, which shows clearly how the 
networked collaboration problem arises. In addition, the incident is well delimited in time. 
It starts with the first detection of the fire and it ends with a sign “fire under control”, 
all of which takes place within approximately 1 hour. Finally, during this period the 
interactions between the organizations are documented in detail in a public inquiry report 
(Inspectorate of Security and Justice 2009b) that describes the emergency response from 
three perspectives, which enhances the validity of the research.
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Figure 14. Communication Network from the Incident Report 
(Inspectorate of Security and Justice 2009b, p. 62)
 
5.5 Methods
The framework used to guide the process from the input data to the results consists 
of three steps, as depicted in Figure 15. The first two steps, the formalization and 
transformation of the data, are explained in Section 5.5.1. The last step, the data analysis, 
is described in Section 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Data Collection
The analysis of the emergency response to the Schiphol train tunnel fire incident is 
primarily based on information from a public inquiry report (Inspectorate of Security and 
Justice 2009b). 
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Figure 15. Data Formalization, Transformation and Analysis 
In the report, the course of events is summarized in three story lines, each described 
from a different perspective, namely from the perspective of the Dutch organization for 
maintenance of the railway infrastructure (ProRail), from the perspective of the Dutch 
principal passenger railway operator (National Railways), and from the perspective of the 
police, the fire fighters and the medical services. In earlier work, these three story lines 
were merged and formalized with the help of the software Leadsto (Bosse et al. 2006) 
in order to create a so-called formal trace of the emergency response (Passenier et al. 
2012). This formalization process is the first step in the data construction. It amounts to 
translating the mostly qualitative report data into a computer-readable format, resulting 
in decisions to represent the events more exactly than described in the public incident 
report. Figure 16 shows a fragment of the resulting formal trace. Each time interval in this 
trace represents half a minute, starting with t = 0 at 17:25 h. Hence, Figure 16 shows the 
events between 18:16 h and 18:17 h.
In order to depict the course of events in a convenient format for the analysis of the 
types of communication during the emergency response, this formal trace, together with 
the explanatory notes of the authors on the side, was used to reconstruct the events into 
one story line in natural language. 
The trace itself is not necessarily a complete representation of all actual 
communication during the incident, because not all communication was recorded by the 
Inspectorate of Security and Justice. Although it is necessary to mention the limits of the 
use of this secondary data, as discussed in Passenier et al. (2012), we are convinced that 
the case itself can function as a good example of showcasing a new network toolset to 
depict the dynamics of communication processes during emergency response operations.
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Figure 16. Formal Trace of Communication Patterns in Time Range 102–104 
The second step in the data construction consisted of the transition between the formal 
trace and the matrices that served as input for the analysis. The communication matrices 
could be composed automatically, because the trace contains all relevant information 
about which actor communicated with whom and at which time point, in a computer-
readable format. We used Matlab to read the trace and generate the matrices, which 
were stored in Microsoft Excel.
For our analysis, two types of matrices were constructed. First, we created 
asymmetric actor-by-actor matrices covering the duration of the communication between 
two actors. In such a matrix, a field i, j describes the duration of the communication (in 
number of time steps) from actor i to actor j. In contrast to conventional network matrices, 
the automatically generated matrices were not constructed for the complete emergency 
response, but instead, we generated a separate matrix for each time step. This resulted 
in a three-dimensional matrix (actor × actor × time) that allowed us to merge the actor-by-
actor matrices to longer time intervals according to our needs. Second, we created actor-
by-time matrices covering the individual activity of actors per time step. Here, a field i, j 
contains a 1 if actor j was involved in a communication at time step i, and a 0 otherwise. 
We used varying durations from 30 s to 2.5 min and marked activity of actors with a 1 or 0 
depending on whether an actor was active in that time period (1) or not (0). Subsequently, 
the data were analyzed with different social network methods to reach convergence in 
our interpretation.
5.5.2 Data Analysis
We have proposed three different tools to analyze the case: time slices, two-mode analysis 
and information pathways. These tools can be used separately, although the time slices 
are the input for the last two analyses.
First, time slices are used to chop the network of interactions in different time 
periods. The length of the intervals can vary according to the researchers’ needs and the 
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number of changes in network structure per unit of time in the network. We searched for 
the most convenient intervals to represent the communication dynamics in the network 
to balance the ability to detect changes in network structure with the level of detail. 
We found that both 2.5 and 5 min time slices showed us a convenient overview of the 
structural changes. Figure 21 displays the traces created by using the 5 min time slices. 
The traces are based on the sequential data in the incident report.
Second, the two-mode analysis is conducted to assess the information about the 
event periods in which the various parts of the emergency system play an active role 
and in what manner. Centrality in two-mode networks consists of two different maximum 
values of centrality. The first is the number of time periods regarded as events in which 
actors operate. The second is the number of actors that can be active in a given time 
period (Everett and Borgatti 2005, Borgatti and Halgin 2011). In our case the various 
actors form one mode, while events form the other mode. A link is considered to exist 
by connecting actors active in a specific event period to that event. One methodological 
caveat is that we assume that in our two-mode calculations the actions of various parties 
at the different moments have some transparency to the others actively exchanging 
information at the same time. This is warranted because a large part of the information 
exchange takes place in a dedicated information system, and also the emergency room 
functioned as a switch board between operating teams and decision-makers. In addition, 
we have included similar actors into higher order categories. For example, individual fire 
engines are collectively labeled fire engine, similar for train drivers. This is warranted as 
first responders at the place of the incident can listen in on the communication between 
the other parties in action, at least in their own domain.
In one part of the analysis, we used degree centrality of an actor to measure the 
frequency with which actors were present in different communication (update) events. 
Betweenness centrality introduces the degree to which actors are present at time 
periods with a unique character. Therefore, these actors are able to digest and distribute 
information in other time periods that others attend which shows the consistency of the 
engagement of the actors over time (Everett and Borgatti 2005). This provides us with 
an indication (regardless of the content of the communication) of which actors have been 
critical in providing communication opportunities between actors, because they have 
been present at critical update events. The other part of the analysis is the assessment of 
which of these event periods connects most of the actors. We ran our analysis originally 
with event periods specified as 30s intervals. However, regarding the overall patterns 2.5 
156  |  Chapter 5
min intervals seem to be more reasonable. Longer intervals introduce the problem that 
the information at the beginning of the interval considered might already be outdated. 
A high-time degree centrality for update events measures how many actors are involved 
in communication in that period (Everett and Borgatti 2005, p. 63). Also for the event 
periods we can compute the betweenness centrality indicating the critical moments in 
time where actors in the network may relay information to others.
Third, we use information pathways to follow the path of information streams 
moving through the network in different time periods. First, we use the time slices to 
create different intervals in the network. Next, we analyzed the edges and indirect paths 
(based on the time slices) between actors in the network (Wassermann and Faust 1994) 
to follow different information pathways between the nodes in the different time periods. 
To get a better understanding of what is communicated in the network, we combined the 
structure of the information pathways with the content of the communication from the 
formal traces to reconstruct the storyline. This allowed us to add a qualitatively informed 
analysis to the information pathways. The software tool VennMaker was used to convert 
the results of the analysis into Figure 20 that shows information pathways between 
different time periods. This combination of data allowed us to see how and what kind of 
messages were spread through the network.
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Network Tool 1: Time Slices
The first reconstruction of the communication networks is based on time slices of 5 
min. The sequential pictures depicted in Appendix 1 (Figure 21) at 5 min intervals show 
which parties (labels in Appendix: Table 13) were actively exchanging information with 
each other in each of the phases. The network structure represents the sequence of 
communication. The first time slice includes conversations between two train drivers and 
two different train traffic controllers. Each conversation includes mention of a possible 
fire. The next phase is characterized by a relatively slow build-up of information exchange 
in a more densely connected network, which fully integrates the functionally different 
groups only in time slice T5 after 21 min. The central components in these different time 
slices vary, as do the central actors. It takes quite some time before the calamity officer of 
the rail network shows up.
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Timeframe  
in minutes
Rail Emergency 
coordination
others
1: 1-5
2: 6-10 Railway Traffic Controller 1
3: 11-15 Railway Traffic Controller 2 Coordination Center 
Schiphol
4: 16-20 Railway Traffic Controller 2 Coordination Center 
Schiphol
KMAR (Military Police)
5: 21-25 ProRail Back Office
Rail Traffic Controller 2
ProRail Emergency Coordinator
Dispatch Center 
Kennemerland
6: 26-30 ProRail Emergency Coordinator Dispatch Center 
Kennemerland
Table 11. Central Actors in the Critical First Half Hour
Overall, 26 min elapse before the information is exchanged in the necessary core 
network of Dispatch Center Kennemerland, Railway Traffic Controller, ProRail Emergency 
Operations Coordinator and Airport Fire Officer. In the meantime sub-networks have 
dealt with the questions and concerns of the train drivers and the public. In summary, 
the time slices show a developing network that lacks common central actors, which may 
be responsible for producing a fragmented response effort. Table 11 shows different 
actors that were most central in communication in the first half hour of the incident. The 
lack of a stable core is noteworthy. Based on the design of existing emergency response 
systems (actors, responsibilities and authorities) this is not what one should expect, since 
this system calls for a constant central core to support coordination. The lack of stability 
in the core in this case shows the complicated authority structures in the Schiphol train 
tunnel. It also shows that the actors fail to communicate across the boundaries of their 
own agencies throughout the first part of the response.
The centrality measures showed that the most central node was different in each 
time slice. In the representation of the networks we can compare those (see Figure 17 
and Figure 18) with earlier suggestions by Topper and Carley (1999) about three organiza-
tional scenarios: (1) emergent with increasing connectivity and order, (2) highly structured 
around one node thus central, and (3) increased and near-complete connectivity between 
all nodes. We can see the second scenario “highly structured around one node thus 
central” in Figure 17 (in T3) and the network is fragmented into two separate parts. The 
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separate networks consist of the emergency services in the left cluster and the railway 
actors in the right cluster. In Figure 18 (in T5) the two separate networks connect to 
each other, and we move back towards the first scenario: “emergent with increasing 
connectivity and order”. In the remainder of the incident the evolving network structure 
remains mostly “emergent with increasing connectivity”, and perhaps due to the short 
duration of the incident, it does not stabilize into a fixed pattern.
In conclusion, the time slices show us that the networks are multi-centered 
throughout the incident. There is not one central actor, but different clusters that 
each have a different central actor. Several moments of increased connectivity can be 
seen, but the network also fragments into different clusters in several time slices (see 
Figure 21). This is partly in contrast with the sequence of the scenarios suggested by 
Topper and Carley (1999).
In Figure 19 (red circles are time periods of 2.5 min, blue squares are the 
consolidated actors), it can be seen that during the time periods B1–B5 there is very 
sparse to no communication, and if there is, it is only between train drivers and railway 
organizations. In the patterning of the red event nodes there is communication between 
two different segments of the network, in general the two parties that we also saw in the 
time slices. In the upper part we see a start-up of communication in B6 and B7, and a 
cluster of activity around B8, B9, B11, B16 and B17, suggesting moments where cross 
connection across the broader segments of the network took place without coordinating 
centers involved. When the emergency comes to an end, the time periods B24, B25, 
and B26 indicate low or no activity of a majority of actors. The coordinating role of the 
ProRail Emergency Operations Coordinator (ProRail_EOC), and the Dispatch Center of 
Safety Region Kennemerland (DC_SR_K) shows a higher representation of these actors 
over other periods B8, B9 and B16, B17. Besides, also more peripheral actors can be 
distinguished, such as the fire fighters (FE) and their commanding officers (AFO; FF_O; 
FF_HO), as well as the connection of worried passengers (PSGN) through the national 
police emergency call center (NPSA).
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Figure 18. Increasing Connectivity in the Network in T5
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5.6.2 Network Tool 2: Event-Actor Two-Mode Analysis
Figure 19. Two-Mode Network of 2.5 min Intervals
Thus, in the figure of event periods, the core moments of coordination can be seen 
clearly, and they add to the insight in the dynamics of the crisis in a different manner than 
a phase description would. This is confirmed by the calculation of degree centrality and 
by the betweenness centrality (see Table 12), showing the crucial period in more detail. 
It can be seen that periods B8–B11 and B16–17 score higher on degree centrality, thus 
connecting more actors together. In addition, the betweenness centrality measures show 
that time B11 and B14 remain a bit more critical periods for combining various actors and 
allowing information sharing.
In the two-mode analysis the critical points in time can be shown. The insights 
from the time slices in paragraph 5.6.1 are confirmed by our indication of critical time 
periods in Table 12. In contrast to stabilization in the command and control perspective, 
we observe the fluctuating nature of information flows between actors in the network.
Incorporating Time Dynamics in Emergency Management Networks  |  161
5
Time Period Degree Centrality Closeness 
Centrality
Betweenness 
Centrality
Eigenvector
B1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
B2 0.083 0.649 0.006 0.015
B3 0.083 0.649 0.006 0.015
B4 0.208 0.685 0.025 0.057
B5 0.167 0.673 0.001 0.057
B6 0.667 0.902 0.014 0.218
B7 0.750 0.949 0.017 0.245
B8 0.833 1.000 0.024 0.263
B9 0.875 1.028 0.030 0.268
B10 0.792 0.974 0.019 0.257
B11 0.958 1.088 0.061 0.273
B12 0.792 0.974 0.019 0.257
B13 0.792 0.974 0.019 0.257
B14 0.750 0.949 0.040 0.210
B15 0.667 0.902 0.013 0.221
B16 0.875 1.028 0.030 0.268
B17 0.875 1.028 0.030 0.268
B18 0.792 0.974 0.019 0.257
B19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
B20 0.750 0.949 0.017 0.245
B21 0.792 0.974 0.019 0.257
B22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
B23 0.708 0.925 0.036 0.196
B24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
B25 0.083 0.617 0.000 0.029
B26 0.208 0.649 0.001 0.070
Table 12. Two-Mode Time Periods Centrality Measures in 2.5 min Event Periods
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5.6.3 Network Tool 3: Information Pathways
Our analysis so far has shown that the communication in the response network is 
fragmented at different times. The central actors from ProRail and the emergency 
organizations in time periods T3 (11–15) and T4 (16–20) (see Table 12 and Figure 17) 
are located in subsets of the network that are disconnected from each other. In these 
time periods these actors communicate solely in their own networks. In time periods T5 
(21–25) (see Figure 18), T6 (26–30), and T8 (36–40), these subsets are connected to each 
other.
The central problem described in the incident report is a miscommunication 
between the Airport Fire Officer (AFO), ProRail Emergency Operations Coordinator, and 
the Railway Traffic Controller (RTC). The miscommunication concerns the location of the 
trains and fire fighters in the tunnel tubes. The fire fighters are under the impression that 
all trains have been evacuated and enter the tunnel, while the ProRail Coordinator and 
RTC are under the impression that fire fighters are already on the tracks and do not dare 
to move the trains. To address this misunderstanding, we use information pathways to 
describe in what order the actors are connected to each other in different time periods. 
Information pathways are the edges connected to each other in relation to the sequence 
of time stamps (Kossinets et al. 2008). Figure 20 shows how the information spreads 
through the network between the time slices.
In T5, the Airport Fire Officer (AFO) asks the Dispatch Center Kennemerland (DC_
SR_K) whether the tunnel can be cleared of trains. The Dispatch Center Kennemerland 
relays this message back to the ProRail Coordinator (ProRail_ EOC) who communicates 
this with his Railway Traffic Controller (RTC). The RTC asks the ProRail Coordinator if the 
fire department wants the trains to be moved out of the tunnel before the fire fighters 
enter. The ProRail Coordinator himself is unsure, based on the communication with the 
Dispatch Center, whether he can move the trains or whether there are already fire fighters 
in the tunnel, so the order to evacuate the trains is not given. This misunderstanding 
keeps reverberating in the following time periods. The information pathways between 
the actors with the information (RTC about the location of the trains and AFO about the 
location of the fire fighters) show that these actors are not connected directly to each 
other, but through the ProRail Coordinator and the Dispatch Center Kennemerland. This 
is distorting the communication in this time period.
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Figure 20. Information Pathways Between the Different Time Periods
In T6, the AFO is directly connected to the ProRail Coordinator. The ProRail Coordinator 
informs the AFO that there are three trains in tunnel tube 2A but none in tube 1A, which 
they can explore. The AFO acts on this information and orders his two fire engine crews 
(FE) to explore tube 1A. The ProRail Coordinator is now aware that he cannot move the 
trains because fire fighters are in the tunnel.
Next, in T7 and T8, the smoke clouds are spreading throughout the tunnel, causing 
a panic in the trains. The train drivers request the RTC to provide clearance to leave the 
tunnel immediately. However, the RTC and ProRail Coordinator are unsure where the fire 
fighters are located in the tunnel and do not execute this request. In T7, the fire fighters 
communicate to the AFO that they are surprised to still find trains in the tunnel, and they 
pull back to let the trains be evacuated. Finally, in T9, 45 min after the start of the fire, the 
trains are evacuated from the tunnel.
The analysis of the information pathways informs us about the influence of direct 
and indirect information flows. The indirect information flow between the AFO and the 
EOC in T5 and T6 shows how the lack of communications can seriously impede the 
emergency response. This can only be seen if we connect the direct and indirect flows 
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between the different time slices to each other, by using information pathways. This also 
provides a new perspective to study the connectedness between nodes across time.
5.7 Conclusion and Discussion
As it has been argued in the theory and methods sections of this paper, it is crucial to 
incorporate timeliness of information exchange in social network studies of emergency 
response to more accurately represent incident response dynamics. We have shown 
that the reconstruction of communication and interaction between parties relevant to 
the emergency operations is not necessarily straightforward (Abrahamsson et al. 2010). 
We have added to the network tools available and have shown different aspects of the 
dynamics of one specific emergency event.
In summary, we have now the following information derived from the chain of 
communication events. From the evolving structure of the communication network it was 
clear that in this brief time span, emergence was dominant over other models proposed 
by Topper and Carley (1999). With regard to the consistency of communication it can be 
made clear, on the basis of the two-mode analysis, that different time periods in the middle 
of sorting out the emergency exhibit characteristics of a distribution over actors, as well as 
critical moments in information flow. This corroborates the pervasive qualitative story of the 
incident report, which showed confusing periods during the incident. Our analysis adds a 
more detailed insight into the patterns and actors present during these critical moments.
Analysis of the information pathways shows how sequences of connections between 
actors are important to explain communication patterns in the network. Information pathways 
illustrate how the timeliness of communication can seriously impede the effectiveness of 
networked collaboration. Not only do direct connections between actors explain the flow 
of information, but also indirect paths appeared crucial to information flow and for the 
explanation of confusion in the network. Thus, in emergency situations, different phases 
with different communication problems and their effects need to be discerned.
The origin and spread of the misunderstanding in the network supports our 
argument that we need a more dynamic network toolset to understand the development 
of the communication network. Using just a single overall measure for centrality fails 
to depict the emergent nature in which the network develops. Actors are connected 
differently to each other in different time periods that result in irregular flows of information 
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through the network. In our case, this irregular synchronization of information allows 
the misunderstanding between fire fighters and rail traffic controllers to reverberate 
throughout the network.
The toolset provides us with a more fine-grained insight in when and where (in 
the network) sources for confusion emerged. As such, we indicated the patterns of 
communication that could help to analyze and counteract well-known problems in the 
first half hour of community response, such as employing the first acting responder as a 
coordinator instead of the strategically most logical alternative, given the situation (Berlin 
and Carlström 2011). Also, in reconstructing the information pathways we have shown in 
what manner various organizations were lacking access to information. Reconstructing 
information pathways that take the timeliness of information into account are essential to 
understand how the miscommunication could spread through the network.
Our solution to analyze the process of information sharing during emergency 
response operations has been to look at the temporary nature of the networks and 
characterize the manner in which this temporality influenced the availability of information 
in an actual incident situation. In this respect, timeliness is an important construct that can 
be analyzed further by looking at the information pathways in the network (Kossinets et al. 
2008). We approached the network analysis not solely through a static set of (centrality) 
measures, but stressed a more process-oriented analysis that better captures the dynamic 
nature of information sharing in crisis situations.
This does not only hold for the scientific community, but we also want to extend this 
message to the inspectorates and incident evaluation community. When network studies 
are incorporated in formal incident evaluation reports, these often lack recognition 
for incident response dynamics in their network depictions. The research report we 
analyzed in our case study is also an example of this. Employing only static (degree) 
centrality measures obscures the real incident dynamics and origin of the communication 
and coordination problems. Using static network analysis diagrams to represent the 
emergence of connections might lead towards the inaccurate assertion that improving 
the direct information flow is key to an effective response. Yet, the analysis of information 
pathways shows us that it is also important to better understand the indirect information 
flow, since indirect paths might prove to be the quickest connections across time periods.
There are of course also limitations to our work. First, we have used only one case 
study that functions as an illustration of our network toolset, and not as a validation of 
the toolset. This choice is justifiable, because each network tool is tested and used in the 
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fields of network studies and computer science. Therefore, we feel that the results of one 
case study can be useful in creating awareness of the issue of dynamics and for applying 
this emerging dynamic method in the field of emergency response studies. Still, applying 
the toolset to more and different kinds of cases is necessary to see whether new inferences 
can be made about incident response dynamics. First, this is necessary to shed a new 
light on the previous network analysis of incident response scenarios that we discussed 
in our theory section. Second, although there were no victims, the sensitivity of potential 
mass disruption of a densely traveled network and the anxiety with the potential incidents 
in a tunnel warranted a high level of scrutiny of which the report itself is a witness. This 
sensitivity might also have colored both the interviews with the actors in the crisis and 
the reconstruction. Third, in reconstructing we have solved the ambiguity in the crisis by 
independent coding of the information elements contained in messages. This certainly 
has influenced the way we could construct the networks. Lastly, in this unique case some 
of the processes seem to have been influenced strongly by the conflicting organizational 
and institutional positioning of key actors. The report has resulted in recommendations 
and ensuing actions that redress these imbalances. Moreover, train drivers are now better 
trained than before to handle tunnel incidents.
We have shown that a broader set of network tools can help to understand the 
dynamics of communication and collaboration in a crisis situation. Applying different 
methods from the social network analysis and network science toolbox may shed a 
different light on the role of actors and communication flows during emergency situations. 
Our toolbox adds to the useful insights that are already made with structural analysis of 
the organizational networks and the people working in them (Uhr and Johansson 2007). 
We add dynamics in our toolbox, while acknowledging the necessity to include elements 
such as trust and the ability to work with the information provided by others. Of course 
applying such an analysis to one case with limited complexity does not do justice to the 
potential. Moreover, in complex situations it might be helpful to address the emerging 
patterns of interaction with other tools such as those applied to large networks and 
addressing processes aspects, such as event-based analysis (Butts et al. 2007).
Incorporating Time Dynamics in Emergency Management Networks  |  167
5
5.8 Appendix 
Abbreviation Organization Function Main Responsibility in network 
(collector, aggregator or 
disseminator of information)
AAS Schiphol Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 
Employees
Collect information
AFO Schiphol Airport Fire Officer Aggregate information 
AMS Medics Airport Medical Services Collect information
CCS Schiphol Coordination Center Schiphol Disseminate information
DC_SR_K Dispatch 
Center
Dispatch Center Safety 
Region Kennemerland
Disseminate information
FE Fire service Fire engines Collect information
FF_HO Fire service Fire fighters Head Officer Aggregate information
FF_O Fire service Fire fighters Officer Aggregate information
KMar RMP Royal Military Police District 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
Collect information
KMar_CR RMP Royal Military Police Control 
Room
Disseminate information
NPSA Police National Police Services 
Agency in Driebergen
Disseminate information
NPSA_RP Railway 
police
National Railway Police Collect information
NS_SC NS Rail National Railway Command 
Center
Disseminate information
NS_Service NS Rail National Railway service 
personnel
Collect information
PSGR Passengers Passengers Collect information
ProRail_BO ProRail ProRail Back Office Disseminate information
ProRail_EOC ProRail Emergency Operations 
Coordinator
Aggregate information 
RTC1 ProRail Rail Traffic Controller 1 Disseminate information
RTC2 ProRail Rail Traffic Controller 2 Disseminate information
SRC ProRail Switching & Report Center Disseminate information
SRC_
Technician
ProRail Switching & Report Center 
Technician
Collect information
TD NS Traindriver(s) Collect information
Table 13. Summary of Main Actors 
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Number Actor Degree 
Centrality
Closeness 
Centrality
Betweenness 
Centrality
Eigenvector
1 FFE 0.692 0.923 0.036 0.242
2 TDs 0.769 1.000 0.116 0.245
3 AAS 0.692 0.947 0.033 0.243
4 KMAR 0.615 0.878 0.010 0.236
5 NS_R 0.615 0.878 0.010 0.236
6 PSGR 0.269 0.720 0.002 0.104
7 RTC1 0.115 0.486 0.002 0.005
8 RTC2 0.654 0.923 0.028 0.231
9 CCS 0.654 0.923 0.028 0.231
10 SRC 0.577 0.857 0.008 0.224
11 SRC_Technician 0.500 0.818 0.005 0.199
12 RTCs 0.500 0.818 0.005 0.199
13 KMAR_CR 0.500 0.818 0.005 0.199
14 AFO 0.692 0.923 0.036 0.242
15 AMS 0.615 0.878 0.014 0.228
16 ProRail_BO 0.615 0.878 0.014 0.228
17 DC_SR_K 0.654 0.900 0.017 0.240
18 NS_SC 0.615 0.878 0.010 0.236
19 NPSA_Driebergen 0.577 0.857 0.008 0.223
20 AAS_HD 0.577 0.857 0.008 0.223
21 ProRail_EOC 0.500 0.818 0.006 0.194
22 NPSA_RP 0.231 0.706 0.001 0.089
23 FF_HO 0.115 0.667 0.000 0.041
24 FF_O 0.115 0.667 0.000 0.041
Table 14. Two-Mode Actor Overall Centrality Measures
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1.a. T1 0-5 minutes 1.b. T2 6-10 minutes
1.c. T3 11-15 minutes  1.d.T4 16-20 minutes
1.e.T5 21-25 minutes 1.f. T6 26-30 minutes
Figure 21. Network Diagrams on 5 min Intervals
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6.1 Towards a fragmentation perspective  
on cross-boundary coordination
In my dissertation I have set out to discover how emergency officers coordinate across the 
boundaries of their organization in an environment that is characterized by rapidly changing 
conditions, increasing uncertainty, and spatial task dispersion. In this final chapter I will 
draw the line and consolidate the results. Based on the findings and conclusions from 
each chapter, I will answer the main research question: how do emergency responders 
coordinate the response operation across the boundaries of their organizations in fast-
paced environments?
The image that emerges from the previous chapters is that it’s impossible to 
reach coordination solely based on integration in emergency management. While in 
the preparation phase for emergencies organizational designs are created, plans and 
protocols are administrated, and centralized command structures are instated, a different 
modus operandi appears during the response operation itself. The four empirical 
studies in this dissertation show that coordination takes the character of emergent 
adaptation, deference to expertise, and spontaneous networking across the boundaries 
of organizations in response to changing interdependencies. In the introduction I have 
presented these aspects of cross-boundary coordination during the response operation 
as paradoxes: 
Integration logic Fragmentation logic
Designed Coordination Emergent Coordination
Administrative Coordination Expertise Coordination
Centralized Coordination Networked Coordination
Table 15. Coordination paradoxes
The analysis of the after-action reports from the Turkish Airlines crash combined with 
insights from current literature showed that these paradoxes emerge in the ‘hot phase’ of 
response operations. Now at the end of my dissertation they feature again, but with the 
deeper understanding now reached, I can add an important insight to them: the way in 
which emergency managers deal with the coordination paradoxes leads to the dominance 
of a fragmentation logic during the response phase. Initially emergency managers tend 
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to consider and prepare for the response phase coordination based upon an integration 
logic, in which the organizational structures for the response phase are designed, 
procedures are administrated, and centralized command structures are instated. Yet, this 
is contrary to the dynamics that are actually visible during this phase itself. 
Coordination during the response operation itself shows a different logic, in which 
emergent adaptations, the negotiation of the relevance of expert judgments, and the 
changing configuration of a multi-organizational response network features. This entails that 
during emergency response operations coordination is not a state of integration that can 
be achieved, but that coordination efforts are consciously aimed at segmentation to keep 
sufficient speed in the response operation. As adaptations are occurring at multiple locations 
simultaneously in a distributed environment, there is no clear ‘whole’, only a changing set of 
interdependent actions performed by different organizations in parallel. Therefore, treating 
cross-boundary coordination in the response phase of emergencies aimed at achieving one 
integrated set of actions seems to be an illusion. If integration is not possible under fast-
paced circumstances, how does the alternative of fragmentation look like? To answer this 
question I will return to the three paradoxes presented in the introduction that emerged 
from the analysis of the response operation to the Turkish Airlines crash.
6.1.1 The paradox between designed and emergent coordination 
The first paradox focuses on the tension between designed and emergent coordination. 
During coordination in the response phase emergency responders are confronted with 
unexpected events that challenge existing procedures, which forces officers in command 
to develop emergent solutions on-scene. This results in paradoxical demands between 
following the designed coordination mechanisms and opting for an emergent solution 
that deviates from the design. This paradox is visible in several chapters. In chapter two, 
the coordination practices of distancing and switching tactics can be regarded as ways 
for dealing with this paradox. The practice of distancing is employed to get an overview 
of the response operation. By distancing from the response operation the officers gained 
situational awareness, but at the expense of control. The practice of switching tactics is 
employed to adjust to changing conditions. Switching between different tactics allowed 
the officers to operate and retain control in a changing environment by adapting to 
unexpected events, but at the cost of predictability. These two coordination practices 
show that in this study emergent coordination is occurring at the level of authority and 
at the level of action. In an attempt to manage loss of control and predictability in an 
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environment in flux, the officers engaged in boundary work. They actively reinstated 
functional and normative boundaries allowing them to regain control and reestablish 
standards. Based on this boundary work the officers succeeded in initiating fast action 
by momentarily putting interdependencies with other officers from different response 
organizations on hold. By reinstating normative and functional boundaries in the course of 
coordinating, the officers established separate pockets of control and restructured ad-hoc 
adaptations. However, paradoxically, by reinstating functional and normative boundaries 
the officers contributed to the very fragmentation they were trying to overcome. 
In contrast to the findings of chapter two, in which the officers reinstated boundaries 
to retain speed of action, in chapter three attempts of boundary bridging are more 
central as here the analysis focuses on the common operational picture that participants 
developed in field command meetings. In this chapter we witness a different dynamic in 
the boundary work of the officers, one that takes place at the level of information sharing. 
The officers take time to develop their common operational picture in the form of a shared 
representation to support the coordination process: a boundary object. The common 
operational picture is a map of the disaster scene constructed by the officers to depict 
the progress of the response operation. During the construction of this boundary object 
the officers employed four different coordination modes to suit the crossing of a particular 
kind of boundary they experienced: selecting tasks, phasing action, standardizing 
information and transforming understanding. The timeline charts in this chapter showed 
that the boundary object is tailored differently to bridge the functional, spatiotemporal, 
normative, or knowledge boundaries the officers’ experienced. Still, the attempts to 
bridge these boundaries were often not successful, as the officers ran into coordination 
issues when tailoring the configuration of the boundary object from different modes. As 
a result the officers failed to bridge the different kinds of boundaries they experienced. In 
contrast, when the officers tailored the boundary object from similar coordination modes, 
it supported the coordination process because the configuration of the object matches 
the boundaries the officers’ experience. These findings indicated that successful cross-
boundary coordination does not depend on the capacity of the boundary object per se, 
but on the relationality between the modes, temporal adjustment of the boundary object, 
and the intentions that are incorporated in its users coordination modes for tailoring the 
configuration of the boundary object. 
What stands out from this analysis is that cross-boundary coordination is not defined 
by the capacities of the boundary object itself, but by the emergent coordination process 
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through which the boundary objects’ configuration is tailored to match the boundaries 
the officers experienced. It signals that during emergent coordination new task sequences 
are negotiated in action that deviate from designed coordination mechanisms. This is 
supported by the subsequent Markov analysis, which indicated that the dominant mode 
in which the boundary object was tailored is phasing action. The coordination mode 
of phasing action is used by the officers to create an ad-hoc working order to manage 
changing interdependencies. This suggests that in the fast-paced environment of 
emergency response most cross-boundary coordination efforts are focused on arranging 
task sequences, which is an act of segmentation. Especially in fast-paced environments, 
segmenting tasks is a more effective solution to divide work, instead of using the boundary 
object to foster shared understanding, which takes too much time. 
In sum, both empirical studies showed the importance of emergent coordination 
processes that deviated from designed coordination mechanisms. Emergent coordination 
is a layered process that takes place at the level of authority, action, and information 
sharing. The paradox between designed and emergent coordination is managed 
by the officers in command through a negotiation process that occurs either during 
action on scene, or during field command meetings with help of a boundary object. 
This shows that negotiation is an essential way of coping with the paradox between 
designed and emergent coordination. Emergent coordination unfolds in a landscape of 
changing interdependencies in which different sorts of boundaries appear that need to 
be renegotiated time after time to adapt to changing contingencies. This continuous 
renegotiation creates equivocality that is part of a situation in flux. In this situation in 
flux cross-boundary coordination can only be a temporal synchronization process that 
finds its roots in the negotiation of boundaries the officers’ experience. This is central 
to a fragmentation perspective on coordination. Therefore, cross-boundary coordination 
processes in fast-paced environments cannot result in a coherent, univocal set of actions, 
but are characterized by the temporal negotiation of boundaries that emerge during the 
coordination process. 
6.1.2 The paradox between administrative and expertise coordination
The second paradox originating from the analysis of the Turkish airlines crash in the 
introduction focuses on the tension between administrative and expertise coordination. 
When the officers encountered unknown circumstances on scene, expertise judgment 
often coincided with existing administrative procedures. Common understanding is 
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partly codified in the logic of administrative procedures, but when experts reassess the 
requirements for coordination this understanding becomes contested in action. The 
findings in the first three empirical chapters indicated that when expertise coordination 
occurred across organizational boundaries, common understanding was usually 
compromised. In chapter two the coordination practice of demarcating expertise was the 
common response for dealing with unknown situations. When the officers encountered an 
unknown situation their initial aim was to assess the danger. While each organization has 
specific procedures for dealing with dangerous situations, the assessment was generally 
left to the officer with the most expertise. For instance, in situations with hazardous 
materials this was the Fire Officer, but for assessing the amount of wounded the Medical 
Officer claimed expertise. The officers actively reinforced knowledge boundaries 
to demarcate the expertise which reaffirmed their capacity to assess the situation. 
Reinforcing knowledge boundaries is an important element of expertise coordination, 
which kept speed in the operation by limiting the necessity for other officers to intervene 
or question the response. Yet, the indirect consequence of this practice is that when other 
officers are kept out of the assessment, or literally away from a dangerous area for their 
own safety, it limited their own capacity to assess the situation. As these officers do have 
to develop their own understanding of the situation to coordinate the response of their 
own units, employing this practice led to a multiplicity of interpretations and issue specific 
coalitions. Multiplicity and coalitions are central aspects of coordination viewed from a 
fragmentation perspective. This shows that common understanding can be compromised 
when officers coordinate by reinforcing their knowledge boundaries. 
Also in chapter three, when the officers engaged in developing shared repre-
sentations in the form of boundary objects in field command meetings, discussions about 
dangerous situations were high on the agenda. To develop a shared understanding of the 
situation the officers engaged in the coordination mode of transforming understanding. 
What stands out from this chapter is that this coordination mode is only successful for 
developing shared understanding when the officers are engaging in this mode collectively 
to bridge the same knowledge boundary. The analysis of the transitions between the 
coordination modes during the configuration of the boundary object, however, shows 
that usually different modes are employed simultaneously, to suit different coordination 
needs. Tailoring the boundary object for coordination is thus a relational process in which 
actors engage with different intentions. Moreover, developing shared understanding 
during the coordination process often took too much time when fast action was required, 
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so the officers preferred to engage in modes of selecting tasks or phasing action so that 
they could coordinate their own units first. When officers tailored the boundary object 
from these different coordination modes, transforming understanding was often not 
successful and multiple interpretations featured that increased equivocality. Equivocality 
is an important feature of a fragmentation perspective, as it leads to a flux of issue specific 
coalitions. It shows that even when collectively engaging in developing boundary objects 
to support cross-boundary coordination, different coordination modes feature which 
make it difficult to reach shared understanding in field command meetings under high 
time pressure. When equivocality arises and multiple interpretations feature different 
issue specific coalitions form that share a specific understanding of the situation. This 
is not necessarily negative because expertise coordination does enable fast action in 
turbulent environments. Furthermore, expertise coordination stimulates the officers 
to negotiate the relevance of their perspective between issue specific coalitions when 
confronted with differences that compromise the coordination of the response operation. 
As such, expertise coordination takes place at the level of information and knowledge 
sharing, and finds its roots in the negotiation of interpretations.
In chapter four I zoomed in on these negotiations between the officers in and around 
field command meetings, based on the concept of the ‘trading zone’. In this chapter I have 
linked the idea of boundary work to the formalization of crisis information management 
systems, based on a sensemaking perspective. To manage the information sharing 
during emergency response operations information systems are created that support 
the development of a Common Operational Picture that can be shared and updated 
at different command centers. Yet, the technology is implemented from a warehouse 
logic that focuses on the storage of information, but neglects the sensemaking process 
that is crucial for the enactment of coordination. The findings in this chapter illustrate 
that during emergency response operations there is often only a limited understanding 
of what consequences information has for the action and needs of other professionals. 
Information is not univocal, but equivocal and incorporates different professional 
languages and is often incomplete as the situation it represents is in constant flux. In 
addition, information must be made actionable to its different users to support the inter-
organizational coordination efforts in emergency response. 
Moreover, one representation of information can dominate others. Information from 
other emergency response organizations is put aside for sake of fast coordination, but 
this can also marginalize the problems other response organizations face. Disciplines and 
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experts acquire dominance over other disciplines through building a central narrative 
about the response operation. However, this narrative can obscure the perspectives of 
other response organizations that are also relevant. The narrative analysis of meetings 
that seemingly lead to integration in the first place, actually shows negotiations and 
contestation during the coordination process. These differences are not always solved or 
recognized, illustrating some of the power dynamics impeding coordination. Swiftness is 
required to attend to urgent coordination issues, but not taking enough time to negotiate 
the meaning of information and be reflexive about its consequences can boomerang 
the coordination issue in its full strength. Therefore, cross-boundary coordination during 
emergency response operations is about interpreting information and negotiating its 
relevance for different professions in a ‘trading zone’. 
6.1.3 The paradox between centralized and networked coordination
The third paradox originating from the analysis of the Turkish airlines crash in the intro-
duction focuses on the tension between centralized and networked coordination. During 
response operations the number of actors that need to coordinate their actions often 
expands beyond the span of control that is arranged in centralized command structures. 
While command structures provide clear lines of authority for the three key emergency 
response organizations of fire department, police, and medical services, other actors are 
not included in these formal lines of command. When the number of additional actors 
increases centralized coordination lies under increasing pressure as decisions by other 
stakeholders, taken at different locations, become increasingly relevant. Therefore, centra-
lized coordination is no longer fully possible as the response network exceeds the span of 
control of the officers in command. As such centralized coordination insufficiently accounts 
for the decentralization and flexibility that is required during the response operation.
While the network expands beyond the borders of the centralized system, the 
command structures themselves remain a dominant coordination mechanism, as new 
partners are attached as liaisons to the command structure. The paradox between 
centralized and networked coordination entails that while the response systems expands 
beyond the span of control from the centralized system, it requires a network governance 
model with a different coordination logic. Networked coordination is based on mutual 
dependencies and trust instead of formal commands, as the organizations in the network 
have limited authority on the actions of others. This leads to coordination tensions, 
as the key response organizations stick to formal command structures and command 
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meetings, but also become increasingly dependent on the expertise and capacities of 
other organizations that operate outside the command system.
This paradox features most dominantly in chapter five. Here I have zoomed out 
towards the network level in the analysis of the multi-organizational response to a fire in 
the Schiphol train tunnel. The network analysis indicated that the network of response 
organizations segments at different points in time. As the network segments, various 
organizations were lacking access to information at different times during the response 
operation. In these situations boundary work cannot take place, simply because the 
actors fail to reach each other. The result is that during this incident five full passenger 
trains are stranded in a train tunnel full of smoke, because the power supply is cut off to 
allow the fire fighters to explore the tunnel. The misunderstanding between the railway 
services and the fire department emerged because the Airport Fire Officer on scene 
was dependent on coordination with the railway emergency operations coordinator, but 
he was not directly included in his network at crucial decision moments. This situation 
shows the limited applicability of centralized coordination during response operations, 
because crucial partners are often situated outside the centralized command system. 
Even when these actors are included in the network as liaison officers, their operational 
work practices and procedures tend to deviate, which requires a different coordination 
approach. In networked coordination actors have to recognize crucial interdependencies 
that need to be coordinated, and subsequently negotiate their interest to align their 
actions. Networked coordination thus takes place at the level of information sharing 
combined with the application of authority or jurisdiction.
6.1.4 Coordination paradoxes as part of a fragmentation perspective
The combination of all four empirical studies shows the multi-layeredness and dynamics 
of coordination processes during emergency response operations. Coordination is multi-
layered because it incorporates coordination of activities, information, expertise, and 
relations. A combination of these layers that constitute the overall coordination processes 
is visible in each chapter. While each empirical study is zooming in on different aspects 
of coordination, in practice these coordination processes occur simultaneously and have 
a direct impact on each other, like we witnessed in the analysis of the Turkish Airlines 
crash from the introduction. As such, coordination occurs in an environment that is prone 
to escalate and where continuous adaptations towards a changing situation are required. 
Based on these dynamics, cross-boundary coordination cannot be seen as one integrated 
Conclusion  |  181
6
whole, or as comprised of several sub-units performing separate tasks in parallel, but 
has a fragmented nature in which interdependencies are continuously renegotiated and 
temporally synchronized. These negotiation processes occur in an ambiguous environment, 
where different sensemaking processes lead to equivocality, that gives rise to a multiplicity 
of interpretations, and a flux of issue specific coalitions. During the coordination process 
different practices and coordination modes are employed, and their relevance negotiated, 
which to a large extend determines whether officers in command engage in attempts 
to bridge or reinforce the boundaries they are experiencing. Therefore, cross boundary 
coordination in fast-paced environments is characterized by a temporal and relational 
negotiation process. This is a multi-layered process because it occurs at the level of 
authority, information, action, and knowledge at the same time. It is temporal because 
interdependencies keep changing. It is relational because interdependencies are redefined 
in action based on the intentions and needs of the actors that are coordinating. Therefore 
I regard cross-boundary coordination as: a temporal and relational process of negotiating 
what kind of interdependencies shape the interaction beyond a perceived boundary. 
In sum, my analysis of cross-boundary coordination during response operations 
show that designed, administrative, and centralized coordination cannot be dismissed, 
but that these elements are taken up and adopted differently in action. Cross-boundary 
coordination in action takes the shape of an emergent, expertise based, and networked 
process. This leads to tensions during the coordination process that I have described 
as paradoxes. These paradoxes are not occurring in isolation, but they also influence 
each other. The combination of dealing with these three paradoxes leads to a situation 
in flux and stresses the importance of a fragmentation perspective for explaining cross-
boundary coordination in fast-paced environments.
Although I present a fragmentation perspective as an important alternative for 
the integration perspective on coordination, its normative associations are generally 
negative. To be regarded as a serious alternative for coordination the term ‘fragmentation’ 
requires amelioration: the transformation of a negative connotation to a positive one. 
Fragmentation implies breakage, disconnection, incompleteness, and disjointedness. 
These are terms that presuppose that an entity once whole has since been broken up and 
to seek integration is therefore the natural solution to return to the status quo (Chisholm 
1989). This requires bringing together the broken parts and disjointed connections 
into one harmonious whole. Such a normative connotation thus sees a fragmented 
organizational arrangement as something to be fixed.
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If we take the negative connotation of fragmentation away and treat it as the status quo, 
it’s possible to advance a description of cross-boundary coordination that corresponds 
much closer to the actual coordination dynamics during emergency response operations. 
During an emergency response operation a multitude of organizations coordinate by 
constituting a loosely coupled network of emergent interactions. During this coordination 
process actors make sense of the situation based on deference to expertise, and 
negotiate the relevance of their perspectives to retain sensitivity to operations. In 
addition, they actively switch between bridging and reinforcing their boundaries to 
balance between overcoming differences and retaining speed of operations. When 
I rearticulate the coordination dynamics during a response operation in terms that are 
central in my dissertation, the system in need of remedy is absent. This framing requires 
attention, precisely because it matches much closer to the reality emergency responders 
experience. Therefore, it’s important not to dismiss the fragmentation that we witness as 
failure, because it is an inevitable aspect of organizing under conditions typical for crises 
and disasters. Let’s not close our eyes to something that has a negative connotation that 
stems from the misapprehension of the coordination process in the response phase itself. 
To understand the coordination process in fast-paced and dynamic environments in its full 
complexity, we need to move beyond the integration bias, and accept that fragmentation 
is a necessity to cope with the complex set of changing interdependencies that arise 
during emergencies. This has important implications for how coordination needs to be 
conceptualized in both organizational, management, and disaster management theories.
6.2 Theoretical Implications for Disaster Management5
A parallel can be drawn between the discussion on coordination based on integration 
and fragmentation, and the current paradigms in traditional sociological disaster 
management literature. The leading paradigm in disaster management has generally 
been Chaos, Command and Control. The assumption is that disasters cause ‘Chaos’, 
5 Parts of this section are published in: 
Boersma K., J. Ferguson, P. Groenewegen, J. Wolbers. 2014. Beyond the Myth of Control: toward 
network switching in disaster management. In: S.R. Hiltz, M.S. Pfaff, L. Plotnick, and A.C. Robinson 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response 
and Management ISCRAM 2014. University Park, Pennsylvania, USA, May 2014: 125-129
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which can be put under ‘Control’, by employing a strict centralized ‘Command’ structure 
(Quarantelli and Dynes 1977). The command and control paradigm is rooted in military 
doctrines, and known for its hierarchical decision capacities and clear role structures, 
and is a powerful instrument for accomplishing tasks characterized by repetition and 
uniformity. This paradigm has been firmly established in disaster management agencies 
and as a planning logic for a response operation. It has become the underlying rationale 
during emergency response operations. 
However, based on extensive sociological research into the behavior of affected 
populations and response management during disasters and crisis situations this control 
model has proven to be unrealistic decades ago (Dynes 1994, Quarantelli 1997). Recent 
discussions in disaster management indicate that approaching disaster response merely 
through command and control (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977) is too limited (Moynihan 
2008, Dynes 1994). The command and control paradigm insufficiently accounts for the 
decentralization and flexibility that are required during response operations in a technically 
complex and turbulent social environment. In a response to these limitations, a different 
paradigm developed that finds its roots in networked operations, instead of top-down, 
bureaucratic organizing: Continuity, Cooperation and Coordination. This alternative model 
is based on the ‘continuation’ of societal and organizational structures after a disaster occurs, 
despite the severe pressure on these structures. As the capabilities of network partners 
generally remain in place, responses must be ‘coordinated’ with different stakeholders, on the 
basis of ‘cooperation’ to deal with the disaster effects (Dynes 1994, Helsloot and Ruitenberg 
2004). A virtue of this paradigm is its decentralized flexibility, but it can underestimate the 
consequences of slow consensus building in a turbulent environment where fast decisions 
are necessary to organize coherent and sustainable response operations (Moynihan 2009). 
Despite the advances that have been made, the command and control paradigm is 
still alive and well (Suparamaniam and Dekker 2003). Most of the literature that is based on 
the command and control paradigm centers around command structures that resemble the 
logic of the United States ‘Incident Command System’ (ICS). In the United States, FEMA 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency) invested profoundly in developing Incident 
Command Systems as a temporal structure to prevent the next ‘disaster-after-the-disaster’ 
(Bigley and Roberts 2001, Moynihan 2009). In ICS the common response for treating 
ambiguity is resolving it through standardization by defining roles and standard operating 
procedures. The result is that, as ICS are implemented nation-wide in the US by standardizing 
command systems, it loses the very flexibility that was proclaimed as its initial success during 
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the Californian bush fires (Boersma et al. 2014). Hence, almost a decade after Hurricane 
Katrina exposed the shortcomings of the American command system to deal with a large-
scale disaster, an elaborate movement towards integration is exactly the development 
we witness. This is problematic as my results, focusing on relatively bounded situations, 
are in line with studies that show that in crisis management unambiguous command is 
needed for the timely direction of the involved units, but at the same time flexibility, on-
the-spot decision making and adaptation towards the continuously changing situation are 
required (Bigley and Roberts 2001, Moynihan 2009, Comfort 2007, Majchrzak et al. 2007). 
By preparing only for standardization and administration, the command paradigm in the 
incident command system neglects the importance of flexibility and ongoing adaptation.
While the limits of the command and control paradigm have been documented on 
several occasions, many studies of disaster management operations still reason based on 
the command and control paradigm. In these studies the search is for technical solutions 
that help to overcome the shortcomings of this paradigm (Comfort 2007, Bharosa et 
al. 2010). There is a strong belief in information technology for delivering the correct 
information to the command layers, thereby increasing situational awareness for bringing 
crisis situation under control (Comfort 2007). The information system are often based 
upon geographical plots, or Geographical Information Systems (GIS), combined with 
digital situational reports that help to foster overview and ‘control’. But, like I have argued 
in chapter 4, these studies are based on an information warehouse principle, in which the 
central premise is that gathering accurate information will enable effective coordination. 
I contribute to these debates by showing that the information warehousing logic 
leads to the ‘myth of control’, which assumes that chaos can be controlled by instating 
command structures which require sufficient information to build a complete overview 
of the response operation (Boersma et al. 2014). I have shown that this is problematic 
because people have different and fluctuating strategies of representing information, 
and actively negotiate its meaning. Therefore, technological information sharing 
platforms are not the solution, but might be at best the input for negotiation processes 
that take place in the trading zone. Furthermore, during the negotiation of information 
dominant narratives might develop that promote a certain strategy, expertise might raise 
knowledge boundaries, and segmentation in emergent networks might obstruct the flow 
of information. Thus, the implication for disaster management literature is not seeking 
for more ways to harness control, but to look for ways in which the negotiation processes 
taking place in the trading zone might be supported. 
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6.3 Theoretical Implications for Organization  
and Management Science
I will argue for three implications for Organization and Management theories based on 
the three paradoxes between designed and emergent coordination, administrative and 
expertise coordination, and centralized and networked coordination. Combined these 
paradoxes show that cross-boundary coordination is based on a negotiation process, 
which has a relational and temporal dynamic.
6.3.1 Emergent Coordination: the importance of temporality during negotiation processes
Coordination has often been treated in the literature as pertaining to an ‘end state’, in 
which the result of coordination was when interdependencies have been managed and a 
generally accepted working order has appeared (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). By treating 
coordination not as a state to be achieved, but as a temporally unfolding process I have 
given insight into coordination dynamics. Rapid changes and time critical processes that 
occur during emergency response operations call for its users to quickly perform the 
actions that are negotiated in the field. This makes the process of coordination highly 
contingent on the current state of events. As the emergency response operation unfolds 
and new information is received, the agreements made moments ago must be adapted, 
and as such, new information needs arise that stoke the coordination process. These 
demands for flexibility, speed, and uncertainty that organizations face, make them focus 
on adaptive capacity rather than specialized routines (Kellogg et al. 2006). 
When operating in an environment that is characterized by fluidity, a flexible form of 
organizing is required to deal with processes which never settle down and are in constant 
flux (Schreyögg and Sydow 2010) or are chronically ‘unfrozen’ (Weick 1977). Fluidity 
enables organizations to adapt to changing environments through reconfiguration of 
structures and practices. Studies that stress the role of fluidity in organization also reflect 
on the necessity of certain points of stabilization. Schreyögg and Sydow (2010) argue that 
organizations cannot be totally fluid, but require at least minimal structure and routines. 
For its members to understand the ongoing adaptations to the changing environment the 
organization must establish and maintain some sort of interpretative action patterns. One 
of the main findings from the analysis of cross-boundary coordination processes during 
emergency response operations is that these interpretive action patters are made up from 
a negotiated order of issue specific coalitions. The outcome of negotiation processes 
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provides a certain level of consolidation in an environment in flux through moments of 
stabilization. This implies that the negotiations during cross-boundary coordination are 
necessary to provide the moments of temporal closure that consolidate the coordination 
process. As this closure is only temporal and occurs simultaneously at different locations 
around the incident site, it leads to distributed action and deviating interpretations. 
Negotiation is a key aspect of emergent coordination (Vaughan 1999, Galison 1997). It 
enables actors to recognize and explore their different positions, and develop a temporal 
working order. This enables them to act without full consensus, because developing 
common understanding takes too much time. 
6.3.2 Expertise Coordination: the importance of relationality in boundary work
Previous studies have shown that during emergency response operations sensitivity to 
operations and deference to expertise are key aspects of reliable performance (Weick 
and Sutcliffe 2011). In my dissertation I have shown that these elements of expertise 
coordination are relational processes, i.e. they are effectuated by an ongoing interaction 
between different coordination modes and practices. The concept of relationality is to 
some extend taken up in the coordination debate in the form of relational coordination 
(Gittell 2002). However, the way in which Gittell (2002) treats relational coordination is 
rather static, as she places it next to other coordination mechanisms based on an infor-
mation processing logic. In the information processing logic coordination mechanisms 
are categorized from having a low to a high information processing capacity (Lawrence et 
al 1976, Van de Ven et al. 1976). Procedures have a low information processing capacity, 
and forms of consultation have a high information processing capacity. Relational coor-
dination is characterized by Gittel (2002) as having a high information processing capacity. 
This, however, still treats relationality based on its information processing capacity, 
which can be assessed and measured. This offers a static and objectivistic approach on 
relationality, and it neglects emergent and more dynamic relations. 
The findings in my dissertation show a more dynamic notion of relationality, which 
cannot be assessed in advance, but arises emergently during the contextualized cross-
boundary coordination process at the disaster site. Boundaries form an important aspect 
of why coordination can be temporarily obstructed in multi-organizational settings. 
Relationality is key in this process, as actors experience different boundaries during the 
same coordination process, and therefore can employ different coordination approaches 
simultaneously. This occurs either through employing different coordination practices, 
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enacting different coordination modes in the configuration of a boundary object, or 
negotiating the relevance of information. These findings imply that expertise coordination 
is not just about how boundaries are perceived, but especially important is how actors 
together shape the coordinative action beyond a perceived boundary. In accordance 
with a more dynamic approach on relationality, boundaries are relational and change 
as they are perceived differently by different actors at different times. An important 
implication in this dissertation is that during the coordination process boundaries become 
contested and their relevance is negotiated based on how they are perceived. Next to 
the dominant idea that boundaries have to be bridged to coordinate interdependencies, 
I found that also reinstating boundaries is central to coordination (Faraj and Yan 2009). 
Officers reinstated the functional or knowledge boundaries when they reclaimed their 
accountability or expertise over certain parts of the response operation. This made other 
officers aware of these boundaries because differences in responsibility or knowledge 
were sharpened. Therefore when reinforced, these boundaries became buffers through a 
strategy of disengagement to limit the actions of other officers. Generally, such strategies 
are considered to harm the coordination processes, as this limits common understanding 
and predictability (Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). However, the findings in my dissertation 
indicate something different. For coordination in fast-paced environment boundary 
reinforcement can in fact be an effective strategy, because it enables actors to make 
faster decisions by temporarily keeping others out and thus putting interdependencies 
‘on hold’. Cross-boundary coordination is thus not only about boundary spanning, but 
also very much about keeping boundaries in place to force fast action. 
6.3.3 Networked Coordination: the importance of time dynamic for assessing coordination 
in networks
Temporality is an important aspect during emergency response operations. The way 
in which actors experience time pressure influences at what level they will engage in 
coordination processes. Especially in social network studies in disaster management 
time is a crucial factor in the analysis of network dynamics. However, most disaster 
management network studies depict network relations without making specific references 
to time (Kapucu 2005). Response networks are normally represented as the summary of 
relations that occurred over the course of time. Yet, the fast-paced coordination dynamics 
during emergency response in chapter 5 show the importance of relating communication 
and coordination network dynamics to the time when they took place. The time slice 
188  |  Chapter 6
analysis of the Schiphol tunnel fire response shows that the network evolved and changed 
significantly over the course of time. This implies that overall (centrality) measures have 
a low explanatory value for studying coordination in fast-paced environments, as these 
centrality values vary significantly across time. This is important, because this entails that 
network analytical explanations about if actors can or cannot be reached, and through 
which pathways information can flow, need to be based upon shorter sequences of 
interaction. Analyzing these temporal structures can provide detailed insights into the 
evolution of the network. It’s important to note that in the dynamic environment of 
emergency management the network is continuously in a state of becoming, therefore its 
structural primacy is only temporal and will rapidly change and become obsolete.
In addition, the analysis of network dynamics in chapter 5 indicates that indirect 
ties in relation to their occurrence in time are crucial to understand the coordination 
dynamics. This adds an important insight to the common premise in social network 
analysis of disaster response operations: centrality measures that are based upon direct 
connections miss out coordination dynamics in reference to time that are vital in response 
networks. In the Schiphol tunnel fire response network emergence is the dominant 
mode in network formation. This entails that network connections are unstable and show 
a dynamic of connection and disconnection over time during the construction of the 
network. It means that when looking at the flow of information based on information 
pathways, a combination of indirect paths that occur earlier in time can be quicker for 
information sharing as a direct link between nodes that occurs in a later stage. When 
calculating centrality measures without the reference of time, these possibilities for 
indirect information sharing are not taken up in the analysis. When taking in account the 
network relations according to the time when they took place, it shows a more dynamic 
and varied network formation process. One can see the emergence of different hubs and 
cliques, in which the interaction shows a flux of irregular synchronizations of information. 
Consequently, my analysis implicates that indirect pathways in relation to time need to 
be analyzed in addition to direct ties, as these may elicit alternative information pathways 
across the network over time.
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6.4 Implications for Practice
Not only does a fragmentation perspective on cross-boundary coordination offer a new 
perspective for academic debates on cross-boundary coordination, it also has important 
implications for practice. As is often argued in formal incident evaluations: coordination is 
the problem and we require better coordination. When we return to the official incident 
investigations of the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) and the Inspectorate of Justice and Safety 
(IoJS) on the Turkish Airlines crash used in the introduction, we can recognize the claim 
that coordination issues appear due to the shortcomings in preparation for and the 
execution of coordination. 
First, both the DSB and the IoJS indicated there was a lack of structure in the 
command meetings, because an insufficient use of uniform action protocols and 
standardized situational reports resulted in a failure to coordinate. According to the IoJS 
the emergency response was too dependent on the performance of individual actors. 
In addition the DSB noted that there is a lack in the design of national standards for the 
command of medical response and trauma teams. Second, the IoJS indicated a lack of 
integrated information management, because incident data was collected on multiple 
sites and in multiple teams. The IoJS noted that the current work practice did not entail 
that these data are collected and shared on a central location in order to inform all actors 
and teams (IoJS 2009a, p.28). Third, both investigation boards noted problems with the 
registration of victims. The IoJS described in detail how changing triage numbers did not 
reach the Operational Leader, and therefore were not communicated to the Regional 
Medical Commander. The advice of the IoJS was to increase the centralization of the 
communication towards the Operational Leader. In summary, both investigation boards 
indicated a lack of centralized control during the operation, and a failure to commit to 
administrative protocols and victim registration procedures. To prevent these problems 
from reappearing in future emergency response operations, a better integration of 
interdependencies is required. As a response to these failures, the Safety Board and the 
Inspectorate claimed that more effort is needed for preparation and execution of inter-
organizational standards. 
When looking for the terms highlighted in italic in the previous paragraph, one 
can see a consistent pattern emerging. All problems and solutions suggested by the 
investigation boards are based upon the central tenets of the integration perspective: 
design, administration and centralization. One can try to overcome problems of integration 
190  |  Chapter 6
by advocating more sophisticated integration, but in the end it’s very likely that it leads to 
the repetition of the same tautological conclusions in future incident reports. In general, 
the emergency management field does not sufficiently recognize that integration is very 
hard to achieve in a complex and changing environment, and might not be the most 
feasible way forward.
The results of my PhD dissertation indicate that if we can accept that emergent, 
expertise and networked coordination are key characteristics of emergency response 
operations, one can start to prepare and tune the emergency response organization 
to practice coordination that accounts for fragmentation. Still, it is difficult to provide 
recommendations to deal with fragmentation, because one of the hallmarks of 
fragmentation is that its corresponding coordination practices and processes are 
emergent, they develop temporally and relationally on scene. Thus preparations do 
not lie in creating structures in advance, but to train for adaptive capacity that can be 
utilized in the ‘hot’ response phase. The results of my dissertation provide several clues 
to the underlying processes that can be trained for. Based on the findings in the previous 
chapters I will discuss five practical implications:
6.4.1 Allow for coordination based on fragmentation
One of the most important insights from my research is that striving for coordination 
based on integration is not viable in the fast-paced environment of emergency 
management. In the preparation phase a lot of attention is paid to procedures, roles 
and command structures, but as the results of my dissertation show these partly become 
obsolete during the response operation. In addition to designed, administrative, and 
centralized coordination, emergency managers have to prepare for emergent, expertise, 
and networked coordination. This requires a different training that helps to develop 
skills for negotiation, boundary work, and the management of expertise. Together these 
aspects can help to increase the flexibility and adaptive capacity that is required for 
cross-boundary coordination in fast-paced environments. Emergency managers have to 
account for fragmentation as it is an inevitable part of managing a response operation. 
This requires more recognition of the inevitability of separate pockets of control, and a 
multiplicity of interpretations that emerge because of ad-hoc adaptations. Preparing for 
coordination based on fragmentation will increase awareness amongst field commanders 
and officers about the importance of emergent adaptations, expert judgment, and 
changing network relations.
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6.4.2 Train for Negotiation and Reflection in Field Command Centers. 
In the exercise sessions I studied the focus often was on increasing the speed of the 
decision-making processes, and on limiting the duration of the overall meeting. In effect, 
different interpretations of the same information did not always show, because narratives 
were not completely told, or there was not enough recognition of each other’s concerns 
and needs. The analysis in my dissertation indicates that coordination problems will 
appear later in the response operation if shared sensemaking processes are neglected. 
Time is required to allow for reflection and to explicate and negotiate the different 
interpretations of the situation. Negotiation is a crucial aspect of coordination in fast-
paced environments, because during the negotiation process standpoints and positions 
of actors become clear. This forces the actors that are negotiating to take account of each 
other’s position, which can stimulate better awareness of their motives and demands. 
Reflexivity is an important aspect of this negotiation process to increase awareness 
for each other’s positions. Enhancing reflexivity can be trained for, based on asking 
questions as: what am I doing, what can I do, and why do I do that? As negotiations in 
chapter 4 showed, failing to see the interdependencies with other organizations leads to 
coordination issues. Reflecting on exercises and training sessions by asking questions of 
reflexivity allows emergency managers to learn to value the relevance of the perspectives 
of others. My recommendation is to allow for moments of reflection in the field command 
meetings to allow officers in command to explicate differences in interpretation. Although 
I recognize that it is difficult to find a balance between promptness and the quality of 
decision-making, taking time to negotiate different interpretations can actually support 
coordination in the long run, and allow the officers in command to win time in the end as 
misunderstandings might be prevented. 
6.4.3 Frame the capacities and limitations of a Common Operational Picture
In the last decade we can witness a sharp increase in the development of technological 
tools that visualize the progress of the response operation, that are based upon the idea 
of a Common Operational Picture. The Common Operational Picture (COP) is often 
introduced as a complete and univocal solution: there is one common operational picture 
that gives a complete overview of the emergency response operation. Yet, the results 
in my dissertation indicate that the COP cannot adhere to the promise of providing the 
perfect overview, this is a ‘myth of control’. Instead, my findings indicate that information 
shared on a Common Operational Picture is interpreted differently: coordination is 
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embedded in sensemaking and negotiation. The COP functions as a boundary object 
that allows the crisis managers to negotiate the relevance of the information and their 
understanding of the situation. This idea of the COP as a trading zone, is important to 
share. The COP is not a solution that provides a complete overview, but a helpful tool in 
supporting negotiations to develop shared sensemaking. Information is not univocal, but 
equivocal and needs to be negotiated in order to support the coordination process. It’s 
important to share this framing, and to avoid too mechanistic approaches of the COP that 
might lead to the myth of control.
6.4.4 Limit the number of officers in command.
Developing a shared situated understanding is an emergent process that can only 
take place at the incident site. Still, learning the basics of what it takes to coordinate 
emergency response operations can also take place in advance by shared training sessions 
and developing knowledge about each other’s routines and procedures. Yet, building 
sufficient knowledge and experience about emergency management operations, stands 
in sharp contrast to the large number of officers in command that can perform stand-
by duties. To develop a more trained and experienced set of officers in command that 
already know each other, the number of officers that can perform stand-by duties need 
to be reduced.
6.4.5 Take stock of information flows and network dynamics
In recent incident reports communication patterns are being analyzed by depicting 
them in network relations, and by developing visual representations of these structures. 
The advantage of visualizing the communication dynamics is that it gives an idea of 
the communication network throughout the incident. Still, results in chapter 5 of my 
dissertation indicate that using static or universal network analysis diagrams to represent 
the emergence of connections is not accurate enough to depict the network dynamics 
during the response operation. Static network analysis might lead towards the inaccurate 
assertion that improving only the direct information flow is key to an effective response. 
It’s important to note that the analysis of information pathways shows that it is especially 
important to understand network connections in relation to time. When incorporating 
time dynamics it becomes possible to map the indirect information flow, since indirect 
paths might prove to be the quickest connections across time periods. Therefore, it is 
crucial to depict time dynamics in network analysis of emergency response operations.
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6.5 Methodological reflection
In this dissertation a have used a diverse set of methods to capture the coordination 
dynamics during emergency response operations in different ways. As each research 
method has a specific focus and is tuned towards a particular goal, these choices also 
come with a cost. I will reflect on the consequences of three important methodological 
choices I have made.
First, in three empirical studies I have taken an actor perspective and observed and 
interviewed officers in command about the challenges they experienced when practicing 
cross-boundary coordination. This gave insight into coordination practices, on scene 
conversations, actions, and considerations. While zooming in on the cross-boundary 
coordination dynamics between different actors, I lost overview on the other sections of 
the response operation. In that respect it’s important to consider that the actor view is 
also a partial view. As I learned in retrospective interviews, these micro level observations 
are –alone– not sufficient to explain the coordination dynamics, since responders are 
also limited by access to information and their involvement in decision making cycles. 
Therefore, I chose in a later stage to develop a combination between detailed micro level 
data and studying coordination patterns on a network level. 
Second, in different chapters I have reflected on the use of exercise observations 
versus real-life response operations. Scenario-based exercise sessions approach the 
reality of the disaster response operation as they start with a predefined script, but 
continue in any possible direction as the events unfold. These exercises differ from 
training sessions in that events are not interrupted for moments of reflection. Still, the 
scenarios are removed from reality and therefore may lack the same emotional aspects, 
decision impact and in some cases delay in the recruitment of units (Latiers and Jacques 
2009). The advantage of studying field exercises is that it allowed me to roam around 
the terrain freely, shadow officers in command, and listen in on their conversations. This 
would have been impossible to do during real-life response operations, since I would 
be in the way and risk jeopardizing the response operations itself. To account for the 
difference between exercises situations and real-life response operations I interviewed 
the officers in command in retrospect and asked them to reflect on their involvement in 
recent emergencies. In addition, I have studied disaster reports from the Turkish Airlines 
crash, Schiphol train tunnel fire, Moerdijk Chemical Fire, and others, to compare the 
coordination dynamics I observed with the analysis made in these reports. The similarities 
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between the coordination issues described here, and the once I witnessed in the field 
exercises convinced me important parallels could be drawn, despite of the differences in 
pressure and decision impact.
Third, I have researched coordination in emergency response in the Netherlands. 
While there are mid-sized emergencies in the Netherlands on a regular basis, there are 
(luckily) no big disasters. Still, it’s important to ask what the scope of my findings is in 
relation to studies on larger disasters. Disaster management literature generally analyses 
and draws lessons from response operations to large-scale catastrophic events, such as 
the earthquake in Haiti, the hurricanes Katrina and Sandy in the United States, and the 
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (Morris et al. 2007, Solnit 2010, Tierney et al. 2006, Van 
de Walle et al. 2015). During these disasters ‘regular’ disaster response structures, such as 
Incident Command Systems, are likely to be compromised. In all of the previous disasters 
the main challenge was that a large part of the local emergency response infrastructure 
was also hit and taken out by the disaster. Needless to say the response operation then 
comes to lie in the hands of other social structures, such as emergent citizen communities, 
or even international NGO’s and United Nations involvement. These response dynamics 
occur at a total different scale as the response dynamics witnessed in the Netherlands. Still, 
the micro level and network dynamics that I have witnessed can be of importance, even 
to these situations. In large-scale catastrophic events actions still have to be coordinated 
by the remaining networks of communities and the responding international community. 
Studies of colleagues in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan indicated that, for instance, local 
on-site coordination meetings were set up, that showed similarities to the negotiations in 
field command meetings I have studied (Van de Walle and Comes 2015). This indicates 
that field command coordination dynamics are, at heart, not that different, despite the 
larger magnitude of a disaster. Even in these meetings the same issues are at stake, 
such as problems with situational awareness, information overload, and coordination 
neglect. Therefore, despite of the large differences in the magnitude of the situation, 
I am convinced that analyzing coordination dynamics in field command meetings on a 
conceptual level, in situations with a smaller scale, also helps to build knowledge that 
is relevant for explaining coordination dynamics at the incident level during large scale 
disasters. In addition, fragmentation might be an even more relevant perspective during 
these large-scale catastrophic events, as the response operation literally takes place in 
different geographical areas, and is therefore very difficult to coordinate. 
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6.6 Directions for future research
Now that I have introduced a new perspective on cross-boundary coordination, and 
argued for its relevance, a new research area appears: how does research into coordination 
based on a fragmentation perspective look like? I will discuss 3 directions for further 
research to explore this issue: process analysis, negotiation, and involving citizens in new 
forms of governance.
6.6.1 Processual studies 
One of the central premises in my dissertation is that coordination needs to be regarded 
as a process. By using a process ontology (Tsoukas and Chia 2002), I departed from the 
idea that all coordinative action consists of an ongoing flow of interactions. Therefore, 
one of the most important directions for further research is to increase our toolset to map 
and explore the nature of these coordination processes (Langley 1999). In this dissertation 
I have used a mixed methods approach to uncover submerged patterns in conversations 
streams with the help of Markov analysis and phase charts. In addition, I have uncovered 
the importance of time in the constitution of communication patterns in an evolving 
emergency response network. The direction for further research is based on these 
analytical grounds. To uncover patterns in the coordination processes it is crucial to look 
for new process methods to acquire a deeper understand of how and why coordination 
unfolds over time and how boundaries are at play in this process. 
An interesting notion is to see how coordination unfolds at different locations 
simultaneously and how coordination processes influence each other. As I collected most 
of my data on my own, I only collected observational data about processes in depth 
at one location in a field command setting. It would be intriguing to collect data on 
different locations simultaneously to see how processes unfold across different locations 
and how they influence patterns of distributed action. As one of the main characteristics 
of emergency response coordination is that actions are distributed and different 
understandings emerge, a crucial way forward is to unravel this flux. In this flux coordination 
hotspots arise and disappear again at different locations, based on changing issue specific 
coalitions. Discovering why and how coordination hotspots emerge at different locations 
could be an exciting way forward to see how emergent coordination comes into being. In 
these coordination hotspots the underlying patterns of emergent coordination might be 
detected by employing different sorts of process methods (Langley 1999).
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6.6.2 Pushing forward on the political dimension: negotiation in the trading zone. 
On several occasions in the empirical studies power dynamics were at play. In my attempt 
to unravel the dynamics of coordination in-action during emergency response operations 
I have emphasized negotiations in the trading zone that are used to give meaning to 
information and ongoing coordination processes. Instead of the execution of coercive 
power along hierarchical lines, in the trading zone we witness a more subtle power 
play that manifests as a continuous struggle for meaning. The trading zone is a space 
where actors influence the coordination processes by opting for a specific framing of the 
situation, based on their cognitive and social resources at that time (Vaughan 1999). As 
the power dimension represents an ongoing and mutually determined interplay between 
various actors, certain framings are continuously redefined during the negotiations for 
coordination. In this framing process actors include or exclude others in the coordination 
process, and use the discussions to legitimate and/or de-legitimize their actions. 
In other words, multiple dimensions of power are visible in the coordination process, 
for example coercion and agenda setting. Yet, according to Lukes (2005) power is at 
its most effective when least observable, therefore he introduces the third dimension 
of power: "the power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances 
by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences" (Lukes 2005, p. 11). During 
the negotiations in the trading zone we can witness power dynamics at all these three 
levels: e.g. first, letting the field commander decide what actions to take; second, giving 
room to specific actors to frame the incident and determine priorities; and third, letting 
a certain framing about safety dominate the incident response operation so that it is 
literally stopped by other emergency management organizations without any hesitation. 
In addition, the perception of boundaries are a key aspect of negotiation during cross-
boundary coordination processes. As the relevance of certain types of boundaries 
are negotiated in the trading zone, they may or may not be depicted on a Common 
Operational Picture. Therefore, deciding why and when to bridge or reinforce boundaries 
during cross-boundary coordination might be an additional key aspect in unraveling the 
power dynamics of cross-boundary coordination. 
In future studies such a layered power analysis can help in unraveling the political 
dimension of emergency response coordination, because power is exercised at multiple 
levels and manifests in more and less observable modes. The concept of the trading zone 
can figure as a vocal point that embodies the space of legitimation for decision making 
processes, and a space of framing, where novel configurations of ideas and norms about 
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the response operation arise. Therefore, the exchange of information in the trading zone 
is not only about dialogic coordination (Faraj and Xiao 2006), but is also a discursive 
practice (Foucault 1980) that is based on a historically and culturally specific set of rules 
for organizing and producing different forms of knowledge. As we learned in previous 
chapters, negotiation is central to cross-boundary coordination in action. The next step 
is to analyze in more detail which (unobtrusive) power dynamics are at play that influence 
the outcome of the negotiation processes.
6.6.3 Smart Governance: moving beyond the boundaries of emergency management 
organizations 6 
Like the analysis of the Schiphol tunnel fire in chapter 5 already showed, as emergencies 
become larger multiple sets of stakeholders become involved in the response operation. 
During disasters, emergent and unforeseen collaborations appear, especially when 
demands are not met by existing response organizations, or when responses are 
insufficient or inappropriate (Drabek and McEntire 2003). This idea is also embedded in 
the Continuity, Coordination and Cooperation paradigm, which entails that emergency 
management organizations have to make use of existing social structures and collaborate 
with other stakeholders, local communities, and citizens during the response operation. It 
is based on the experience that very often your neighbor is the first emergency responder 
on scene.
Emergent networks fill an important void that cannot be filled by command and 
control approaches to disaster response (Tierney et al. 2001). Namely, they comprise 
adaptive, networked partnerships that did not exist before the disaster struck, and can 
continuously adapt to an environment in flux. At the same time, emergent networks are 
also characterized by fleeting membership, dispersed leadership, unclear boundaries, 
and unstable task definitions (Majchrzak et al. 2007). One characteristic of emergent 
community responses which makes it hard to manage is that these initiatives emerge in 
a situation where different types of networks co-occur. Emergent community networks 
have varying functions (e.g. logistics, shelter, aid), and have different origins (e.g. 
6 Parts of this section are published in: 
Boersma K., J. Ferguson, P. Groenewegen, J. Wolbers. 2014. Beyond the Myth of Control: toward 
network switching in disaster management. In: S.R. Hiltz, M.S. Pfaff, L. Plotnick, and A.C. Robinson 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response 
and Management ISCRAM 2014. University Park, Pennsylvania, USA, May 2014: 125-129
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neighborhood, religious, local (sports)clubs and partly (re)organize in response to disaster, 
or are reconfigured by key emergent actors to interconnect with one another. Their 
initiatives are therefore difficult to recognize, govern, and support from within existing 
response organizations. 
As a result, the functioning of distributed, emergent coordination is not yet fully 
understood (Topper and Carley 1999). Including local communities in the response network 
and facilitating their efforts is nonetheless a critical aspect of disaster governance. Local 
involvement potentially enables professional disaster managers to harness the capacities 
of existing societal structures, leaving local communities to deal with tasks that managers 
are overburdened with, and allowing managers to focus on other relevant activities. To 
deal with disaster effects responses must be coordinated by heterogeneous stakeholders, 
in cooperation with citizens (Dynes 1994, Helsloot and Ruitenberg 2004). Communities 
thus become part of the disaster manager's resources, since they know how to solve local 
problems much better than outsiders.
Still, in general, emergency response agencies tend to resort to means of control 
for protecting the established social structures and to restore public order (Quarantelli 
and Dynes 1977, Tierney et al. 2006). The paradoxical result is that the resilience 
of communities during disasters tends to be hampered, rather than supported by 
government responses, due to their quest for control (Solnit 2010). To impose an 
authoritarian structure on a disaster is limiting, because it fails to integrate the overall 
community response. While the command and control remains a powerful instrument for 
accomplishing tasks characterized by repetition and uniformity, it insufficiently accounts 
for the response capacity of communities. 
Overall, the consequences of citizen participation are still highly unknown (Roberts 
2011). How to govern the disaster management operation together with all kinds of social 
stakeholders, including emergent citizen communities, is an open research issue, that I 
will attempt tackle as a Postdoctoral Researcher in the coming four years in the NWO 
awarded smart governance research program: "Enhancing smart disaster governance: 
Assessing the potential of the net-centric approach".
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Summary
When disaster strikes the common perception is that chaos arises and emergency 
response organizations need to put the situation under control by employing a 
centralized command structure. ‘Command and Control’ is the dominant paradigm for 
many disaster theories and for the response organizations themselves. However, current 
studies in disaster sociology have proven this idea of control to be unrealistic. Disasters 
generally do not end up in chaos. Instead the capabilities of societal and organizational 
structures remain in place, whilst being put under pressure. The relief effort thus requires 
coordination and cooperation with different stakeholders in a network of responding 
organizations. Therefore the following question is central in this PhD dissertation: how do 
emergency responders coordinate the response operation across the boundaries of their 
organizations in fast paced environments?
The results of this research indicate that while in the preparation phase for 
emergencies organizational designs are created, plans and protocols are administrated, 
and centralized command structures are instated, a different coordination approach 
appears during the response operation itself. In four empirical chapters I build up an 
account which illustrates that cross-boundary coordination during emergency response is 
based upon emergent adaptation, deference to expertise, and spontaneous networking 
across the boundaries of organizations in response to changing interdependencies. Crisis 
managers require these practices to deal with unexpected situations and unknown threats 
they encounter in emergency response operations.
On a theoretical level this offers counter intuitive evidence to conceptualize 
coordination processes in fast-paced environments. The dominant coordination approach 
articulates that coordination is achieved through integration based on three conditions: 
accountability, predictability and common understanding. In contrast, my results indicate 
that crisis managers cope with the fast paced environment by engaging in coordination 
processes that are rooted in conditions of fragmentation. Fragmentation often has a 
negative connotation of disconnectedness and failure. Yet, in this dissertation I show 
that fragmentation is not necessarily negative, and matches much closer to the reality 
experienced by crisis managers on the disaster scene. This is the case as crisis managers 
are inclined to reinforce the functional, knowledge, and normative boundaries they 
encounter, instead of bridging them. This allows them to demarcate their responsibilities, 
engage in continuous adaptation, and employ their expertise, to keep sufficient speed 
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and flexibility in the response operation. 
Fragmentation is not only identified in the crisis managers’ work practice, but it also 
appears during a second study focusing on the drawing of maps of the disaster scene. 
Maps of the disaster scene are commonly used in command centers to develop situational 
awareness. The professional term for these maps is a common operational picture. The 
common operational picture can be regarded as a boundary object, because it allows 
crisis managers to bridge the boundaries between them by engaging with the object. By 
looking into the language crisis managers use to discuss their interdependencies whilst 
drawing maps, four different coordination strategies were identified: selecting tasks, 
phasing action, standardizing information, and transforming understanding. A process 
analysis of these strategies revealed that crisis managers employ different coordination 
strategies. The dominant coordination strategy is based upon segmentation, hinting to a 
fragmentation logic. 
Similar coordination issues become visible when zooming in on sensemaking 
processes during the construction of the common operational picture in a third study. 
In crisis management the common operational picture is increasingly incorporated into 
more advanced information systems. This development is rooted in an information 
warehousing logic. It holds that information can be collected, sorted, and exchanged 
in an accessible and univocal form. In practice, however, professionals interpret similar 
information differently as they make sense of the information based on their different 
professional backgrounds. The analysis of three crisis situations indicates that different 
ways of sensemaking trigger a negotiation process. Negotiation is an important process 
in crisis management, because it allows crisis managers to clarify their position and 
specify their needs, without depending on shared ideas, interest, and norms. This is 
difficult to accomplish in fast-paced environments. As a result of negotiations different 
narratives are constructed, each with their own value. However, dominant narratives can 
only be negotiated if sufficient time is taken to reflect during command meetings. If crisis 
managers neglect this process and forget to address all interests, coordination problems 
and misunderstandings are likely to resurface in later phases of the incident.
Finally, fragmentation also becomes visible in the fourth study at the level of 
networks. This study focuses on the analysis of the response operation to a fire in the 
Schiphol train tunnel. The network analysis shows that the network segments on multiple 
occasions during the response operation. Although many network study are based on a 
accumulation of network interaction across a certain time period, this study shows that 
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a response network undergoes major changes during much shorter time periods. This 
stresses the necessity to incorporate time dynamics in network studies of emergency 
response operations. In addition, the segmentation of the network again illustrates the 
role of fragmentation during coordination processes, this time at the level of network 
collaboration.
Combined, these four empirical studies challenge the dominant role of integration 
as condition for coordination in crisis management. In this dissertation I show that not 
only integration, but especially fragmentation is an alternative approach for coordination 
under time pressure. Hereby, this research expands current organizational knowledge 
on coordination and disaster management. Designing structures and developing 
technological solutions does not offer a way out for coordination under pressure, but 
their efficacy depends for a large extend on their configuration in action. Still, it is also 
important not to dismiss integration, as it features so dominantly in the preparation 
phase and in the logic of command doctrines. Integration and fragmentation can be 
regarded as two different coordination approaches that have a paradoxical relation. The 
paradox is that while integration is often the way emergency management organizations 
prepare for response operations, in practice crisis managers based their coordination on 
a fragmentation approach that allows them to employ their expertise, and increase speed 
and flexibility during the operation. 
This also has important implications for practice. An analysis of after-action incident 
reports reveals that recommendations are often based upon an integration approach. 
Improvements of structures, protocols and procedures are regularly advised, while the 
research findings in this dissertation indicate that a different coordination logic is used 
on the disaster scene. Plans and protocols are required to activate the emergent crisis 
response structure, but cross-boundary coordination also requires a fragmentation 
approach to harness the expertise driven, flexible mode of operations that is practiced 
by crisis managers.
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Als de samenleving wordt geconfronteerd met een ramp is een gebruikelijke aanname dat 
rampenbestrijdingsorganisaties de chaos van de ramp onder controle moeten brengen 
door daadkrachtige commandovoering. ‘Chaos, Command & Control’ is dan ook het 
dominante paradigma in onderzoek naar rampenbestrijding en vormt daarnaast de basis 
voor de sturing binnen veel hulpverleningsorganisaties. Echter, recentelijk sociologisch 
onderzoek toont aan dat dit idee van beheersing tijdens rampen onrealistisch is. Rampen 
ontaarden over het algemeen niet in chaos. De capaciteiten van getroffen organisaties 
en maatschappelijke actoren blijven juist vaak in tact, hoewel ze onder druk komen te 
staan. Rampenbestrijding vergt dan ook veel meer samenwerking en coördinatie in 
een complex, snel veranderend netwerk van partijen. Daarom staat de volgende vraag 
centraal in dit proefschrift: hoe coördineren crisis managers hulpverleningsoperaties over 
de grenzen van hun organisatie in snel veranderende omgevingen? 
De resultaten van dit onderzoek suggereren dat waar er in de preparatie fase veel 
aandacht uitgaat naar het ontwerpen van organisatiestructuren, het vastleggen van plannen 
en protocollen, en het bekrachtigen van gecentraliseerde commando structuren, er tijdens de 
hulpverleningsoperatie zelf een andere benadering van coördinatie ontstaat. In vier 
empirische hoofdstukken bouw ik een gelaagde analyse op die laat zien dat coör dinatie op 
de ramp plek zelf gebaseerd is op een proces van emergente adaptie, het voegen naar elkaars 
expertise en spontane netwerksamenwerking in reactie op steeds veranderende afhankelijk-
heden. Crisis managers hebben deze praktijken nodig om in te spelen op onverwachte 
situaties en onbekende dreigingen die zich voordoen tijdens hulpverleningsoperaties.
Op een theoretisch niveau levert deze analyse contra-intuïtief bewijs op om coör dinatie 
processen in snel veranderende omgevingen anders te conceptualiseren. De dominante 
benaderingswijze van coördinatie is gebaseerd op integratie, waarbij coördinatie mogelijk 
wordt geacht onder drie condities: verantwoording, voorspelbaar heid, en wederzijds 
begrip. De resultaten uit mijn onderzoek laten echter een contrasterend beeld zien, 
waarin crisis managers omgaan met een snel veranderende omgeving door coördinatie 
processen te hanteren die gebaseerd zijn op condities van fragmentatie. Fragmentatie 
heeft vaak een negatieve connotatie die doet denken aan elementen die uit elkaar vallen 
en mislukken. Echter, beargumenteer ik in dit proefschrift dat coördineren op basis van 
fragmentatie niet per se negatief is, en veel beter past bij de realiteit die crisis managers 
op de rampplek ervaren. Dit komt omdat crisis managers geneigd zijn om de functionele, 
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kennis en normatieve grenzen die zij tijdens de coördinatie met anderen ervaren, te 
versterken in plaats van te overbruggen. Dat stelt ze in staat om verantwoordelijkheden 
af te bakenen, zich continue aan de situatie aan te passen, en hun expertise in te zetten, 
zodat ze voldoende snelheid en flexibiliteit in de operatie kunnen houden. 
Fragmentatie doet zich niet alleen voor in de werkpraktijk van crisis managers, maar 
komt ook naar voren tijdens een tweede studie die zich richt op het tekenen van kaarten van de 
rampplek. Kaarten van de rampplek worden veel gebruikt in crisis centra om een situationeel 
overzicht te ontwikkelen. In vakjargon staat dit bekend als een ‘common operational 
picture’, of een gemeenschappelijk operationeel beeld. Conceptueel gezien vormt het 
common operational picture een ‘boundary object’, omdat ze crisis managers in staat stellen 
om via interactie met het object grenzen tussen elkaar te overbruggen. Uit het taalgebruik 
waarmee crisis managers hun wederzijdse afhankelijkheden bediscussiëren tijdens het 
schetsen van de locatie van de rampsituatie kwamen vier coördinatie strategieën naar voren: 
taken selecteren, actie faseren, informatie standaardiseren en begrip transformeren. Een 
procesanalyse van deze strategieën laat zien dat crisis managers verschillende coördinatie 
strategieën hanteren. Hierbij is een sequentie van strategieën dominant die tot segmentatie 
leidt. Dit duidt wederom op een onderliggende fragmentatie logica. 
Tijdens het inzoomen op betekenisgevingsprocessen tijdens het construeren van 
het gemeenschappelijk operationeel beeld in een derde studie deden zich vergelijkbare 
coördinatie problemen voor. In crisis management wordt het operationele beeld steeds 
meer geïncorporeerd in geavanceerde informatie systemen. Echter, deze ontwikkeling 
komt voort uit een magazijn logica. Dit houdt in dat de onderliggende overtuiging bestaat 
dat informatie kan worden verzameld, gesorteerd en uitgewisseld in een toegankelijke en 
uniforme vorm. In de praktijk, daarentegen, wordt informatie door verschillende actoren 
anders geïnterpreteerd als ze betekenis aan deze informatie geven op basis van hun 
professionele achtergrond. Uit de analyse van drie crisis situaties blijkt dat de verschillende 
manieren van betekenisgeving leiden tot onderhandelingen. Onderhandeling is een 
belangrijk proces in crisis situaties omdat hierdoor de positie en behoeften van ver-
schillende actoren zichtbaar wordt, zonder dat men zich hoeft te beroepen op een gedeelde 
ideeën, belangen en normen. Dit is namelijk moeilijk te bewerkstelligen als er weinig tijd 
is. Het resultaat van onderhandelingen in crisis situaties is dat er verschillende narratieven 
ontstaan, elk met hun eigen waarde. Dominante narratieven kunnen alleen ter discussie 
gesteld worden als er voldoende tijd wordt genomen om te reflecteren. Als blijkt dat 
hieraan voorbij wordt gegaan en niet alle belangen van de crisispartners worden behartigd, 
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ontstaan er in een later fase van het incident coördinatie problemen en misverstanden.
Tot slot wordt fragmentatie in de vierde studie nogmaals zichtbaar op het gebied 
van netwerken. In deze studie staat de analyse van de hulpverleningsoperatie tijdens een 
brand in de Schipholtunnel centraal. De netwerkanalyse laat zien dat het netwerk over de 
tijd heen meerdere keren segmenteert. Ondanks dat veel netwerkstudies zich baseren op 
een cumulatie van netwerk interacties over een totale tijdsperiode, blijkt uit deze studie dat 
het netwerk in kortere tijdsperiodes grote veranderingen ondergaat. Dit laat de noodzaak 
zien om tijdsdynamiek mee te nemen in de analyse van crisis management netwerken. 
Daarnaast illustreert de segmentatie van het netwerk wederom de rol van fragmentatie in 
coördinatie processen, deze maal op het niveau van netwerksamenwerking.
Gecombineerd ontkrachten deze vier empirische studies de dominante rol van 
integratie als conditie voor coördinatie tijdens crisis management. In dit proefschrift laat 
ik zien dat niet alleen integratie, maar juist fragmentatie een alternatieve benadering 
is voor coördinatie onder tijdsdruk. Hiermee verruimt dit onderzoek de kennis over 
coördinatie en management van crisis situaties. Het ontwerpen van organisatiestructuren 
en het ontwikkelen van technologische oplossingen bieden geen directe uitweg voor het 
oplossen coördinatie dilemma’s, maar de doelmatigheid van coördinatie hangt juist in 
grote mate af van de configuratie van structuren in actie. Toch is het ook belangrijk om 
integratie niet af te doen als onnodig, omdat het nog steeds zo’n dominante rol heeft 
in het preparatieproces en in commandovoering doctrines. Integratie en fragmentatie 
kunnen beschouwd worden als twee verschillende coördinatie benaderingen die een 
paradoxale relatie hebben. De paradox is dat waar hulpverleningsorganisaties zich vaak 
voorbereiden op rampenbestrijding middels integratie, in de praktijk de crisis managers 
coördinatie baseren op een fragmentatie benadering die hen in staat stelt om hun 
expertise te benutten en snelheid en flexibiliteit te waarborgen gedurende de operatie. 
Dit heeft ook belangrijke praktische implicaties. De analyse van evaluatie rapporten 
van incidenten laat zien dat aanbevelingen over het algemeen gebaseerd zijn op een 
integratie benadering. Verbetering van structuren, protocollen en procedures worden 
met regelmaat geadviseerd, terwijl de onderzoeksbevindingen in deze dissertatie juist 
laten zien dat op de rampplek zelf een andere coördinatie logica wordt gehanteerd. 
Plannen en protocollen zijn nodig om de rampenbestrijdingsstructuur goed te kunnen 
activeren, maar coördinatie over de grenzen van de betrokken hulpverleningsinstanties 
heeft een fragmentatie benadering nodig om de flexibele en expertise gestuurde modus 
van opereren te ondersteunen die gehanteerd wordt door crisis managers. 
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